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Foreword
The Committee on Human Factors was established in Octo-
ber 1980 by the Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and
Education of the National Research Council. The committee is spon-
sored by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences, the Office of Naval Research, the Air Force Office of Scien-
tific Research, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
the National Science Foundation, and the Army Advanced Systems
Research Office. The principal objectives of the committee are to
provide new perspectives on theoretical and methodological issues,
to identify basic research needed to expand and strengthen the sci-
entific basis of human factors, and to attract scientists both within
and outside the field for interactive communication and performance
of the necessary research. The goal of the committee is to provide
a solid foundation of research as a base on which effective human
factors practices can build.
Human factors issues arise in every domain in which humans
interact with the products of a technological society. To perform its
role effectively, the committee draws on experts from a range of scien-
tific and engineering disciplines. Members of the committee include
specialists in such fields as psychology, engineering, biomechanics,
physiology, medicine, cognitive sciences, machine intelligence, com-
puter sciences, sociology, education, and human factors engineering.
Other disciplines are represented in the working groups, workshops,
and symposia. Each of these contributes to the basic data, the-
ory, and methods required to improve the scientific basis of human
factors.
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Preface
The Panel on Pilot Performance Models for Computer-Aided
Engineering was formed by the National Research Council (NBC) in
response to a request from the Army Advanced Systems Research
Office. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Ames Research Center asked the NRC to conduct a study that would
provide advice and guidance in a number of areas important for the
Army-NASA Aircrew/Aircraft Integration (A 31) program which is
developing a prototype of a human factors computer-aided engi-
neering (CAE) facility for the design of helicopter cockpits. This
study was conducted under the auspices of the Committee on Hu-
man Factors within the National Research Council's Commission on
Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education.
The objectives of the study were to review current models of
human performance; to identify those that would be most useful for
the CAE facility; to identify limitations of the models; to provide
guidance for the use of these models in the CAE facility, and to
recommend research on models and modeling that might overcome
existing limitations. The panel focused its attention on the visual
and associated cognitive functions required of pilots in the operation
of advanced helicopters, which often fly under low-visibility and low-
altitude conditions. By limiting the scope of the study in this
way, the panel was able to address an important domain of human
performance models (vision and associated cognition) in some depth
and to gain an understanding of the prospects and problems of using
such models in a CAE facility for helicopter design. In addition, the
xv
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Part I
1
Introduction
This report discusses a topic important to the field of computa-
tional human factors: models of human performance and their use in
computer-based engineering facilities for the design of complex sys-
tems. It focuses on a particular human factors design problem—the
design of cockpit systems for advanced helicopters—and on a par-
ticular aspect of human performance—vision and related cognitive
functions. By focusing in this way, the authors were able to address
the selected topics in some depth and develop findings and recom-
mendations that they believe have application to many other aspects
of human performance and to other design domains.
The report is addressed to human factors professionals and oth-
ers interested in human performance models, human factors design
methodology, and design tools. It describes some of the key vision-
related problems of helicopter flight and cockpit design as a way of
introducing the reader to the design domain on which the report
is focused. It discusses issues in the integration of models into a
computer-based human factors design facility and the use of such a
facility in the design process, and it reviews existing models of vision
and cognition with special attention to their use in a computer-based
design facility. It concludes with a set of findings about the adequacy
of existing models for a computational human factors facility and a
related set of recommendations for research that is needed to provide
a stronger foundation of models upon which to base such a facility.
A. model is a representation or description of all or part of an
object or process. There are many different types of models and they
are developed for a variety of reasons. In a design context, models can
be considered to be a "thing" of which we ask questions about some
aspect of a design. Models of human performance have long been used
in the human factors design of complex systems to answer questions
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Analytic models represent human performance mathematically,
typically in terms of algebraic or differential equations. Both the
form of the equations and their parameters are of interest to the
psychologist and the designer. Analytic models often provide concise
descriptions and even "laws" governing human behavior that are of
enormous value in the design process.
Some models attempt to represent specific human processes,
usually by simulation, and as a result are known as process models.
Others attempt to predict only human output without claiming to
be good representations of the human processes involved, and are
known as performance models. Models of the processes used by the
human to accomplish the task under study are more powerful than
those that just describe the observed external behavior (outputs)
because they are more likely to be applicable to a wider range of
tasks and conditions.
Most models in the literature are descriptive in the sense that
they were developed to describe observed human behavior, perfor-
mance, or processes. A few, however, are prescriptive in the sense
that they prescribe how the human should perform if he were to
behave in a rational way that takes into account the information
available, the constraints that exist, the risks, rewards, and objec-
tives. Some rational models are based on strong theories of optimal-
ity, such as those that have been developed in the fields of control,
decisions, and signal detection, and are known as ideal observer or
ideal operator models. We will often refer to prescriptive models as
rational action or normative models.
Until fairly recently, most human performance models were nu-
merical or quantitative and lent themselves to classical, numerically-
based computation. As a result of progress in artificial intelligence
and cognitive science, a substantial body of non-numerical, quali-
tative, but calcuiable models, has been developed. These models
are necessary for representing cognitive behavior. Although they are
qualitative, they are computational and, as such, are amenable for in-
clusion in a computer-based engineering facility. Many of the reviews
of vision and cognition in this report address qualitative models.
Models can represent behavior at different levels and with differ-
ent amounts of detail. There are mission-level models that attempt
to encompass the whole mission or major mission segments by repre-
senting human behavior at a high level of abstraction. Such models
are concerned, typically, with issues such as the workload on the
human operator. Models can address entire human subsystems, such
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as vision or motor control, or be focused on a part of a complex task
or of a human subsystem. There is the goal of building models that
tie together detailed models of several human subsystems to obtain a
"complete" representation of human behavior in a complex system.
Ilowever, most comprehensive models contain little detail about spe-
cific aspects of human performance, reflecting the harsh reality of the
trade-off of breadth against depth.
Most existing models of human performance were developed with
a simple task in mind, but there have been numerous efforts to build
more comprehensive models that attempt to represent more complex
behavior, often by assembling and integrating simple task models
within a uniform framework. As a result of decades of research, a
large collection of models now exists for many aspects of human
perceptual, motor, cognitive, and biomechanical performance. The
extent to which these simple task models can be usefully integrated
to represent more comprehensive behavior depends upon the nature
of the gaps in the coverage of the models and on the completeness of
the linkages among them. Both of these problems are addressed in
the reviews of models in Parts II and III of this report.
Much of the progress in modeling that has occurred in recent
years has been due to the remarkable increase that has occurred
in the power of mainframe and desk top computer systems and in
the ability to network large numbers of computers together. This
increase in computational power has made more comprehensive and
complete models, as well as large scale simulation models and models
of cognitive processes, practical. This has made it easier to apply
models of all types to the problems of system analysis and design,
and has fostered advances in software technology, most notably in the
areas of human interface design and in the construction of very large
modular software systems that are critical to dealing with complex
models.
The advances in computer t ,3chnology have also made possi-
ble the development of very important computer-aided engineering
(CAE) tools for a number of different disciplines such as mechanical,
VLSI (very large scale integrated), electronic, architectural, and air-
craft design. These tools have greatly increased the efficiency of the
design process and the quality of the resulting designs, largely by en-
abling the designer to work rapidly, construct a model of the system
being designed, and carry out computations on that model to predict
and analyze its performance under a wide range of conditions.
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It is not surprising, given all these developments, that grow-
ing interest has emerged in applying computational modeling and
engineering techniques to the human factors design of complex sys-
tems. Underlying this interest is the belief that from the collection
of existing computational models of human performance, a suffi-
ciently comprehensive set could be assembled in a CAE facility to
make feasible a computer-based human factors design methodology
for complex human-machine systems. Such systems could be used to
formulate and evaluate alternatives for allocating functions to human
operators, for the design of human-machine interfaces, and for the
design of machine characteristics.
In this technological context a joint program was initiated by
the Army and the NASA Ames Research Center in 1985 (Corker,
Davis, Papazian, and Pew, 1986) with the objective of developing a
computer-based methodology and a set of tools focused on the design
of advanced helicopter cockpit systems, a challenging example of hu-
man factors design of particular interest to these organizations. This
program, called All (Army-NASA Aircrew/Aircraft Integration), is
developing a prototype human factors computer-aided engineering
(HF/CAE) facility to investigate problems of computational design
methodology and to demonstrate the utility of the methodology and
of the facility itself. The HF/CAE facility will incorporate models
of human performance together with other data and tools useful for
human factors design and will make them accessible to trained design
practitioners for use in actual design problems. The project hopes to
demonstrate that it is possible for designers to explore many more
design alternatives than they can now and to make better evalua-
tions of these designs before they are committed to the costly and
time-consuming construction of prototype hardware and software.
Although the All CAE system is directed toward the design of ad-
vanced helicopter cockpit systems, the system itself and the concepts
and technology upon which it is based have broad application to the
development of computational human factors design methodology
for complex human-machine systems.
In 1985 NASA requested the Committee on Human Factors of
the National Research Council to conduct a study to provide advice
and guidance for the development of the human factors aspects of the
HF/CAE facility. The purpose of the study was to review current
models of human performance, identify those that would be most
useful for the purposes of the CAE facility, identify limitations of
these models, provide guidance for the use of these models in the
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CAE facility, and recommend research on models and modeling that
might overcome these limitations. The focus of this study was to be
the perceptual and control tasks required of a single pilot in advanced
helicopter operation in low-altitude (i.e., nap of the earth) and low-
visibility (e.g., nighttime) missions, which are very demanding flight
conditions.
As the panel began its work and acquired a better understand-
ing of helicopter piloting and cockpit design problems, it became
apparent that the overwhelmingly dominant problems, in terms of
human factors, under the low-altitude, low-visibility flight conditions
have to do with human vision, particularly the interpretation of vi-
sual information, and the use of visual aids and displays designed to
assist the pilot in obtaining information necessary for the successful
completion of a mission. The panel also concluded that much was
known about the state of manual control models, especially since the
Committee on Human Factors had earlier initiated another study
of human performance models of complex dynamic systems (Baron
and Kruser, in press). For these reasons, the panel decided to focus
its attention on models of vision and on those aspects of cognition
that interact with the human visual system in the helicopter flight
task. It undertook to review the state of models in these areas, to
recommend how they might be used in design and integrated into
the CAE facility, to propose how they could be integrated into such
a facility, and to suggest research that might make models more use-
ful in the future for CAE-based design by eliminating the gaps and
limitations of currently available models. Although its study focused
on vision, the panel believed that an in-depth study of this area not
only would provide useful guidance about vision to the A 3I project,
but would provide broader insights into the potential problems of
attempting to incorporate models from the psychological and hu-
man factors literature into a computer-based design tool such as the
HF/CAE facility.
To conduct this study, the panel assembled a number of experts
from the fields of vision, cognition, perception, performance mod-
eling, aviation psychology, decision theory, system design, manual
control, and related fields. The results of its work are reported here.
INTRODUCTION
HELICOPTER FLIGHT PROBLEMS AND APPLICATIONS OF
HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELS
Helicopter operation is difficult, and performing low-altitude,
low-visibility missions with a single-person crew places very severe
demands on the pilot. Analysis and design of the helicopter cockpit
system and the missions it is to perform must be thorough to ensure
that the missions are indeed possible and that the cockpit system,
especially visual aids and displays, facilitates successful accomplish-
ment of required flight tasks. If the A3I project and others based on
similar concepts are successful, this analysis and design will be ac-
complished by using CAE facilities and design methodologies based
on the use of human performance models of the type discussed in
this report.
This chapter attempts to give the reader a concrete, intuitive
feel for the application of human performance models to the design
of advanced helicopters and other highly automated vehicles. A
sequence of vignettes is presented, each of which is a brief episode
illustrating an important practical problem that can arise from a
limitation in the perceptual and cognitive capabilities of the pilot,
which might be solved through design based on human performance
models. The kinds of models that might be used to characterize pilot
capabilities are described, along with the way in which they might
be used for design. Reference is made to chapters of this report in
which these models and their application are discussed more fully.
DETECTABILITY AND VISIBILITY (CHAPTER b)
Parched by summer drought, the pine, oak, and eucalyptus of
northern California's Santa Cruz Mountains erupt in flames, and
many remote mountain households are threatened. By afternoon,
access roads to some homes have been cut off by encroaching flames,
and rescue helicopters are summoned. As dusk approaches, the pi-
lot's ability to navigate and identify his destination deteriorates.
Soon the forest below dissolves into a sea of gray. What is most
worrisome is that the pilot can no longer scan the landscape for sus-
pended wires, the cause of a disproportionate number of rotorcraft
accidents. The pilot pulls down a visor on which is mounted a so-
phisticated night vision system, and at once the earth below appears
alive with light. The crisp detail of the imagery enables the pilot
to avoid an oncoming power line and to detect the white clapboard
corner of the threatened home.
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The design of the night vision system was aided by computer
models of the pilot's visual system. Engineers could predict, in ad-
vance of construction, whether the pilot equipped with a candidate
system would have adequate resolution, contrast, and temporal dy-
namics to detect the targets critical to mission success. In particular,
the visibility of threatening wires in both central and peripheral view
could be calculated accurately. Equipped with this information, de-
sign decisions can be made to optimize the performance of the viewer.
Without adequate computer models, designers would be forced into
a repeated cycle of design, prototype fabrication, and field test—each
step costly and time-consuming. Computer models also provided a
further insight: even with an optimal viewer design, not all threat-
ening wires can be detected. In certain cases, the wire may simply
not be visible enough to the human visual system. This suggested
the need for a vision aid that could either enhance wirelike features
of the visual image or automatically detect their presence and notify
the pilot.
SURFACE AND MOTION ESTIMATION (CHAPTER 8)
Attempting to evade enemy radar, a helicopter pilot approaches a
target at high speed and low altitude. Hugging the rolling desert ter-
rain contours at this speed, the pilot must react instantly to changes
in the terrain, which is especially difficult because it is dusk and
shading cues are absent. Suddenly, sagebrush that previously dotted
the landscape is no longer there, and the terrain below becomes a fea-
tureless, untextured sheet. The pilot immediately engages a ground
contour synthesizer (GCS) and instead of shapeless terrain, the full
depth of the undulating desert floor is revealed.
This illusion is made possible by the helmet-mounted display
(HMD) of a computer-generated image (CGI), texturing superim-
posed on the view of the terrain below. The GCS design draws heav-
ily on human models of self-motion and object shape perception,
describing pilot performance in dynamic visual environments. Early
in the design state, mission planners and human factors !ngineers
used these models to identify mission segments and environmental
conditions that could pose significant problems to the pilot flying the
baseline vehicle configuration. A variety of augmentation schemes
were then proposed and evaluated, again by using pilot models to
rank the expected performance improvements. The GCS scheme was
selected for further evaluation, and the design engineers outlined a
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basic architecture consisting of a laser range finder driving a CGI on
a head-tracked HMD. Using some of the available perceptual models,
the display and controls group then evaluated a wide range of design
factors, such as field-of-view, texture density, ranging accuracy, and
update rates, and narrowed their full-scale simulation evaluations to
a small number of promising designs. This allowed them to focus on
system "tuning" well before committing to prototype hardware.
OBJECT RECOGNITIOi' (CHAPTER 9)
To locate a missing vehicle, a pilot is flying a rescue reconnais-
sance mission under threat of hostile ground fire. In a standard
defensive precaution, the pilot must "pop up" briefly from behind
each protective hill, survey the scene from that short vantage, and
immediately drop down again behind the hill. In that momentary
survey, he must determine whether the missing vehicle is present,
what potentially hostile objects are present, and the position and
orientation of each relative to the terrain and objects.
The cockpit designer has considerable control over the ease with
which a pilot can perform this type of perceptual task. The shape
of the windscreen and the distribution of occluding structural com-
ponents limit the size of the continuous field of view. Also critical
are the visual parameters of artificial displays such as night vision
or other video and computer-generated imaging devices. These pa-
rameters include the spatial resolution, contrast, and gray scale or
number of colors used to depict objects and features; the field of view
encompassed by the display; the display refresh rate; and the rate
at which a viewing camera or sensor's direction can be changed. If
image enhancement algorithms are used, they may hinger or facil-
itate rapid object recognition by interacting with stimulus features
of the patterns being reproduced. Although not enough is known
to develop computational models that will take parameters such as
these into account in modeling object recognition, enough is now
known to help the designer make quantitative assessments. Research
is underway to expand this knowledge.
Even for direct vision unobstructed by parts of the aircraft, the
rapid survey task may be a formidable one that requires assistance.
Target objects and their context are likely to be viewed from an
unforeseen direction and with unanticipated pwTtial occlusions from
other objects and features of the terrain. This is especially likely
when the pilot's course has been tortuous in order to take advantage
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of whatever cover the terrain provides. Synthesized schematic pre-
views of the vista, using navigational data and terrain data bases,
which show anticipated target objects viewed from several positions
and reduced to their essential features, may improve task perfor-
mance. The design of such displays can call upon the growing knowl-
edge about the component processes involved in the rapid recognition
of scenes and objects, and about mental rotation.
HETERO-OCULAR VISION (CHAPTER 11)
As illustrated in previous vignettes, conditions of haze or dark-
ness that would otherwise make low-altitude helicopter flight impos-
sible can be at least partly overcome by vision-augmenting devices.
While this makes flying possible when it would otherwise be impossi-
ble, it may impose a new set of demands on the pilot. One system in
active use, the pilot night vision system (PNV S), is a helmet-mounted
monocle that presents the right eye with both a video picture of the
environment as scanned by a forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensor
and an array of symbols that reflect the state of the vehicle. The left
eye is free to view the world directly. This system is usable, making
nap of the earth (NOE) flights possible under conditions of very low
visibility, but has severe drawbacks in its present form. It is difficult
to learn, demanding and fatiguing to use, and interferes with normal
involvement of the two eyes. Some of these problems are structural,
such as the fact that the FLIR sensor (which moves in response to
the pilot's head movements) is substantially offset in viewpoint, but
another set of problems arises because the pilot must attend to the
disparate information received by the two eyes.
In general, when the two eyes receive different views that cannot
combine to form a single scene, binocular rivalry results: at each
small region in the combined field of view, the control of one eye
or the other is visible, but not both. One eye will occasionally and
for a short time dominate to the exclusion of the other: thus, a
small dot in one eye's view will be visible almost continually if it
falls against a blank field in the corresponding part of the other eye's
view. A piecemeal alternation between fragments of the two views
is, however, the more general occurrence. Which view prevails in any
region depends on the stimulus conditions (contrast, sharpness of
contour, etc.) in each of the two corresponding hetero-ocular regions
and on the gaze directions and states of the two eyes (e.g., their
adaptation and accommodation). Although the pilot must try to
INTRODUCTION	 13
attend to the eye that offers the information needed at any moment,
this can apparently be done only by closing or otherwise diminishing
the effect of the other eye, by changing the relative gaze directions of
the two eyes so as to bring different regions into correspondence, or
by physically changing the monocular video display in some way.
Control over the physical characteristics (luminance, contrast,
temporal and spatial discontinuities, etc.) can thus give the pilot
more control over the rate and bias of tAe rivalry. With the growing
knowledge in the field of binocular rivalry, it seems reasonable to
aim for models that will allow the rate of rivalry, and its effects
on information under various designs and viewing conditions, to be
evaluated.
Even without rivalry, there are problems associated with the use
of two eyes as separate channels of information. For example, the
pilot is denied the binocular information about depth that is normally
so important for judging near distances. Yet rivalry seems to be the
most troublesome aspect of the hetero-ocular procedure, and one
that should prove relatively easy to ameliorate by proper design.
When that is done, the optimal hetero-ocular method can then be
compared to alternative ways of presenting the various channels of
information.
WORKLOAD AND PILOT PERFORMANCE (CHAPTER 15)
A helicopter is flying "nap of the earth" below treetop level in
the dim illumination of twilight. The pilot listens to the copilot
call out landmarks that must be located and aimed at all the while
judging altitude, adjusting speed, and assuring clearance from ground
obstacles. While mentally computing the distance from a rendezvous
point, the pilot receives a radio communication describing the relative
locations of other aircraft in the area. An alarm sounds, indicating a
potential fault in the tail rotor engine.
How well will the pilot be able to integrate and time-share these
various activities? Will the auditory alert be noticed while navi-
gational instructions are being encoded? How will the difficulty of
resolving landmarks in the twilight degrade the pilot's ability to vi-
sualize the spatial layout of helicopters in the area or comprehend
verbal communications? How will all of these cognitive activities
degrade the ability to fly? To attempt to answer these questions, the
designer will need workload models that will predict the interference
between these activities as a function of their similarity to each other
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and their difficulty. With this information, the designer can make in-
telligent decisions regarding crew complement, information displays,
and decision-making aids.
DECISION THEORY (CHAPTER 20)
Returning to home base and low on fuel, the pilot receives a
transmission requesting assistance elsewhere. Is there enough fuel?
In the past, this could be determined only by difficult mental calcu-
lations involving fuel, airspeed, and wind velocity. The pilot consults
a new display that shows an ellipse superimposed on a map of the
local area. The ellipse encloses the points that can be reached given
the current fuel, airspeed, and wind velocity. On the basis of this
simple, accessible display, the pilot makes a rapid decision.
Design of the display was assisted by models of human decision
making. These models suggest that reducing uncertainty leans to
better performance; thus, this display should improve performance in
estimating whether the pilot can reach a given destination. However,
because the display is concrete and precise, pilots may attribute
excessive accuracy to the readings, and thus unduly reduce their
margin of safety, thereby actually increasing the chance that they
will run out of fuel. Use of models of decision making, along with
simulations of hypothetical missions, could assist in answering this
type of question.
MEMORY OVERLOAD (CHAPTER 10)
As the pilot pursues his rescue mission through fire and smoke,
radio communications must be maintained with other helicopters, air
traffic control, and teams from the fire and police departments. In
previous cockpits, setting many precise communication frequencies
had been a difficult manual and mental task. The pilot is fortunate
in having a new interface that places the memory burden on the
computer rather than the human.
The design of the new communications interface was guided by
models of human memory integrated into a system for simulation of
the rotorcraft mission. The engineers sought to understand whether
the previous system imposed too much mental workload on the pilot
and how much improveme it would arise from several new (and more
expensive) proposed designs. Extensive simulations of previous de-
signs showed that frequent confusion of radio frequencies occurred,
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and that memory overload degraded performance in other tasks,
such as looking for threatening wires. By contrast, simulations of the
new design demonstrated that it effectively eliminated confusion and
reduced the overall memory workload.
SKILL ACQUISITION (CHAPTER 17)
The pilot enters way point information into the navigational
computer using the navigation keyboard. Then the flight computer
is used to enter fuel consumption information. Keyboards for the
two computers are laid out somewhat differently. Despite repeated
use, the pilot cannot get the "feel" for entering the data and must
look to the cockpit much longer than safety would allow.
Having multiple keyboards creates both cognitive and motor dif-
ficulties. The skills to be acquired in using one keyboard interfere
with the skills to be acquired in using the other. The pilot's use
of navigation and flight computers must be so highly practiced that
data entry tasks can be performed "almost without thinking." This
level of skilled performance is known as the achievement of auto-
maticity. The presence of multiple keyboards, however, prevents the
pilot from being able to acquire automaticity in performing either
task and increases the probability that an error will be made in
entering data. Models of skill acquisition cannot yet provide direct
specifications for keyboards and displays that would promote auto-
maticity. However, the simplest models in the form of guidelines
suggest that minimizing the number of alternative methods allowed
for data input will promote automaticity.
HUMAN ERROR (CHAPTER 19)
Guiding a highly automated commercial aircraft toward the air-
port, the pilot moves the controls so as to produce an appropriate
descent toward the runway. Unknown to the pilot, the aircraft is in an
automatic control mode, and the pilot's action has no effect. Because
the pilot's intended path and that executed by the automatic systems
are very similar, there are few indications that anything is wrong.
Only when an unusual condition occurs, for example, a request from
air traffic control that the pilot use an alternate runway, do problems
begin. The aircraft does not respond to control actions, and it takes
some time for the pilot to realize the source of the problem.
This is an example of a mode error. When systems have multiple
modes, people may confuse which mode the system/interface. is in
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and take actions for an inappropriate mode. The control, navigation,
communication, and weapon systems aboard modern aircraft have
numerous system modes; thus, the potential exists for many mode
errors.
Mode error correction strategies fall into two categories: one is to
design the systems with a minimal number of modes (Norman, 1983);
the other is to provide a perceptual cue of the current mode of the
system. Labels are generally not sufficient; a salient background field
may be more effective (Monk, 1986). Models of human information
processing, and specific models of mode error, may identify interfaces
that are prone to mode error and assist in the design of new systems
that are immune to this potentially disastrous flaw.
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Preview of Models
Parts II and III of this report contain chapters that review models
of vision and cognition which are important for the analysis and
simulation of pilot performance of the visual tasks encountered in low-
altitude, low-visibility helicopter operations. The models discussed
in these chapters are important candidates for inclusion in a human
factors computer-aided engineering (HF/CAE) facility.
FRAMEWORK
In selecting and organizing the models reviewed, the authors
had in mind the general framework and functional decomposition
shown in Figure 2-1. Even though the chapters in Parts II and
III and the individual models discussed in these do not follow this
framework rigidly, it has been useful for organizing the discussion of
this complex field.
The framework of Figure 2-1 is aimed toward a full simulation
model of the visual system. This system is modeled as a serial set
of processes starting with early vision. Eye fixation, although shown
in the figure, is only treated statistically, and the details of the eye
movement process are covered superficially. The inputs to the early
vision models are direct physical measures of the visual scene, and
thus these models and those that build from them are image driven.
The framework assumes that the outputs of models at one stage
provide the inputs needed by those at the next stage in progression
from early vision to form perception, three-dimensional structure
through motion, state-variable estimation, object recognition, mental
manipulation of information and finally to combination of views. The
later stages of vision are recognized as being cognitive, and are shown
as being within the envelope of the cognitive system. Later visual
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and many cognitive processes, especially those that determine what
will be attended to, also influence earlier visual processes, although
these effects are not shown in the framework. This linear framework
has proven to be a useful way of organizing the discussion of vision
even though it is clearly an oversimplification.
For cognition we lack a well-developed architecture to structure
simply the flow of information and interaction among the functional
components of cognitive processing. Rather, we have found it useful
to differentiate between models of mechanisms of the human cog-
nitive architecture and models of rational action. The section on
cognitive models begins with a review of models for the architecture
of human information processing. We then discuss several component
mechanisms of the cognitive architecture, nam-'y resource allocation
and attention, working memory, and learning. _he rest of the section
focuses on models of rational action, first addressing models that are
based on scenarios consisting of the actions the pilot is required to
perform to execute a specified mission. Three other types of rational
action models are treated in this section: errors, decisions, and rep-
resentation of knowledge. The later stages of -vision that are included
within cognition belong mostly within the rational action grouping.
This collection of topics does not provide complete coverage of all the
cognitive functions involved in helicopter flight or even of those just
dealing with the visual tasks of flight, but it is a large and important
subset of those functions.
ASSESSMENT OF MODELS
The reviews of Parts II and III cover a large domain and a great
number of models. A rough estimate of the number is provided by the
bibliographic citations in the review papers, of which there are about
600, equally divided between vision and cognition reviews. While
there is often considerable overlap among models in a functional
area, it is quite clear that the designers of a human factors design
facility must comprehend a very large collection of models if they
are to provide complete coverage of just these two aspects of human
performance. Moreover, the users of the design facility must have a
significant level of understanding of the models in order to recognize
their limitations and to interpret correctly the results from applying
them in design. Coping with this complexity and numerology will be
a challenge.
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There is a strong bias in the vision reviews toward simulation
models that can in principle be connected together to simulate hu-
man vision interacting with the physical environments encountered
in helicopter flight. Most of these are descriptive modes, but a few
are normative, such as those dealing with motion-based state estima-
tion (Chapter 8). A considerable number of models, especially those
of higher level visual processes and cognition, are taken from the ar-
tificial intelligence (AI) literature and were not developed as models
of either human process or performance. Rather, they are machine
(computer) implementations of functions required for constructing
complete machine vision systems. They have been included in this
collection of models because they represent the only currently avail-
able computational implementations of certain functions. Although
there is considerable controversy on this point, one can argue that
it is better, perhaps necessary, for a complete simulation of human
vision to have some representation of these functions in the HF/CAE
facility rather than to leave them completely unaccounted for. The
psychology and Al communities have developed increased interest in
investigating how well these machine implementations represent hu-
man behavior and how they and the concepts incorporated in them
can be adapted to model human behavior. Examples of machine
implementation models can be found in Chapters 7 (structure from
motion) and 9 (real-time human image understanding).
The models in the cognitive section are more disjoint, and there
is no attempt to provide a complete cognitive simulation that could
interact with the physical environment. Doing so is well beyond
the state of the art for most of the vision tasks confronting pilots.
However, in many areas of cognition the models make close, although
separate, contact with the physical or operational environment of
flight. They do this at several fairly well-defined levels of abstraction
or aggregation. For example, the models for scenario-based actions
provide a basis for addressing problems of mission planning and
feasibility by focusing on the workload that the mission imposes on
the pilot. These models make very crude approximations about the
human performance of individual actions, but provide very useful
tools for answering high-level questions about mission alternatives
and crew task assignments. At a different level of abstraction, models
of resource allocation and attention use parameters of the physical
environment to predict how visual fixations axe distributed among
instruments on a panel. Many of the models within the cognitive
realm are predicated on the notion of rational action and thus are
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prescriptive to some extent. Machine implementations have had a
strong influence on these models of cognition, but there has been a
considerable effort to fit these ideas into the framework of what is
known about human performance.
In reading the following chapters, it becomes clear that a large
number of models are relevant and potentially useful to advanced
helicopter design. However, the models discussed have many lim-
itations that will affect the ease with which they can be used for
computer-based human factors design. The collection of models is
fragmentary. Some areas are not covered by existing models, and in
many areas the models that do exist have major gaps. The linkages
among models are a particular source of concern. In many areas
the models for one set of processes do not readily couple to models
for other related processes. This makes it difficult to implement a
complete simulation of either the visual subsystem or the cognitive
functions associated with vision. This problem is exacerbated by the
lack of a satisfactory architecture for human information processing
that would provide a strong framework for integrating cognitive func-
tions. Finally, many of the individual models and integrated subsets
of models discussed have not been well validated against human per-
formance data, and as mentioned earlier, some are not based upon
human behavior but are drawn from machine implementations whose
authors never aspired to model human behavior. When validation
is poor or lacking, the validity of the simulation of which the model
is a part and of the analysis performed with the aid of the model is
open to question. Although validation is difficult enough for models
of single tasks, it is an even more difficult problem in models of com-
posite behavior. Nonetheless, in the absence of validation, doubt is
cast on the correctness of analyses and designs based on the use of
models.
Thus, one is led to the conclusion that a complete detailed model
of human visual performance is not feasible given the current state
of models. There are, however, many important questions about
vision that can be answered with the aid of existing models if the
focus is on simple tasks or on simplified abstractions of more complex
tasks. For example, the detectability and legibility of simple targets
can be estimated using models of early vision (Chapter 5), and the
performance of the pilot in estimating system state variables can be
predicted using the models of Chapter 8. Although not discussed in
this report, there are also good models of viewability that can be
used to evaluate whether or not the pilot can even view displays and
22	 PREVIEW OF MODELS
other objects in a proposed design. Some of the models discussed
in Chapter 15 (resource allocation and attention) can be used to
obtain useful estimates of the attentional demands on pilot vision
which, in turn, can be used to answer questions about panel layout.
The scenario-based mission analysis methods of Chapter 18, based
on models of workload, lend themselves to interactive computer im-
plementations and are a substantial improvement over current static
techniques. The models of error, learning, and decisions provide
insights about aspects of human performance important for design
and, if applied with careful attention to their limitations, could be
useful in a design facility.
To summarize, we are far from having a complete set of models
for representing human vision and related cognition, but there are a
number of important types of questions that current models would
help answer. There is a reasonable expectation that integrating these
models in a computer design facility could make the existing portfolio
of models more accessible to designers than they are today, enable
their wider use in design, and lead to improvements in the design
process and the resulting designs. It would also provide the base
from which more capable and complete design facilities could evolve.
It could provide a driving force for extending models in directions
that would make them even more useful for design. It would almost
certainly raise a number of interesting theoretical questions about
models, modeling, and their application. We discuss these issues
more fully in the next chapter which is about integration and use.
3
Use and Integration of Models
The purpose of the human factors computer-aided engineering
(HF/CAE) facility is to improve the process by which complex piloted
aircraft systems are designed and, thereby, improve the quality of
the designs. The basic premise underlying the HF/CAE program
is that better system designs will result from enabling designers to
explore more design alternatives and to evaluate these designs before
constructing costly and time-consuming prototype hardware. Models
such as those discussed in Part II are central to improving the quality
of the evaluation process. By making models and other information
and facilities more accessible to designers, the HF/CAE facility can
increase the range of variables and the number of alternatives that
can be explored.
When implemented, the HF/CAE facility will be a tool—one
hopes a key tool—in the design process. In aircraft cockpit design,
well-established and complex design processes exist into which this
facility or tool must fit. These processes have evolved over many
years and are unlikely to change rapidly. As a result, the HF/CAE
facility must work well with the existing design processes; otherwise,
it will not be accepted. In time, as it proves successful, it -will lead to
changes in the design processes in which it has been embedded, but
these changes will come primarily from successful application of the
facility and the improved designs that result from its use.
A detailed discussion of cockpit design methodology is beyond
the scope of this report. To understand some of the key issues
involved in the use and integration of the models discussed here, it is
helpful to summarize the nature of the processes currently being used
for aircraft cockpit design and give some examples of the analyses
that are performed in the course of design.
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DESIGN PROCESS
The design of helicopter cockpit systems is a complex process
involving a large number of people representing many different dis-
ciplines and constituencies. They work in a design space that is
large but has many constraints, and attempt to satisfy a large set
of interacting and often contradictory requirements. Satisfying these
requirements is almost never easy and is, in some cases, impossible.
The amount of analysis, simulation, information, and data that must
be considered in the design is great. A large number of potential
designs must be explored before a final configuration is developed
and adopted.
Cockpit design begins as a top-down process with an analysis of
system and mission requirements and the development and analysis
of mission scenarios. This leads to the identification of functions that
must be performed by the system and to the successive decomposition
of these functions into the procedures and then into the individual
tasks that must be performed to accomplish the required mission
scenarios.
In a complex system with a complicated set of requirements, the
task of the designer focuses first on developing a thorough under-
standing of the problem that the system is supposed to solve, on the
requirements themselves, and on their implications for system design.
The structure of the requirements must be understood, and in partic-
ular, those requirements that critically drive the design and critically
interact with other requirements must be identified. For such design
problems, the goal is usually to satisfy a set of requirements, not to
optimize performance because optimization is too difficult. In fact,
people do not apprehend the amount of effort that designers expend
to avoid and eliminate sources of catastrophe. Thus, the goal of
design is often to make the system adequate without blunders.
Although, in principle, design starts out at the "top" with the
analysis of requirements and missions, it does not unfold as a purely
top-down process. Detailed design or analysis of lower level func-
tions, tasks, and proposed solutions is required to determine whether
higher level functional decompositions or procedural definitions are
acceptable. Alternative approaches must be conceived, trial solutions
developed, detailed analyses completed, and results communicated
to other members of the design team so that the impact on other
functions can be understood. Real design requires both top-down
decomposition and bottom-up synthesis and analysis.
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Most system designs are not "clean sheet" but rather start with
certain critical components or elements of the design prespecified and
constrained. Design features that come later must conform with the
decisions already made if unacceptable penalties of cost and delay
are to be avoided. In helicopter design, human performance is both
critical and constrained, and it makes sense to take account of human
constraints early in the design, as a reference to which other decisions
must conform. This suggests a design process that is user centered,
in which the support of user roles in the system is a major driver
of the design. However, current design practice usually relegates
definition and support of human roles to later stages of design. One
of the reasons for this lack of an early focus on user roles is the lack of
methods for considering user roles early in the design process (Rouse
and Cody, in press). An HF/CAE facility should help remedy this.
User-centered design moves from the system and mission re-
quirements to a characterization of the role of the crew in terms of
the general tasks that it will perform. It proceeds by assessing the
demands that these tasks impose upon the crew in terms of critical
performance requirements and workload. Information requirements
and control actions required for these tasks must be determined, and
techniques for providing this information and eliciting the appro-
priate responses must be developed. Obstacles to the satisfactory
performance of the to ks by the crew must then be identified and
appropriate revisions made to the configuration. To complete a de-
sign in this manner, the designer clearly requires a strong support
system.
There have been many studies of the design process and of
what designers of aircraft systems actually do. Rouse and Cody
(in press) found that designers spend most of their time consulting
with other individuals working on their project and doing individual
problem solving, analysis, and synthesis. Much of this time is spent
studying and interpreting system requirements. Little time is spent
consulting formal printed materials. Most information is obtained
from informal contacts with people close at hand. The circumscribed
nature of personal technical interactions is a well-known phenomenon
(Allen, 1977). Clearly, the primary support system for current design
practices is the designer's colleague group. The IIF/CAE facility
must be designed so that it augments, not replaces, this group in
addition to providing technical tools for analysis and design.
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TOOLBOX FRAMEWORK
It should be apparent from the preceding discussion that the
HF/CAE facility will be used to examine pilot performance in a vari-
ety of situations and from a variety of viewpoints. The facility must
accommodate many different kinds of human performance models
and data. It should be constructed so as to enable a skilled designer
to move flexibly through the design process, asking and answering
specific questions as they arise, and to iterate previous design deci-
sions as new information, constraints, or interactions among elements
of the design become prominent.
This type of use suggests that the facility should be a framework
for integrating an evolving collection of tools and data that is placed
at the disposal of the designer and that, ultimately, embodies the
design itself. This collection will include tools for doing simulation
at several levels; for static analysis; for accessing data bases of guide-
lines, case studies, and behavioral data; and for conducting rapid
experimentation (another application of simulation). There should
also be tools for adding new models and data to the facility, both as
part of the design process and as part of the process of maintaining
and enhancing the facility. It is up to the designer to make good use
of this collection of tools and to determine when to employ particular
tools, how to use the results, and how to proceed through the design
process.
Many of the tools in the collection will be devoted to understand-
ing the mission and its operational requirements and the crew's role
in meeting these .requirements. These mission analysis tools should
allow the designer to design prototype mission scenarios, to perform
task analyses, and to determine workload as well as regions of over-
load or interference between modalities and tasks. Other tools in the
collection will be aimed at detailed design in which the ability to con-
struct and evaluate prototypes or simulations of prototype devices,
displays, layouts, etc., is important. These detailed design tasks
would benefit from access to a rich collection of simulation and ana-
lytic models of various types and to human factors data bases, all of
which would help the designer assess the impact of proposed designs
on user performance, user loading, and overall mission success.
The principal types of human performance evaluation tools that
should be included in the HF/CAE toolbox are listed below:
Complete Pilot Simulation Models
Mission Level Simulation Models
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Partial Simulation Models
Static Analytic Models
Guidelines, Data, Case Histories
Rapid Experimentation Facilities
Three levels of simulation models are identified in this list rang-
ing from a complete pilot model ("megasimulation") to simulation
models of different aspects of human performance. The static (non-
simulation) analytic models presumably cover a wide range of human
performance. Data bases consisting of guidelines, case histories, and
human performance data, as well as facilities for rapid experimenta-
tion by human operators are also included.
Building one megamodel that ties together models of all relevant
aspects of human performance and aspires to be a complete simula-
tion of pilot behavior is theoretically possible. Such a model would
be able to answer all human performance questions. However, it is
clearly impractical and unrealistic to build such a model today. As is
apparent from the discussion in Parts II and III, current models are
not complete enough to support this approach. The validity of such
a simulation would be limited by the weakest element in any of its
components. Even if a megasimulation model could be developed,
it is not clear that a design system should be based entirely upon
such a model. Most people who have experience with systems that
have taken this approach find them cumbersome and awkward to
use. Among other things, this results from having to specify a large
amount of information to use the model for even the most trivial of
questions. Thus, a complete simulation model does not appear to be
a practical basis for the HF/CAE facility now or in the near future.
The other types of models listed above are practicable today
even though megasimulation is not. Mission level simulation models
attempt to encompass the entire mission (or major segments of a
mission) by using models of human and system performance at a
high level of abstraction. Individual human functions are approxi-
mated either statistically or deterministically as discrete decisions or
actions; and cognitive, perceptual, or motor processes are not repre-
sented. Mission level simulation models are useful for showing how
a mission will unfold and for estimating its probability of success.
They are also useful for performing task analysis to determine the
critical parts of a mission, where the demands on the pilot are high
and the sensitivity of pilot load to mission parameters is great. Mis-
sion level analysis is useful as a starting point for the analysis of pilot
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performance and for identifying where more detailed analysis should
be directed.
Partial simulation models have less breadth than mission level
models but more depth in specific aspects of human perform, .!ice. A
partial simulation model attempts to represent a single aspect of hu-
man performance with enough detail so as to be useful for answering
specific performance questions and carrying out detailed analysis.
Because such models are simulations of human performance, they
can be coupled to the er'ernal environment and run in a closed-loop
mode that reveals the uvnamics of interaction between a pilot and
the environment, for example, vehicle flight path. As discussed in
Part II, some lower levels of vision can be represented by simulation
models of this type that will be used to answer questions about fixa-
tion, detection, and recognition performance. Biomechanical models,
although not discussed in this report, are partial simulation models
that can be used to determine the viewability and accessibility of dis-
plays and controls in a cockpit design. Similarly, control theoretical
models can be used to simulate pilot control performance in a variety
of situations.
For many- aspects of human performance, there are no mod-
els that are complete enough or of the correct form for simulating
pilot performance; however, models do exist which provide static
analytic descriptions of specific types of performance. These models
are useful for carrying out static analyses of specific aspects of pi-
lot performance and for estimating parameters of that performance.
Classical examples of such models are Fitts law for predicting the
time to point to a target as a function of distance and siza, signal
detection models, and models for predicting instrument scanning
patterns. Many of the models discussed in Parts II and III are of this
type, and a large collection of such models reported in the literature
is potentially useful to the designer.
It is also important that the computer-aided design/computer-
aided engineering (CAD/CAE) cockpit design facility be the repos-
itcry for description of the resulting design decisions as they are
being made. This description should incorporate graphical layout
and detailed design decisions expressed in graphic form, as well as
a narrative rationale that permits an audit trail of the state of the
design at each stage. By embodying this description in the same
facility as the design tools, those models or anal yses that require ac-
cess to extended aspects of cockpit design will have the data available
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electronically and will not have to reenter specific parameters of the
design.
Often, experimental results and design principles have not been
reduced to analytic form. The human factors and psychology litera-
ture contains a wealth of information in the form of data, guidelines,
and case histories that is of great potential value to the designer and
would be even more useful if readily accessible. These data, guide-
lines, and histories form an important knowledge base that can be
used for making design decisions that are in accord with established
practice or previous experiences and for evaluating a desigr, to deter-
mine its consistency with guidelines and principles. The HF/CAE
facility can serve an important function in providing access to such
information and facilitating its use in the design and evaluation pro-
cess.
Finally, a facility that contains a rich collection of simulation
tools for representing the vehicle under desigr and simulation mod-
els of various aspects of human performance is a powerful tool for
conducting rapid experiments to answer specific questions within
the context of the missions for which the system is being designed.
For example, pilots can be asked to fly parts of a mission and the
acceptability of their performance can be measured, visual scenes
can be constructed, and the detectability of a specific object can be
determined.
SELECTING TOOLS AND MODELS
The AF/CAE facility will be an evolving set of tools based on a
growing body of models. It is important that the initial set of tools
and models be chosen well because they will have a large influence
on the success of any effort to develop a design facility. The goal
should be to choose an initial set of tools that will make the design
process better in some important way. It is probably a good strategy
to focus on improving the design process rather than on improving
designs, since it is easier to see how tools change the process than it
is to see how they change the designs.
In selecting the tools it is useful to think in terms of the kinds of
engineering analyses that are required for a design, the questions that
need to be answered in the course of these analyses, and the models
that might help answer these questions. Analyses should be chosen
that are important to the design, required by the design process, and
difficult or time-consuming to do. Questions should be chosen that
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are not easily or well answered by current design methods and for
which models exist that can provide insights important to answering
these questions. It is not necessary to do a perfect job with these
analyses or questions, it is only necessary to do significantly better
than is currently possible.
Although we are far from having a complete simulation model
of human vision, the reviews in Parts II and III indicate that we
have many models that do in fact provide useful insights relevant
to answering a number of important design questions. Performance
that depends primarily on aspects of early vision and estimation
of aircraft state from two-dimensional optical flow information, and
some related response in certain restricted cases, seem tractable with
current models. For time sharing and workload, practical models are
available. Current scenario techniques can be extended and applied
to good advantage. There are approaches that could be taken to
predict errors that have some limited usefulness. The models of
decision making behavior have potential near-term application to
system design.
This limited portfolio of models can support analyses in a number
of areas. Much can be done with instrument panel layout, viewabil-
ity of displays, and their visibility and legibility, and with target
detection. The state estimation models, in conjunction with models
of human control performance, can be used in a variety of analyses
of vehicle flight control performance. The scenario techniques and
workload models support a variety of analyses of mission feasibility,
task analyses of crew workload and allocation of functions among the
crew. Some limited error prediction analysis can be done. Finally,
analysis of pilot decision performance is feasible, but care is needed
to take account of the special characteristics of human decision be-
havior. Selection from among the set of supportable analyses should
be done only with good knowledge of the practices followed by expe-
rienced cockpit design teams. They are the customers for the design
facility and must be willing and interested in using it for their work.
Once the analyses that are to be supported have been chosen,
it is then possible to think about the way in which a tool should
be designed to support and enhance each different type of analysis.
Each tool should integrate the most appropriate methods and models
available for answering the questions central to this analysis. If
experience from other disciplines is a guide, the initial set of tools
will be rather crude and limited in the breadth and depth of analyses
that they address, but over time they will improve provided they are
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actually put to use. The feedback from real application is compelling
and drive the evolution of the systems like this, if the initial version of
the system turns out to be interesting enough to attract and reward
early users.
The following section illustrates how the HF/CAE facility might
be used to carry out some of the engineering analyses required to
design a helicopter cockpit. In the course of so doing it gives some
examples of how the tools and the types of models incorporated into
the facility might be used.
ENGINEERING ANALYSES
The state of human performance models relevant to the design of
a CAE workstation for helicopter cockpit design is reviewed in Parts
II and III of this report. The useful incorporation of analytic models
into design and engineering methodology is itself a step requiring
substantial effort and insight. It is beyond the scope of this report to
address design methodologies for the computer-aided engineering of
cockpits; however, it is useful to sketch briefly a few possible applica-
tions of human performance models in design. Such applications give
a flavor of the enterprise and emphasize the point that the selection
of models may depend deeply on which factors matter greatly in
design (and, therefore, must not be compromised) and which matter
very little (and can, therefore, be largely approximated.)
One way to envision such engineering use is to consider the de-
sign outputs of other engineering models. During design, engineering
models are often employed to perform analyses, some more or less
standard, others unique to a particular question. On a CAE work-
station, these analyses may be reflected in cathode-ray tube (CRT)
displays as designers explore variants and "what if" questions. Even-
tually, the most important paths of the analyses would be included as
pages in engineering design documents. Human engineering models
might also be expected to lead to analyses that eventually become
pages in engineering manuals and, hence, part of the technical docu-
mentation for the device being designed.
Examples of standard engineering analyses, taken from the oper-
ator's manual of an AH-64A helicopter (U.S. Army, 1984) are given
in Figure 3-1. Figure 3-1(a) shows regions of danger indicated by
crosshatched lines surrounding the helicopter, which are the results
of various engineering analyses. Although conceptually simple, these
analyses establish such factors as clearances required for successful
APU EXHAUST AREA 6 TA IL ROTDR AREA
ENGINE EXHAUST AND ROTOR DISC AREA
,__L__,.^
DD NOTENTER SHADED ARDS LV ILE
LASER AREA
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FIGURE 3-1(a) Danger areas. SOURCE: U.S. Army (1984).
canopy jettison and dangerous areas for service personnel. Figure
3-1(b) summarizes another set of engineering analyses, in this case
airspeed operating limits. This diagram enables calculation of maxi-
mum airspeed, given pressure and altitude. Figure 3-1(c) is the result
of an engineering analysis of the ability to land the helicopter in case
of engine failure as a function of flight parameters. Figure 3-1(d)
summarizes weight calculations for the helicopter's components.
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FIGURE 3-1(b) Airspeed operating limits chart (100% rotor RPM). SOURCE:
U.S. Army (1984).
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FIGURE 3-1(c) Height velocity plots. SOURCE: U.S. Army (138-1).
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In the spirit of these analyses, a small sample of analyses is
now considered that might be informed by available or reasonably
attainable human performance models.
Mission Level Scenario Generation
Many analyses depend on some method of generating pseudo
behavior that can serve as a stand-in for what actual behavior would
be in an operational environment. Models for scenarios and time
lines are discussed in Parts II and III.
The traditional way of generating pseudo behavior is to stipulate
a mission, then have the analyst imagine how the actors would behave
within the constraints of the scenario and equipment. This process
is so labor intensive that it is impractical to repeat for small design
variants. Because of the expense of redoing the analysis, time lines are
out of date with respect to changes in the system design, rendering
them less useful than they otherwise might be (but see Aldrich,
Szabo, and Bierbaum, 1988, for examples of where, at substantial
expense, time line analyses are used to investigate major system
design trade-offs).
The use of a computational environment for such analyses in a
CAE workstation eases this constraint. Ideally, such a system would
have modules corresponding to
(1) external environment:
• terrain,
• external agents;
(2) design:
• methods/doctrine (procedures for accomplishing goals),
• abstract display and control functionality,
• crew and automation function assignments,
• display and control methods (procedures for accomplish-
ing goals using equipment),
• panel layouts; and
(3) pilot description:
• pilot models.
A scenario would be generated automatically from a high-level
mission statement (e.g., load 1000 pounds of fire-fighting equipment,
take off from forest service camp A, fly through valley B, deliver
equipment to fire camp C, return to base). Variants of the scenarios
would be generated by making changes to the modules (e.g., chang-
ing displays or even details of terrain). A set of 100 basic scenarios,
USE AND INTEGRATION OF MODELS 	 37
for example, might be used for the development of a cockpit. Varia-
tions in design would be flown against these 100 scenarios, perhaps
computed and analyzed overnight. Because the design itself would
be altered in a CAE system by modifying its machine representation,
this representation might be used, without the. labor-intensive oper-
ations now generally required, as input to the scenario analysis. In
this way the analyses would stay current with the design.
An automatic scenario generation system would require a so-
phisticated planning model (see Part III). Currently, this is proba-
bly feasible only for simplified situations, such as air-to-air combat
among two or a few aircraft, which has apparently been done in
the AASPEN system. On the other hand, it probably is feasible
to improve upon rigid time lines by using a model of the GOMS
sort, as described by Corker, Davis, Papazian, and Pew (1986) (see
Chapters 15 and 18). Figure 3-2 is a fragment of an analysis page
showing methods and doctrine that might be part of a typical mis-
sion analysis. This analysis would be used to generate actions for a
time line, rather than their being generated directly by hand. The
same method might also be applied to linking external mission level
tasks to the abstract display and control functionality, as well as to
the display and control methods for actually reading displays and
Mail ! pulating controls.
Time-Line Analyses
Figure 3-3 shows a possible time line generated from the opera-
tors in Figure 3-1. For each task the time line specifies a set of four
user-defined vectors (eventually these would be stored in a table look
ti p ). These vectors are
1. task priority—based on an expected value calculation, by
borrowing directly from algorithms included in the PRO CRU
model;
2. opportunity window—a duration of time within which the
task could be rescheduled if required (see below);
3. estimated completion time for discrete tasks; and
4. demand level—a vector quantity for each task that may
be borrowed directly (initially) from data obtained by Mc-
Cracken and Aldrich (1984).
This time line generates useful information that is the input
to several other analyses. In a CAE system, the time line itself
could be examined by using the class of tools often associated with
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EVADE-MISSILE-FIRE
JINK-OR-TURN-TAIL
.. JINK-AND-HIDE
... CHOOSE-JINK-DIRECTION
... JINK
.... WAIT-FOR-JINK
.... FLY-CONTOUR-AND-STOP
... STABILIZE-CRAFT
... HIDE
.... GO-TO-ELEVATION-AND-STOP
.... STABILIZE-CRAFT
.. TURN-TAIL-AND-HIDE
... TURN-TAIL
... STABILIZE-CRAFT
... HIDE
.... GO-TO-ELEVATION-AND-STOP
.... STABILIZE-CRAFT
.LEAVE-EVALUATE-DECISION
.. EXIT-FIRING-POSITION
... SELECT-EXIT-PATH
... NOE.AND-STOP
.. EVALUATE-DAMAGE
. CONTINUE-MISSION-DECISION
.. RETURN-TO-BASE
... CHOOSE-RETURN-PATH
... COORDINATE-AND-RETURN
.... COORDINATE-AND-RETURN-SEQUENCE
..... GIVE-EGRESS-COMMAND
......SEND-RADIO-MESSAGE
....... PLAN-AND-RETURN
..... AWAIT-MESSAGE
.... NOE-APPROACH
..... NOE-ADJUSTMENT
FIGURE 3
-2 Operator/suboperator summary of mission level methods.
displays an analysis of the time line as a tree on its side. The height
of each box is proportional to the percentage of time used in that
operation. To simplify the diagram, only those operations that use 5
percent or more of the time are shown. Users can expand each node
on the graph to get a subanalysis. The display can be set to count
the number of operation invocations instead of time, workload, or
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SEQUENCE TASK
I CHOOSE-JINK-DIRECTION
2 WAIT-FORJINK
3 FLY•CONTOUR-ANMTOP
4 STABILIZE-CRAFT
5 TURN-TAIL
6 STABILIZE-CRAFT
7 GO-TO-ELEVATION-AND-STOP
8 STABILIZE-CRAFT
FIGURE 3-3 Possible time line generated from operators in Figure 3-1.
memory load or to cumulate the information in various ways. Users
are, therefore, able to dynamically explore where system bottlenecks
exist and to adjust the design and rerun the analysis to compare the
differences.
Workload Analysis
The structure of the workload analysis is based upon combin-
ing particular features of the PROCRU, human operator simulator
(110S), Siegal and Wolf, and workload index (WINDEX) models de-
scribed in Part III. In particular, the analysis makes the distinction
between the sequential-scheduling aspects of multiple task environ-
ments and the concurrent-parallel aspects of those environments.
The principal input is a time line analysis, along with various user-
defined parameters described below, whereas its outputs are
• a workload profile over time, which may be used to gauge
overall mission difficulty and assess the workload reduction resulting
from training or automation; and
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• specific performance measures on some tasks.
Workload Analysis Model (WLAM) Structure
The structure of the WLAM is shown in Figure 3-5. A task time
line, which could be required as input for analysis, was described
earlier. The demand vector can be modified in important ways
as suggested below. The demand level vector has two important
components.
1. the processing resource structures demanded by the task—an
entry is required in at least one of the columns of Figure 3-6 (this is
a modification of North's 1985 WINDEX model); and
2. the demands for resources within each channel—these de-
mands can change from 0 to maximum (e.g., 10) as a function of the
task and the task characteristics. Thus, for example, the demands of
helicopter flight control will increase in the visual scene channel from
hovering in clear visibility (2-3) to hovering over featureless terrain
at twilight (6-8). The demands of continuous manual control will
increase with turbulence level.
The demand levels of all tasks to be performed concurrently are
input to a WINDEX-based workload computation (see below) whose
output is a scalar value of workload (WL) computed at one point
in time. This value is compared against a "maximum workload"
criterion (WL.). If WL G WL., the situation moves to the next
time point and WL is recomputed. If WL > WL. (workload is
excessive), then rescheduling is carried out. This logic simulates an
operator's strategy of task shedding when demands became excessive.
Ali tasks are checked according to their priority levels, and those of
lowest priority are abandoned and placed in a task queue.
Tasks in the queue are then joined by new tasks on the time line,
and these must compete with each other for reentry to the workload
matrix. The highest priority task in the queue will enter the matrix
if
• it has higher priority than tasks already in the queue, or
• the workload computed with its inclusion does not exceed
WL.. Discrete tasks leave the queue after their completion.
Task priorities may be governed by (1) user-defined baseline val-
ues (e.g., stability control has a higher priority than communications)
and (2) time passage (e.g,, a postponed task may gain priority with
the passage of time). This gain can be modeled by a function that
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Time Line Analysis r— j Task Queue
Priority
Opportunity
Window
TASK CHARACTERISTICS
Tasks
A B C etc.
Completion
Time
Demand
Resource
Structure ffF-
Low
F
High
r-----------^Active
Tasks
r-----------------^
i WorkloadComputation
L-----------------
No L
XTASK DEMAND VECTOR CONFLICT MATRIX
Resource Resource
R1	 R2	 R3	 etc. Ri	 R2	 R3
Task A4
	 2	 0 R7	 1.0	 0.40.2
Task B	 2	 0	 0 11 R2	 0.5	 0.5
etc. R3	 0.8
etc.
FIGURE 3-5 Workload analysis logic.
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increases linearly from the baseline value to a maximum v0ue until
the opportunity window is passed, then it is reset to zero.
The passage of time may also influence the demand level for
certain tasks. For example, responding to a request for data entry
will increase in demand as the time passes because of the increased
working memory load (or decreased reliability) of the material over
time.
Workload Computation
Any task can be identified by the set of demand values in Figure
3-6. The interference of this task perfo*med concurrently with a
second one is calculated by summing the demand values within each
column and multiplying (or adding) each sum to which both tasks
contribute to a resource conflict value. Examples of values, shown in
Figure 3-7, range from 0 to 1(1 to 10 if addition is used) and are based
upon assumptions from multiple-resource theory. For example, it
heavily penalizes two tasks that may compete for common processing
stages (manual data entry while controlling), codes (voice control
while rehearsing communications information), or display modalities
(requirement to target search while map reading). This computation
is carried out across all nonzero cells of the 8 by 8 matrix, and
workload is set as the sum across these cells. The aggregate conflict
value may be thought of as a penalty that is subtracted, in a manner
inversely proportional to the priority value, from the performance of
each task in a pair.
Continuous Tasks
It is clear that stability/flight path control will be a continuous
entry in the task matrix (except as replaced by autopilot). The
modeler should probably also be aware that planning is a continuous
task as well as one that is modulated over time according to the
depth of planning.
Outputs
In addition to the workload analysis, it is possible to make more
specific predictions of task performance. These include measures of
task delay for discrete tasks and are equal to the service time plus
time spent in the queue. Service time itself may be modified by
workload calculations. It may be lengthened in inverse proportion to
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the resources allocated. The output may also include degradations
in the quality of performance (e.g., loss in flight control resolution or
reduction of expected accuracy level of discrete task). Each task in
competition for resources required for other concurrently performed
tasks will be penalized proportionally to (1) the amount of resource
competition and (2) its priority value relative to the competition.
Thus, two time-shared tasks of equal priority will suffer equally if
they suffer at all.
For visual tasks, the percentage of resources allocated to visual
channels may be a fundamental parameter passed to the visual per-
formance models. Techniques from optimal control models can be
used to derive a signal-to-noise ratio for resolution of these visual
inputs as a function of the resources allocated.
Model Simplification
The workload analysis model may be simplified for exercise in
any of a number of directions. First, it may be made into an open-
loop model by breaking the feedback loop after the workload com-
putation in Figure 3-5. hence, no scheduling or prioritizing logic
would be employed other than that which is inherently built into
the fixed time line provided as input. Second, assumptions regarding
changing priorities or demand levels with the passage of time can
be abandoned. Third, assumptions regarding the resource competi-
tion between concurrent tasks can be simplified along any number of
lines, as suggested by the discussions in Part III. In particular, the
number of resources or channels assumed to modulate task compe-
tition can be reduced from the eight shown in Figures 3-6 and 3-7
to one. In this case there is no conflict matrix, and demand values
can simply be added across tasks. An example of a two-level vector
might be one that assigns task resources to one of two categories:
perceptual-cognitive or response.
At this point it appears that the model is relatively modular,
so simplifications of one sort do not distort the operation of other
components of the model.
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Model Exercise
Rather than fully aescribing the exercise for each of the two
problems—communications and pop-up—a brief description is pre-
sented of some of the implications of the model for the two prob-
lems performed concurrently. First, during preparation for unmask-
ing, planning activity would be particularly heavy, thereby impos-
ing conflict with concurrent tasks to the extent that the latter are
perceptual-cognitive (e.g., a penalty would be applied to understand-
ing communications). Additional high penalties would be imposed
on continuous manual control if a stable hover was required in tur-
bulent conditions with small margin for deviation (e.g., among the
trees). This demand would penalize heavily any tasks requiring key-
board data entry. After unmasking, heavy resources are demanded
by the task of visual scanning, which interfere extensively with the vi-
sual aspects of flight stabilization (maintaining position and altitude
over ground). These perceptual-cognitive demands will not however,
greatly disrupt response tasks such as voice output (e.g., reporting
targets) or keyboard data entry. Disruption of the keyboard task
should be reduced further if voice, rather than keyboard, is used for
data entry. If a secondary perceptual or cognitive task is imposed at
this time (e.g., determining fuel status or dealing with an instrument
advisory), performance of this task would be postponed until the
workload of one or both of the higher-priority tasks of flight path
control and target identification were reduced below criterion level.
Perceptual resource demands of target acquisition would be dictated
by measures of scene complexity and target-background similarity
(e.g., feature overlap). These measures should be provided by pa-
rameters passed from the visual models. Cognitive resource demands
of this task would be governed by measures of target identity and
location uncertainty, as well as by the number of relevant targets
to be located. Quantitative demands of communications would be
linearly related to message length and working memory load.
The quantitative value of the fraction of resources allocated to
flight path control and to target detection would be passed back to
the visual models.
Display Layout Analysis
The pilot's usual strategy for scanning an instrument display
is driven directly by his information needs. Important information
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channels or those delivering high bandwidth information will be fix-
ated frequently, whereas rapid transmissions may be observed be-
tween pairs of information channels that are associated with highly
cross-correlated information (e.g., rate of climb and altitude). Stud-
ies by Fitts and his colleagues (Fitts, Jones, and Milton, 1950) and by
Senders (1964, 1983) have confirmed these assertions. Furthermore,
human engineering applications of these conclusions by McRuer, Jex,
Clement, and Graham (1967) have demonstrated that display lay-
outs which are guided by analysis of fixation frequency and transition
probability can result in improved pilot-vehicle performance. Quite
simply, information sources that are fixated frequently should be lo-
cated near the center or top of the display. Those between which
transitions occur frequently should be located in close proximity to
each other. The concerns for close spatial proximity are guided not so
much by the time required for visual scanning as by cognitive orga-
nizational factors related to confusion of display elements and target
search. Hence, the design guidelines are equally applicable to the
design of heads-up displays (HUDs) and helmet-mounted displays in
which actual eye movement is less of a concern. However, it should
be noted that peripheral motion and guidance information may not
suffer from the constraints of visual scanning.
Besides fixation frequency and transition probability, six addi-
tional constraints must be considered in the analysis of display layout,
particularly for helicopter design.
(1) The requirement to scan instruments is unlikely to replace
outside-the-cockpit viewing. Hence, primary concern must focus on
the view outside as the primary flight instrument.
(2) Clustering of instruments in terms of system organization
facilitates interpretability. Thus, displays pertaining to the same
physical system, or the same functional system, should be displayed
contiguously (Goodstein, 1981). Although only two dimensions of
physical space are available to define contiguity, these may be aug-
mented by the use of color codes that define physical or functional
similarity.
(3) Optimal scanning patterns may differ between normal sys-
tem functioning and system abnormality. During the former, opera-
tors will sample from one each of a cluster of correlated instruments,
because sampling from other members of the same cluster provides
redundant information. During failure, however, operators will be
more likely to sample sequentially within a cluster (Moray, 1986).
USE AND INTEGRATION OF MODELS 	 49
(4) Display organization and clustering should also be guided
by stimulus-response compatibility. Hence, displays that provide
information relevant to left-handed controls should be positioned
to the left of those providing information relevant to right-handed
controls (Hartzell, Dunbar, Beveridge, and Cortilla, 1983).
(5) Some success at reducing the number of separate displays to
be scanned can be accomplished through object integration in which
two or more dimensions of quantitative or categorical information are
represented as dimensions of a single object (Barnett and Wickens,
1988).
(6) When display space is at a premium, computer-callable
displays—although sometimes necessary—should be incorporated
with considerable caution (Moray, 1981). Replacement of valuable
physical real estate by logical circuitry to make displays callable on
command will add the perceptual-motor (or speech) demands nec-
essary to call up the particular displays and will increase potential
memory and cognitive loads associated with knowing where one is in
a menu structure.
The steps necessary to accomplish this analysis are outlined in
Figure 3-8 and proceed as follows. From the time line analysis, an
information analysis is produced that provides a second-by-second
profile of the information necessary to perform the tasks. The N
channels along which such information may be displayed can be
placed in three N by N matrices that represent three different dimen-
sions of what is called "task proximity," shown on the right side of
Figure 3-8:
(1) Correlational proximity is based on the product moment cor-
relations between state values sampled within a four-se-ond window.
(2) Functional proximity is based on the model user's decision
of the extent to which two indicators must be integrated/compared
in performing a task (Boles and Wickens, 1987).
(3) Physical proximity is based on the similarity between the
physical sources of the two indicators of each pair of displayed sources.
Thus two indicators of rotor functioning are more similar than one
of rotor functioning and one of navigational functioning.
In addition to these three task proximity matrices, each channel
is associated with a value representing
(4) Frequency of use,
(5) Proximity to the windscreen, and
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(6) Associated relevant control actions.
The final matrix is defined by (7) the spatial proximity between
pairs of displays in a particular configuration. Display proximity
may be measured in centimeters. Alternatively, it should probably
be measured by the number of intervening displays between relevant
pairs (hence, adjacent displays would be assigned a value of zero).
Two displays configured as dimensions of a single object would also
have a display proximity of zero.
These data will not, by themselves, dictate an organizational for-
mat that minimizes the distance (correlational, functional, physical,
and responsive) between all related pairs of instruments, although
in theory they could be made to do so. however, criterion values of
distance along any combination of the three distance metrics (func-
tional, physical, and correlational) can be set, and a cockpit con-
figuration that is generated by designer's intuition can be checked
against these criteria to establish if the physical distance between
any particular pair violates the maximum distance criterion. (A pair
of instruments might be said to have this violation if they have a
task distance less than X, but are located with a physical distance
separation greater than Y). Similar criteria can be set for viola-
tions of stimulus-response compatibility or excessive distance of high
information displays from the outside-the-cockpit view. These cri-
teria may be weighted by the frequency of information use. This
scheme will allow the designer to alter the design in response to se-
vere violations of proximity and allow reconfiguration through rapid
prototyping.
Naturally, a tool of this sort is only as effective as the information
analysis that provides input to it and the talent of the designer or
expert who codes correlational, physical, and functional proximity.
Analysis output then would consist of listing all pairs of displays
that violate user-defined proximity criteria and all single displays
that violate (1) stimulus-response compatibility and (2) frequency
criteria for distance from the visual window.
DISCUSSION
Different demands are placed on a model of human vision or
cognition when it is used for engineering analysis than when it is
used by a scientist to fully characterize a visual or cognitive process.
To characterize a process or mechanism, a model should be "deep"
but usually need not be wide, because scientific models are typically
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concerned with small, subtle effects. They are intended to expli-
cate a mechanism that can be identified by an empirical signature
(observable phenomena), even if the empirical signature is small. It
is occasionally even useful to fit model parameters backward from
the data the model is to explain. By contrast, for engineering use,
models that are broadly applicable and robust are required. They
must generally be applied from an analysis of the situation they are
to model, with no fitting of parameters (zero-parameter predictions).
As Woods and Roth (1986, p. 29) in their study of models for nuclear
power plant operators say,
In part, the integration of heterogeneous concepts to model a
complex domain represents a heuristic to deal with a tradeoff
between the formal, applicable, and scope dimensions of models.
In general for the behavioral sciences, the more formal a model,
the narrower the coverage of and applicability to real world tasks.
Approximate models that trade precision for broad applicability
are often appropriate here, but it should be noted that the validity of
a model is logically prior to its ease of application. Easily applicable,
but wrong, models are still wrong and may be worse than no model
at all.
AFTERWORD
The suggestion has been made that the HF/CAE facility be con-
sidered as a framework for a set of tools to design helicopter and,
presumably, other aircraft cockpits. In developing this framework it
is important to provide for evolutionary growth of the facility and
to foster the acceptance of tools and models from many sources.
There is the opportunity to use the HF/CAE facility as a vehicle for
stimulating the development, evaluation, and refinement of tools and
models for design by a large community of students, researchers, and
practitioners in the human factors and aircraft design field. To do so,
the facility must be "open" in that its interfaces and programming
conventions should be available to groups outside of NASA. If this
is done, there is a good chance to build a large community of con-
tributors that collectively will help develop the facility into a widely
useful tool.
Attention is focused in this report on models for use in answering
questions about human performance relevant to helicopter design. In
building the facility, the focus can be on design models or design ques-
tions. Although this report is clearly directed toward models, it is
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probably more important for the design of the facility to concentrate
on developing tools that help answer design questions. These tools
will call on models that have been discussed, but it is the answers
that are needed. The models are a means to this end. The questions
will lead to the selection and prioritization of the models that should
be incorporated into the facility.
Finally, it is well known that designers have been reluctant to
use human performance models, possibly because these models are
unfamiliar to them. Familiarity now depends heavily upon personal
or at least colleague group knowledge. To introduce a new collection
of tools like those to be incorporated in the HF/CAE facility into a
design community requires that careful attention be paid to methods
for promoting acceptance by that community in a reasonable time.
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Paxt II
4
Introduction to Vision Models
At least four requirements must be met in order to develop a
computer-based model of the sensory performance of a pilot. First,
it must be possible to make quantitative or definite predictions of
sensory responses to measured input characteristics for appropriate
situations. This is a challenging task and one which daunts even the
most intrepid computer scientist who aspires to devising a machine
vision system equivalent to human perceptual performance.
Second, it must be possible to provide the computer with direct
physical measures of sensory input as opposed to encodings that can
only be made by a human observer. Third, it must be possible to
provide the components of the predictive system in compatible com-
puter algorithms. Fourth, the model should, in principle, be image
driven, which means that it should be able to respond to the physical
characteristics of the visual displays that confront the hypothetical
pilot. This requirement engages some of the most difficult problems
faced by computer scientists in their attempts to devise machine
vision systems that achieve results equivalent to human perceptual
performance. The question of empirical or principled psychophysical
prediction of human perceptual behavior is, therefore, only one of
the two major problems, actively investigated but by no means com-
pletely solved, on which the efficacy of pilot modeling must depend.
A great deal of quantitative and qualitative psychophysical in-
formation about human vision now exists that should be accessible
to designers. However, this inforration does not yet meet the four
requirements for a computer-based model of sensory performance.
Thus, one cannot do justice to such information in this report, not-
ing only where appropriate that it exists (Boll and Lincoln, 1986).
In the attempt to evaluate whether computerized pilot performance
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modeling is presently feasible, the chapters in Part II focus on what
seem to be critical aspects of visual input and perception.
The chapters in Part II move in a rough progression: from
early vision; through form perception, three-dimensional structure
through motion, flight estimation and object perception from flow
patterns, object recognition, and mental manipulation of objects; to
a final combination of views. These chapters offer a substantial, but
incomplete, sample of the visual tasks for which human performance
models axe needed that can be implemented now or in the near
future. These models should be able to predi .:A the information a pilot
retrieves from the visual environment and h: ad these predictions on
for further processing by decision and performance models.
Models are identified and referenced in all the chapters, but only
Watson and Zacharias (see Chapters 5 and 8) seem comfortable with
the proposition that existing models now or soon can be used to
simulate pilot visual performance in the domains with which their
chapters are concerned.
The models on early vision in Chapter 5 (as opposed to handbook
wisdom, no matter how quantitative) are in better shape than the
models in any of the other chapters. The kinds of questions addressed
are indicated by the chapters' subheadings. Although models that
might be image driven fare better in early vision than in the more
perceptual areas, much remains to be done. Thus, although some
models described therein could be used in simulation in which the
attempts at performance modeling ask special questions about target
visibility or the legibility of specific signals or symbols, in most cases
these models would have to be queried not by the cognitive group's
questions but through intervening higher perceptual questions. Also,
important gaps exist. For example, there is as yet no explicit bridge
between models of two-dimensional velocity detection and the ex-
traction of three-dimensional structure from such two-dimensional
velocity fields, a central issue in pilot performance. Again, although
attention and expectation are admittedly important in at least such
tasks as wire detection, these factors have not yet been embodied in
attempts to apply early vision models to specific problems.
Todd and Braunstein (Chapters 6 and 7) axe pessimistic about
the use of any cu*rently implementable models, calling for new mod-
els and for systematic gathering of the data on which to base them.
Todd, discussing shading cues of form, argues for the construction
of expert systems on vision that would guide human factors work
now and provide a more solid base for future models. Hochberg
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(see Chapter 11) agrees with this suggestion. Braunstein, reviewing
attempts to recover three-dimensional structure fro.n moving two-
dimensional displays, holds that no current models will work and a
way is needed to make present knowledge, as well as new research,
more accessible to the designer and to human factors practitioners.
On the other hand, Zacharias (see Chapter 8), dealing with the
extraction of flight state estimation from the same two-dimensional
displays and using essentially the same set of models, believes that
those models should be employed and presents a schematic system
for the simulation effort. The disagreement is primarily one of em-
phasis, rather than of analysis or even evaluation. Zacharias, like the
other authors, repeatedly notes the incompleteness of the models,
the serious constraints on the conditions in which they can be ap-
plied, and most important, the paucity of data in which predictions
from the models are validated against human performance. (Indeed,
few such validations are mentioned.) However, he argues that the
nap of the earth (NOE) situation provides stimulus arrays to which
some models may well be applicable (see Model Applications and
Limitations section in Chapter 8, page 119) within limits that will
impose cautions on their use.
In Chapter 9, Biederman presents a compelling account of object
perception—recognition-by-components—outlining material that
should be of great importance to the human factors of NOE mis-
sions, but a great deal of experimental and theoretical work remains
to be done. There are no currently implementable models that recog-
nize objects as well as humans do or by similar processes. However,
this has recently become an area of intense activity, and implemen-
tations by Biederman and his colleagues represent promising devel-
opments. One difference between many of the machine vision models
and human performance is that humans are very much affected by
orientation in the aircraft but only moderately affected by rotation
in depth. Processing time and effort are needed for recognizing in-
verted objects, so that mental manipulation of visual information
becomes important to object recognition and to navigation. That
is the topic of Chapter 10 by Cooper. Although some models are
mentioned there, they are poor candidates for human performance
model development at this time.
Chapter 11, by Hochberg, outlines two sets of problems that
arise, particularly with regard to the artificial displays currently used
in NOE flying: (1) viewers must combine successive partial views
of scenes, presented piecemeal in displays, into coherent schematic
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representations of scenes, events,or objects; and (2) the views of two
eyes when disparate, may combine in stereoscopic combination, in
alternating dominance, or in piecemeal rivalry. Although no models
suitable for simulating pilot performance currently exist for either
problem area, it does not seem impossible to achieve models for
limited aspects of these problems (i.e., those aspects that belong
most properly in early vision).
5
Models in Eaxly Vision
ANDREW B. WATSON
OVERVIEW
Early vision refers to those stages of vision that involve the
capture, preprocessing, and coding of visual information, but do
not involve interpretation or other cognitive processing of visual
information. A number of models of parts of early vision are reviewed
here: temporal dynamics, spatial processing, and motion processing.
For present purposes, a model is defined as a simulation of some
physical system, typically as a set of mathematical expressions or
computer programs, that produces explicit predictions. For pur-
poses of comparison, models may be rated according to breadth,
depth, and accuracy, as well as whether they predict competence
or performance. A competence model describes how a task is done,
whereas a performance model describes how well the task is ac-
complished, without necessarily indicating how it is done. Models
may also be distinguished by their degree of validation, their imple-
mentation, the nature of their inputs and outputs, their domain of
operation, restrictions on their operation, and their applications.
In the domain of spatial vision, a number of models have been
implemented which are reasonably broad and accurate, but shallow.
Most are concerned only with detection and discrimination, and then
only of rather specific simple targecs. Howeve, , they provide the basis
for a fairly general and competent model of visibility, that is, of what
can and cannot be seen. The generality of these models could be
increased by a more thorough treatment of masking. At the level
of coding or representation, there are a number of interesting and
plau0ble approaches, but little of this work has been validated by
experiment.
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In the temporal domain, current models generally predict the
visibility of temporal fluctuations in luminance or contrast. The
models are highly developed, accurate, and relatively well validated,
but shallow and narrow in domain. Integration with spatial models,
motion models, and models of light adaptation would considerably
extend their domain and utility.
As in other domains that have been considered, models that
predict the visibility of moving signals are well developed and do
not pose serious implementation problems. Models of higher-level
estimation, including several that estimate local velocity at several
scales, have been implemented but are more speculative. Nonethe-
less, they may be of considerable value. They already incorporate
the visibility aspect, as well as many known properties of human mo-
tion sensing. They are thus more than simple models of competence,
although less than complete models of performance.
The perceptual process can be partitioned into three segments:
filtering, coding, and interpretation. Filtering determines what in-
formation is captured and what is lost, either within the total system
or within a particular stream or channel. Coding describes how spe-
cific visual mechanisms represent particular components of visual
information. Interpretation describes how the coded information—
perhaps from numerous sources, including memory—is used to de-
termine the state of objects in the visible world.
The models reviewed in this chapter deal largely wi ch the filtering
stage, slightly with the coding stage, and hardly at all with interpre-
tation. The models that inspire the most confidence are clearly those
at the earliest stages. Indeed, there is no obstacle to the creation
of a fairly comprehensive model of visibility that would incorporate
spatial, temporal, and motion sensitivities, as well as the effects of
mean luminance and location in the visual field. Work on the later
stages is vigorous, but there are currently no convincing models of
coding and interpretation.
INTRODUCTION
A sad consequence of the expanding knowledge of human vision
is the increasing compartmentalization of vision science. Early vision
has come to refer to those stages that involve the capture, preprocess-
ing, and perhaps the coding of visual information, but do not include
interpretation or other cognitive processes. Fortunately, the precise
border between early and late vision is not of great consequence.
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This chapter considers a number of models of parts of early vision,
spatial processing, temporal sensitivity, and motion processing. It
begins with a discussion of models per se: what they are, how they
may be integrated, and how they are related to simulation.
WHAT IS A MODEL?
The word "model" has many definitions, and several are to
be found even within the pages of this report. For the purposes
of this chapter, a model is defined as a simulation of some physical
system. Although this simulation might take mechanical or electronic
form, it is typically a set of mathematical expressions or computer
programs. A defining characteristic, however, is that it produces
explicit outcomes. This, therefore, excludes qualitative, intuitive, or
purely conceptual descriptions of a process.
Beyond this, models can be distinguished along many dimensions
(Watson, 1987c). How large a piece of reality do they encompass in
breadth (one receptor versus the complete set of receptors) and in
depth (ranging from the optics of the eye to behavioral performance)
and with what accuracy do they mimic that reality? How explicit
is the model? Are models of both competence and performance of
interest? Vision science has numerous modest, ad hoc models of
small components of performance, mostly in a form less explicit than
computer code. Because these model fragments are not likely to be
useful for simulating interesting segments of reality, this chapter is
confined to a few explicit models of sizable parts of the system.
MODEL ATTRIBUTES
To get a better grasp of the capacities and limitations of existing
vision models it is useful to determine the following attributes for
each model:
a Validation: Are there data demonstrating agreement between
the model and human performance, or the superiority of the model
over other models?
a Implementation: Does the model exist in the form of com-
puter programs? If not, could the programs be developed easily?
a Input: Distinction is made between models that are image
driven and those that are parameter driven. In the former, the input
is an image or sequence of digital images derived, for example, from
a camera and digitizer, and the output is some prediction of human
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performance relative to those images. In the latter, the output may
be the same but the input is some set of parameters, for example,
the coordinates of points or the amplitude and phase of a sinusoidal
grating. While the latter sort of model may be useful, it begs the
question of how the visual system derives the parameters from the
image data. This relates to the issue of generality of input. An image
input is quite general, whereas a model accepting an amplitude and
phase as an input has no natural way of treating a natural image.
For each model then, one may ask: Is it image driven or parameter
driven? What are the parameters? As noted, a model typically
simulates some piece of the chain from sensation to action. As one
moves further along this chain, it becomes less and less likely that the
input can be drawn directly from the physical environment (i.e., be
image driven). This means that these later models depend critically
on the assumptions regarding their input, which is some internal
state not known to exist.
• Outputs: Outputs can be represented in terms either of hu-
man performance in a well-specified task or of some observer knowl-
edge of the observed world. A disadvantage of the latter is that it
requires an additional step to actually predict performance, whereas
a disadvantage of the former is that it cannot predict any task other
than the one for which it was designed.
Restrictions: What, if any, are the restrictions on the appli-
cation of the model, beyond those implicit in the characterization of
the inputs and outputs?
• Applications: How might the model be used to simulate pilot
performance? Although this general question is considered in more
detail in the section on integration, models can play a role as a.
component in some larger integrated simulation of the pilot or as a
discrete simulation of some isolated fragment of performance.
Domain: It is useful to categorize the various models of low-
level vision in terms of the primary input variables with which they
are concerned: temporal, spatial, and motion. For each domain, this
chapter presents a sequence of models, usually proceeding upward in
terms of the complexity of dimensionality of the inputs and outputs.
SPATIAL VISION
A spatial model can be defined as that which proceeds from an
input defined primarily in spatial terms (e.g., as a static luminance
image), to some human performance relative to that input or to
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some estimates of the spatial configuration of surfaces, textures, or
objects. Such models may be useful for predicting the visibility
of information and for describing human representation of visual
spatial information. Models of the earliest stages of spatial vision are
concerned primarily with the detection of luminance contrast and
the discrimination of simple spatial imagery.
Wilson and colleagues have developed a series of models for de-
tection and discrimination of spatial patterns (Wilson and Bergen,
1979; Wilson and Gelb, 1984). The essence of these models is a
set of sensors with specific spatial and temporal weighting functions
(receptive fields), and a specific nonlinear output function for each
receptive field. There are a number of different sizes of receptive
fields, all of which grow with increasing distance from the fovea.
Inputs are usually one-dimensional continuous luminance patterns
(e.g., vertical lines or gratings), and output is a small set of numbers
(between approximately 4 and 150, depending on the model) that are
the sensor responses. Rules are given for converting these numbers
into performance on various tasks, such as detection and discrimina-
tion of various patterns. The models predict' a wide variety of data,
such as contrast sensitivity, effects of frequency adaptation, and fre-
quency discrimination. There has been little independent validation
of the models. Shortcomings of these models include the following:
(1) they operate only on one-dimensional images, (2) there is no gen-
eral scheme for predicting performance from sensor responses, and
(3) more complex tasks would require a more complete specification
of the sensor set, because the small number of sensors defined clearly
does not capture all the visual information (Nielsen and Wandell,
1986).
Burbeck and Kelly (19?0) predict thresholds for sinusoids in
space and time by means of a filter that is characterized in both
spatial and temporal dimensions. No mechanism is provided for
extending the predictions to arbitrary targets. Because this is a
"single-channel" model, it cannot predict second-order effectors due
to multiple channels (Watson, 1982).
Carlson and Cohen (1980) have a model designed primarily to
predict the visibility of artifacts (such as blur and aliasing) in teievi-
sion displays. The input is a one-dimensional image decomposed into
several bans of spatial frequency which are then perturbed by noise,
'Here and elsewhere in the text, the phrase "the model predicts" is used to
mean "the model generates a prediction, which may or may not be correct."
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squared, and integrated. Later modifications introduce change in
spatial scale with eccentricity (Carlson and Klopfenstein, 1985). The
model has been applied with some success to predict one-dimensional
hyperacuity thresholds (thresholds for visual elements smaller than
the dimensions of a human cone).
Klein and Levi (1985) have created a model to interpret hyper-
acuity thresholds. It accepts one-dimensional spatial waveforms and
generates a space-frequency diagram or viewprint which, with further
processing, predicts certain detection and discrimination thresholds.
Like Wilson's models, it incorporates multiple sizes of receptive fields
and a nonlinear contrast-response function. A distinctive feature of
the model is that some phase information is discarded by combining
the response energies of odd and even receptive fields. Shortcomings
of the model are (1) it operates only in one dimension, and (2) there is
no general scheme for predicting performance from sensor responses.
Watt and Morgan (1985) have developed a model that transforms
a one-dimensional spatial waveform into an ordered list of "primi-
tives," such as regions of signed response and inactivity. These prim-
itives have been related in somewhat indirect ways to human perfor-
mance in detection and discrimination of contrast and blur. There are
difficulties in extending the model to two dimensions (Watt, 1987).
It seems doubtful that the primitives suggested provide a complete
description of the visible image information. Programs exist for this
model.
Geisler and Davila (1985) have developed a model of detection
and discrimination based on an ideal observes and the known prop-
erties of the visual optics and receptors. It can predict detection and
discrimination of arbitrary foveal two-dimensional spatial patterns.
With additional assumptions, it can predict color discriminations.
Its predictions often agree in form with human performance but typ-
ically differ in absolute sensitivity by about 1.5 log units. Programs
for this model are available (Geisler, 1987). Because the model deals
only with losses of information at the very earliest stages of vision
prior to the electrical response of the receptors, it cannot predict
phenomena due to losses of information later in the system. It is
nevertheless a powerful and general first approximation to a descrip-
tion of human visual sensitivity.
Watson and colleagues (Ahumada and Watson, 1985; Nielsen,
Watson, and Ahumada, 1985; Watson, 1983), have a model which ac-
cepts :arbitrary two-dimensional spatial images and transforms them
to an internal feature vector of many thousands of elements, which
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are then acted on by an uncertain ideal observer. Each element of
the feature vector is the response of a sensor with a Gabor-shaped
receptive field. The model predicts contrast detection thresholds
and discrimination thresholds for arbitrary two-dimensional images
placed anywhere in the visual field. It has a modest amount of vali-
dation and has been implemented on various machines. A simplified
version has been used as the basis of a scheme for image coding
(Watson 1987a,b). Shortcomings are that the model (1) functions
only at threshold; (2) is large and cumbersome; and (3) like the
model of Geisler and Davilla (1985), fails to predict "higher-level'
discrimination (Nielsen et al., 1985).
Whereas the preceding models are concerned primarily with de-
tection and discrimination, a number of models have been advanced
that purport to describe the coding or representational properties
of early spatial vision. Examples are the zero-crossing representa-
tion proposed by Marr and Hildreth (1980), the MIRAGE model of
Watt and Morgan (1985) mentioned above, the CORTEX transform
of Watson (1987a,b), and the boundary contour and feature con-
tour systems described by Grossberg (1987). All of these schemes
are somewhat speculative at this point, and none has compelling evi-
dence in its favor. Nevertheless, if they were to be made more explicit
and linked more closely to performance, and perhaps to physiology,
a clearer picture in this area may emerge. One general difficulty is
that the visual system is not a serial sequence of processing modules
but rather several parallel streams. Since each stream may require a
different model, it is essential to know which performance is due to
which stream.
There is also a large body of work in the computer vision liter-
ature on "early vision," that deals with feature detection and repre-
sentational schemes, but little of this work relates directly to a model
of human performance. The work is nevertheless a useful source of
ideas concerning the computational and functional aspects of early
vision.
Prospects
At the level of early vision, models are expected to provide
predictions of simple detection and discrimination, and perhaps some
indication of how the spatial image is represented internally or, put
another way, how primitive image properties are estimated. Most
of the models considered in this review are concerned simply with
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detection and discrimination, and only with rather specific targets.
However, they provide the basis for a fairly general and competent
model of visibility, that is, of what can and cannot be seen. At the
level of representation, little work has been closely tied to human
performance, but this is an active area of research that will also
benefit from synergy with research on artificial vision.
TEMPORAL SENSITIVITY
The temporal nature of a stimulus has important effects on
visibility and discriminability, and models in this area attempt to ac-
count for these effects. Input is typically a continuous time waveform
specifying the brightness or contrast of an image, and output is the
detection threshold for that waveform. Internally, most models have
the form of a linear filter or filters, whose parameters may depend in
nonlinear ways on the adapting luminance, followed by some point
nonlinearity, further integration, and a threshold (De Lange, 1952;
Fourtes and Hodgkin, 1964; Kelly, 1961; Rashbass, 1970; Sperling
and Sondhi, 1968). A review of this early work is provided by Watson
(1986).
Kelly (1971a,b) has introduced refinements that allow the spatial
configuration of the target to control the amount of low-frequency
attenuation. Roufs (1972) has developed a quite complete analytic
formulation, whose parameters are estimated from extensive data on
thresholds for pulses and sinusoids at various adapting luminances.
Watson (1979, 1986; Miller, 1984) has emphasized the role of prob-
ability summation over time and has attempted to test his model
against a ,vide range of aperiodic waveforms.
The visibility of temporal signals is not separable from their
spatial configuration, so that purely temporal models are of limited
practical use. Several efforts have been made to combine both spatial
and temporal models of visibility. As noted above, some of the
models have parameters that are controlled by spatial configuration.
Burbeck and Kelly (1980) have derived a spatial temporal filter that
is reported to account for thresholds for spatial temporal sinusoids.
Watson, Ahumada, and Farrell (1986) have shown how a very simple
first-order model of spatial temporal visibility can be derived by
assuming approximate separability.
Most of the simple temporal models are available in explicit form,
usually as mathematical expressions but occasionally as computer
programs (Watson, 1986). They are "image driven" in the sense
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that their input is luminance or contrast over time. The author is
aware of no fully .implemented, image-driven computer programs that
include both spatial dimensions, the time dimension, and the effects
of adapting luminance. However, the principles for constructing such
a program are clear.
Prospects
Models of temporal sensitivity are highly developed, accurate,
and relatively well validated, but narrc.v in domain. Integration with
spatial models and with models of light adaptation would extend
their usefulness considerably.
MOTION PROCESSING
A model of early motion sensing is defined as one that proceeds
from the visual input to some human performance or to estimates
of the three-dimensional motion parameters (and confidence mea'
sures) of objects in the recent visual field, and of the self relative to
those objects. No existing models satisfy this definition completely,
but many address aspects of it. In particular, there are models of
motion detection, of one-dimensional direction estimation, and of
two-dimensional velocity estimation.
At the earliest level, models of motion detection exist (Burbeck
and Kelly, 1980; Watson, 1986). These allow one to compute the
probability of detection of spatial temporal perturbations in lumi-
nance (see preceding section). As such, they are not specifically
"motion" models, but, nonetheless, serve to predict the visibility of
moving images. They do not estimate motion parameters. Each
suffers from various restrictions, and neither has been fully imple-
mented; but each could be expanded, generalized, and implemented
without extraordinary effort. Both have a substantial amount of
empirical validation.
At the next level are models of one-dimensional direction estima-
tion (i.e., discriminating one of two possible directions of a moving
pattern) (Adelson and Bergen, 1985; Van Santen and Sperling, 1984,
1985; Watson and Ahumada, 1983). Typically these are models of a
single sensor, which accept an input with one spatial and one tem-
poral dimension. The spatial temporal receptive field of the sensor
is arranged so as to respond to only one-dimensional direction of
motion. Thus a pair of units, tuned for opposite directions, predicts
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the apparent one-dimensional direction of the image at one location.
A distinctive feature of these models is that each sensor is tuned for
a band of spatial frequency, so that the motion sensing is carried out
at several scales in parallel. The models have some validation and
either have been implemented or could be with moderate effort.
Next are models that estimate two-dimensional velocity fields
over a space-time image (i.e., discriminating the two-dimensional di-
rection of a moving pattern from any possible direction) (Heeger,
1987; Watson and Ahumada, 1985). Input is a sequence of dis-
crete two-dimensional images, output is several velocity flow-field
sequences, one at each of several spatial scales. Each vector within
a flow-field is an estimate of the two-dimensional velocity of image
corn ponents at a particular resolution and location. Both models
operate by first applying a set of local sensors tuned for different
directions and then resolving the set of responses into a single esti-
mate of local velocity. The models are based on several well-validated
aspects of human visual function, but neither has much validation.
The models have been implemented.
Another model in this general class is that of Marr and Ullman
(1981), which computes approximate direction at the locations of
edges. The basic algorithm is based on a comparison of spatial and
temporal gradients ( ennema and Thompson, 1979), which does not
fare well at motion discontinuities or textures (Kearney, Thompson,
and Boley, 1987) and does not agree with the spatial frequency
tuning of human perception. It has been implemented by Batalia
and Ullman (1979), but there is little published validation.
Beyond this point, models do not usually begin at the image
level, but rather at the level of defined points or contours. For
example, there are the various algorithms that derive, from a set
of corresponding two-dimensional projected points in several frames,
the three-dimensional structure and motion of the objects on which
the points lie (see Chapters 7 and 8). These models come largely
from the machine vision literature and are often concerned only
tangentially with human performance.
Prospects
As in the other domains, models that predict the visibility of
moving signals are quite well developed and do not pose serious im-
plementation problems. Models of higher-level estimation are much
more speculative. Nonetheless, they may be of considerable valve
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They already incorporate the visibility aspect and were designed to
simulate at least some of the evident properties of human vision.
They are thus more than simple models of competence, although less
than complete models of performance. Future models may benefit
from rapid advances in the knowledge of the physiology of motion
pathways (Emerson, Citron, Vaughn, and Klein, 1987; Movshon,
Adelson, Gizzi, and Newsome, 1986). Finally, there are efforts un-
derway to link these low-level models to higher-level estimates of
three-dimensional object motion (Zacharias, Caglayan, and Sinacori,
1985).
SUMMARY
It is useful to partition early vision into three processes: fil-
tering, coding, and interpretation. F:icring determines what infor-
mation is captured and what is 'lost, either within the total system
or within a particular stream or rhannel. Examples are the spatial
filter expressed in the contrast sensitivity function, the temporal fil-
ter expressed in the temporal contrast sensitivity function, and the
spectral luminosity function that describes how well each wavelength
contributes to luminance. Coding describes how specific visual mech-
anisms represent particular components of visual information. For
example, a motion sensor may represent the velocity at a particu-
lar location. Interpretation describes how the coded information—
perhaps from many sources including memory—is used to deduce the
staig of objects in the visible world.
The models reviewed here deal primarily with the filtering stage,
rather than with coding or interpretation. The models that inspirs
the most confidence are those of the earliest stages. Indeed, no
obstacle exists to the creation of a fairly comprehensive model of
visibility incorporating spatial, temporal, and motion sensitivities,
and the effects of mean luminance and location in the visual field.
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6
Models of Static Form Perception
JAMES T. TODD
The purpose of this chapter is to review current theoretical anal-
yses of how human observers (e.g., pilots) are able to determine the
three-dimensional structures of objects and surfaces in the surround-
ip ; environment from statically presented patterns of light intensity.
the process of image formation is considered first, that is to say, the
way in which the reflection of light by surfaces in the environment
produces a structured pattern of stimulation at the point of obser-
vation. Existing methods for analyzing different aspects of optical
structure are then examined, with careful attention paid to the as-
sumptions about image formation that must be satisfied for these
analyses to perform as advertised. The discussion is organized ac-
cording to the complexity of optical structure being analyzed. First,
perceptions of shape and surface quality from smooth variations in
image shading are discussed. Next, the detection of abrupt disconti-
nuities in shading and the manner in which they must be organized
and categorized are considered. Finally, current models are reviewed
for the analysis of surface shape from different types of image discon-
tinuities including texture, reflectance contours, occlusion contours,
and the edges of plane-faced polyhedra.
IMAGE GENERATION
The amount of light that reflects from a surface in any given
direction depends on a variety of physical variables including the
orientation, roughness, and chemical composition of the surface, as
well as the positions and spectral compositions of the sources of il-
lumination. Most recent analyses of image formation (Blinn, 1977;
Blinn and Newell, 1976; Cook and Torrance, 1981; Kay and Green-
berg, 1979; Phong, 1975; Whitted, 1980) model the reflection of light
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as a linear combination of two separate components, referred to as
diffuse and specular reflection. The diffuse component of reflection
refers to light that is scattered equally in all directions. It originates
from multiple surface reflections on a rough surface or from inter-
nal scattering when the incident light is able to penetrate beneath
the surface. The intensity of diffusely reflected light at any given
point of observation depends on the surface albedo and the angle of
illumination. However, because the reflected light is scattered in all
directions, its intensity is independent of viewing position. The spec-
ular component represents the highlights produced by the mirrorlike
properties of shiny surfaces in which reflected light is concentrated in
a particular direction. The image intensity of a specula: surface will
vary with viewing position and can be modeled for a variety of sur-
face materials by using the Beckman distribution function (Beckman
and Spizzichino, 1963).
Analysis of image shading becomes considerably more complex
when the environment is cluttered with many different objects be-
cause the amount of light reflected from one surface can be influ-
enced dramatically by the presence of another. One such effect is
the appearance of cast shadows which occur when light rays headed
toward a visible surface are occluded by an opaque object. A re-
lated phenomenon occurs when transparent surfaces are observed.
For example, consider the pattern of image shading produced by a
pool of clear water. Some light rays are reflected from the surface
of the pool. Others are transmitted through the water and reflected
from the bottom. Both sets of reflected rays eventually combine to
determine the pattern of image intensity at a point of observation.
Another way in which patterns of shading can be affected by surface
interactions is through the process of indirect illumination. When-
ever a surface is illuminated, some of the incident energy is reflected
in many directions and can illuminate other objects in exactly the
same way as direct illumination from a luminous body such as the
sun.
IMAGE ANAYLSIS
In a model of image formation, the structure of the environment
is given and the resulting pattern of light intensity (i.e., image) at
a point of observation must be computed. In a model of visual per-
ception, however, the problem is reversed: that is, a, pattern of light
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intensity is given and the structure of the environment that pro-
duced it must be determined. Because mapping from environmental
structure to images is "many-to-one," inverse mapping cannot be
computed uniquely without applying additional constraints to the
solution.
Shape from Shading
The lowest possible level of image structure that could contain
information at3ut an object's three-dimensional form is the quantity
of reflected light from each local region, commonly referred to as
image shading. One possible model for determining an object's shape
from shading has been developed by Horn and his coworkers (Horn,
1975,1977,1981; Ikeuchi and Horn, 1981). The goal of this analysis is
to determine the local orientation of a visible surface region from the
intensity of its reflected light. To constrain the solution the model
assumes that (1) the direction of illumination is known, (2) the
spectral composition of the light source is known, (3) the surface has
a homogeneous reflectance, (4) its albedo is known, (5) there are no
speculas highlights, (6) shadows are cast on the surface, (7) there is no
indirect illumination, (8) there is no transparency, and (9) the surface
is smooth. Horn has shown that whenever these assumptions are
satisfied, the local surface orientation can be computed by solving a
set of differential equations. The problem, of course, in applying this
model in an uncontrolled natural environment is that the required
assumptions are seldom, if ever, satisfied.
Pentland (1982, 1984b) and, more recently, Lee and Rosenfeld
(1983, 1985) have developed an alternative approach to Horn's that
does not require prior knowledge of the direction of illumination or
the surface albedo. To compute the direction of illumination, these
models assume that all possible surface orientations occur with equal
frequency throughout the observed scene. The models also differ
from Horn's in the manner in which local surface orientation is com-
puted. Horn's model uses the known albedo and illumination to
establish a mapping between individual intensity values and their
corresponding surface orientations. The analyses of Pentland and
of Lee and Rosenfeld, in contrast, use the gradient of intensity to
compute surface orientation: the magnitude of the gradient is used
to estimate surface slant, and the direction of the gradient is used to
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estimate surface tilt. This assumes, however, that the observed sur-
face region is locally spherical (i.e., that the magnitude of curvature
is equal in all directions).
Pentland (1984a, 1986) has also extended this analysis to elimi-
nate the assumption of surface smoothness. If the roughness of the
surface is governed by a spatially isotropic fractal function, which
seems to be the case for many naturally occurring surfaces, then
the average orientation of the surface can be determined from the
statistical variations in image intensity. The tilt of the surface is
specified by the direction in which there is the highest frequency of
variation in intensity, and the slant is estimated by the magnitude of
this frequency relative to the average value within a more globally
defined region.
Although there are several important differences among these
models for computing shape from shading, a few critical assumptions
are shared by all, namely, that the observed surface has a homo-
geneous reflectance with homogeneous illumination and that there
are no transparencies or specular highlights. It is important to keep
in mind that these assumptions are frequently violated under nat-
ural viewing conditions, and there is some psychophysical evidence
to suggest that such violations may have little or no effect on the
perception of shape from shading by actual human observers (Beck,
Prazdny, and Ivry, 198,'; Gilchrist, 1979; Hagen, 1976; Metelli, 1974;
Todd and Mingolla, 1,83). In one recent experiment, for exam-
ple, Mingolla and Todd (1986) obtained observers' local orientation
judgments for simulated ellipsoid surfaces with differing reflectance
functions. On the basis of existing theory it would be reasonable to
predict that the addition of specular highlights in a display should
increase the error in observers' judgments. That was not the case,
however. Indeed, there was a small but statistically significant im-
provement in performance as the proportional contribution of the
specular component to image intensity increased.
Surface Quality from Shading
Another important issue that must be considered in the analysis
of image shading concerns the determination of surface quality, in-
cluding such distinctions as matte versus shiny, rough versus smooth,
opaque versus transparent, and light versus dark. Human observers
are in fact quite good at identifying different surface materials un-
der a broad range of conditions. Most of the existing work in this
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area has focused primarily on the perception of surface reflectance
(e.g., albedo and color) under conditions of varying illumination (i.e.,
the phenomenon of lightness and color constancy). There are many
different models of this phenomenon (Brill, 1979; Land, 1986; Land
and McCann, 1971; Wandell and Maloney, 1984; Weinberg, 1976),
all of which compare the spectral characteristics in any given unit
area with other unit areas throughout the entire scene. The models
differ in terms of the extent to which they can tolerate variations
in illumination, and whether or not they require prior knowledge
about the reflectances of certain objects to provide a reference for
subsequent calculations.
A fundamental assumption in all of these models of lightness and
color constancy is that the observed surfaces in a scene are completely
opaque. This does not seem to be the case, however, for actual hu-
man observers. There is considerable psychopliysical evidence that
observers can perceive the transparency of a surface under appropri-
ate experimental conditions. Models of this phenomenon, pruposed
by Metelli (1974) and by Beck et al. (1984), can successfully predict
the perceived transparency of a surface from the lightness values in
several neighboring regions subject to certain configural constraints.
Some research has also been reported on the perception of sur-
face roughness. Pentland (1984a, 1986) has argued that the fractal
dimension of any given image region provides potential information
about the roughness of the depicted surface in that region. This
hypothesis seems to be supported by observers' judgments of surface
roughness: if the fractal dimension of an image is 2 (i.e., the same
as its topological dimension), the surface is perceived as smooth. As
the fractal dimension is made larger than 2, the apparent roughness
of the surface increases.
Edge Detection
Many of the existing techniques for computing the structure of
the environment from visual images do not work directly from image
intensities but are designed instead to interpret image contours or
edges, which are defined by abrupt changes in intensity. The detec-
tion of image contours has thus become an active area of research ir,
both human and machine vision.
The most common method of contour detection is to convolve
the image with an appropriate set of locally applied "edge operators,"
and much evidence suggests that a similar strategy has evolved in
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biological systems. A variety of different local operators have been
proposed as possible mechanisms for the process of edge detection
(Canny,1986; Grimson and Hildreth, 1985; Haralick, 1984; Marr and
Hildreth, 1980; Torre and Poggio, 1986). Most of these operators are
generically quite similar. The image is first smoothed at a particular
scale by convolving it with a regularizing function (e.g., a Gaussian
or a Gabor); then a differentiation operator (e.g., the Laplacian) is
applied to detect rapid changes in intensity.
A fundamental problem with this general method of edge detec-
tion is that the response of each local operator combines the effects
of many different image properties such as edge position, orienta-
tion, and contrast, which must ultimately be disentangled. It is
also not clear how a population of local operators could produce
the global patterns of organization so characteristic of human per-
ception. Some researchers have attempted to address these issues
by using parallel distributed networks of neural elements (Walters,
1986a,b; Zucker, 1986). The most well-developed model of this genre
has been proposed in a series of recent articles by Grossberg and Min-
golla (1985a,b; 1987). Their model uses an ingenious combination
of competitive and cooperative interactions to sharpen and organize
the outputs of local operators, and has been employed to simulate a
surprisingly broad range of psychophysical phenomena in the areas
of pattern and form perception.
Another important issue that has received only limited atten-
tion in the analysis of image contours is the problem of contour
classification. Image contours can arise from a variety of physical
phenomena including changes in surface reflectance, changes in illu-
mination (e.g., shadows), specular highlights, abrupt discontinuities
in surface geometry (e.g., the edges of polyhedra), and the occlusion
of one part of a surface by another. Existing techniques for determin-
ing the three-dimensional form of a surface from patterns of image
contours inevitably assume that the process of contour classification
has already been performed.
Reflectance Contours
One possible source of information about the three-dimensional
form of a visible surface is provided by the overall pattern of reflection
contours. Suppose, for example, that the reflectance contours on a
surface form small bounded regions called texture elements (e.g., the
spots on a leopard). The projected sizes and shapes of these texture
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elements would vary systematically with the surface geometry. In
particular, the projected size of each element would decrease with the
square of its distance from the point of observation, and the projected
shape of each element would be compressed (i.e., foreshortened) by
increasing surface orientation relative to the direction of gaze. Thus,
any systematic variation over space in the projected sizes and shapes
of bounded texture elements provides potential information about
the geometry of an observed surface.
The first computational analyses of this type of texture pattern
were developed by Gibson and his associates in the 1950s (Gibson,
1950; Purdy, 1958). These analyses assume that the observed surface
is planar and that its distribution of texture elements is stochastically
regular (i.e., that the texture elements within equal areas of a surface
have comparable distributions of size, shape, and density). When-
ever these assumptions are satisfied, the gradients of size, shape, or
density in the optical projection of the texture pattern can be used to
determine the orientation of the surface in three-dimensional space.
More recent analyses have attempted to analyze the three dimen-
sional structures of curved surfaces from patterns of optical texture.
One approach adopted by Witkin (1981) assumes that the texture
elements are approximately circular and viewed from a sufficiently
long viewing distance to approximate a parallel projection. Surface
orientation in that case can be computed from the foreshortening
of each element in the visual image. Another approach adopted by
Stevens (1981a) assumes that each element is approximately circular,
of known size, and viewed under strong polar projection. Under these
conditions, the depth of each texture element can be determined by
the length of its optical projection.
There is little evidence to suggest that any of these models have
much in common with the processes of human perception. For ex-
ample, in a recent series of experiments, Todd and Akerstrom (1987)
asked observers to estimate the perceived eccentricity of simulated
ellipsoid surfaces that were depicted by using various types of texture
patterns. The results demonstrated that the perception of a curved
surface can be achieved under a variety of theoretically anomalous
conditions including both parallel and polar projections, as well as
displays in which all of the projected texture elements have constant
length, constant foreshortening, or constant area. Todd and Aker-
strom proposed that changes in the perceived depth of a surface are
determined by smooth variations over space in the widths of its pro-
jected texture elements. A specific implementation of this analysis
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was proposed, based on the neural network model of Grossberg and
Mingolla (1987), which provides a close fit to the psychophysical data
over a wide range of experimental conditions.
A second method of deriving the three-dimensional form of a
surface from its projected pattern of reflectance contours focuses on
the nature of contour intersections rather than the regions that are
bounded by contours (i.e., the texture elements). One such model,
recently proposed by Stevens (1981b, 1983), assumes that the con-
tours on a surface are restricted to lines of maximum and minimum
curvature. Based on this assumption, it is possible to determine the
local Gaussian curvature of a surface in the neighborhood of a con-
tour intersection. If one of the contours projects to a straight line,
the surface is parabolic (i.e., a plane or a cylinder). If the contours
project to curves of the same sign, the surface is elliptic (i.e., locally
concave or convex); and if the contours project to curves of opposite
sign, the surface is hyperbo?ic (i.e., saddle shaped). There is some
psychophysical evidence that human observers may employ such a
strategy when presented with simple patterns of two intersecting
curves (Ivry and Cohea, 1987). However, the utility of the analysis
for a model of pilot performance seems dubious at best, because
the reflectance contours encountered in an unconstrained natural
environment are seldom restricted to lines of principal curvature.
Occlusion Contours
Another possible source of information about the three-dimen-
sional form of a visible surface comes from patterns of occlusion con-
tours, which arise in images when one part of an object is partially
hidden behind another. In a recent mathematical analysis, Koen-
derink and van Doorn (1976, 1982) have shown that the curvature
of an occlusion contour with respect to its attached surface region
provides potential information about the Gaussian curvature of the
surface in that region. If the Occlusion contour is convex, then the
corresponding surface region to which it projects must be elliptic. On
the other hand, if the occlusion contour is concave, the corresponding
surface region must be hyperbolic. This analysis assumes that the
observed surface is smooth (i.e., the edges of polyhedra require a
different type of analysis, considered below) and that the region of a
surface to which the contour is attached is clearly specified. There
is some psychophysical evidence to suggest that in the absence of
other information, an occlusion contour is perceptually attached to
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the visible surface region directly below it. Under these conditions
an inversion of the image produces a corresponding change in the
perceived curvature of the depicted surface.
Identifiable Features
Some analyses of visual information are designed to operate only
after more primitive analyses have identified the optical projections
of specific features of environmental structure. For example, Sedg-
wick (1973, 1983) has shown that when an object is in contact with
an unbounded, planar ground surface, its height above the ground is
visually specified by a relationship between its projected size and its
position relative to the horizon. To apply this analysis, however, it is
necessary to distinguish among the optic elements that correspond to
the object, the ground, and the sky. This is not a trivial requirement.
Although human observers apparently have little difficulty identify-
ing bounded regions within a cone of visual solid angles, there are at
present no adequate theories of how this is accomplished.
Other analyses in the field of artificial intelligence are also de-
signed to operate on identifiable features. Indeed, many of the scene-
analysis programs used in computer vision research receive coded
representations of line drawings as inputs rather than real visual im-
ages. This is typically justified by assuming that some earlier process
has identified the lines and junctions on a visual projection surface
that correspond to the edges and vertices of opaque, plane-faced
polyhedra in three-dimensional space. One famous program written
by Guzman (1968) classifies line junctions on a visual projection
surface into a relatively small number of categories. The result of
this classification is generally ambiguous, because each type of line
junction can have many possible three-dimensional interpretations.
However, because there are severe topological constraints on the way
in which the line junctions can be connected to one another, the
number of possible interpretations for the entire configuration is re-
duced dramatically. Subsequent research has demonstrated that any
remaining ambiguities can often be eliminated by taking into account
additional constraints on the relative orientations of lines on the pro-
jection surface (Macworth, 1977) or the projected boundaries of cast
shadows (Waltz, 1975).
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POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
The models of static form perception described in this chapter
have a variety of potential applications for facilitating pilot perfor-
mance. This is particularly true for helicopter flight maneuvers in
which the aircraft remains near ground level except for short periods
of time when it must pop up for a brief glimpse of the surrounding
terrain before returning to the relative safety of a more concealed
position. During this brief period of unmasking, the pilot must ob-
tain vital information about the visual scene, including the presence
of potentially hostile targets and the structure of the surrounding
landscape.
For example, one important way in which theories of static form
perception could help improve pilot performance in this context is in
the design of computer-generated visual displays. This application is
especially relevant for the next generation of potentially windowless
helicopters in which all information for piloting the aircraft will be
provided by cockpit instrumentation. It is of obvious importance
in this type of environment that the appropriate information be
presented with the greatest possible perceptual salience. This can
only be achieved, however, with a thorough understanding of the
mechanisms of human perception.
Another important application for theories of static form per-
ception is the design of automatic aids. Because the perceptual
capabilities of human observers are far superior to any machine vi-
sion system developed to date, the existing technology can probably
be improved significantly by copying some of the proven methods of
analysis that nature has developed through the process of evolution.
The primary st umbling block for achieving these potential appli-
cations is that existing models have been designed with little regard
to the properties cf human vision and therefore, have only minimal
value in predicting )ilot performance or in optimizing the perceptual
salience of cockpit instrumentation. Moreover, as documented in the
present summary of these models, they are typically derived from
highly restrictive assumptions that would seldom be satisfied in the
natural imagery encountered by real pilots. This lack of generality
is a serious shortcoming that limits the utility of existing models for
the design of automatic aids (e.g., a machine vision system for target
recognition).
These limitations are sufficiently severe that no adequate models
of static :orm perception are expected to appear in the foreseeable
future. The most feasible strategy for developing a useful model in
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the near term is likely t involve some sort of expert system. This
could best be facilitated oy a substantial increase in psychophysical
research on the visual perception of three-dimensional form. The
benefits of this research will be twofold. Its most immediate benefit
would be to provide useful human factors guidelines for optimiz-
ing the perceptual salience of cockpit displays depicting surfaces in
three-dimensional space. It would also give a longer term benefit by
providing a more solid empirical foundation for the development of
future computational models.
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Structure From Motion
MYRON L. BRAUNSTEIN
OVERVIEW
The charging images resulting from relative motion between an
observer and surfaces in the environment constitute an important
source of information about the shapes, orientations, and relative
distances of these surfaces. The perception of three-dimensional
structure from motion is relevant to virtually all tasks involving vision
of the environment outside the cockpit, whether direct or provided
optically or electronically. For some problems such as wire detection,
minimum visibility considerations are primary and structure from
motion is likely to play a minor role at best. For other tasks, structure
from motion is likely to be a major source of much of the needed
information, especially if one considers the interaction of motion
with other sources of depth information, such as occluding contours,
texture, shading, and binocular disparity. Structure from motion
is likely to be important in visual navigation, the perception of
the distal scene, and the identification of objects and landmarks.
In unmasking, target detection, and masking maneuvers, structure
from motion considerations would be important in determining what
is perceived in the visual scene and how quickly it is perceived.
Many empirical results in the literature on visual perception that
would be useful in making predictions about the role of structure from
motion in the perception of a visual scene under various conditions.
However, most of these findings are not captured by models in a way
that would allow specific outputs to be predicted from specific inputs.
A number of models describe the information potentially available
about three-dimensional structure from motion. Some describe the
minimum numbers of points and views required to recover structure
under various constraints; and others describe components of optic
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flow that are informative about structure and motion. As currently
formulated, however, these models are not directly applizable to the
specific flight tasks mentioned above. There appear to be two reasons
for this. The first is that the existing models deal with situations
that do not approach the complexity found in most real-world visual
scenes. Second, for reasons detailed in this report, the validity of
general computational models of structure from motion has not been
determined for human observers. If a very simple scene was involved,
such as three small lights on the ground being observed during a fixed-
axis rotation of the helicopter, on the basis of structure-from-motion
proofs, one might predict that a human observer could judge the
relative distances between the points. Even with a model that states
that three distinct views are necessary for that output to result from
that input, no quantitative predictions of accuracy could be made
because the concept of "distinct views" is not clearly defined and the
relationship between the output of the model—recovering the three-
dimensional structure--and the output required of the pilot would
have to be determined.
Overall, it must be concluded that a great deal of additional
research on complex perceptual processes, such as structure from
motion, is needed before model-based input-output relationships can
be determined. Additional models need to be developed that are
based on a systematic consideration of human psychophysical data
and provide specific quantitative predictions of human performance.
Models must be developed that integrate different perceptual mod-
ules and relate multiple stages in perceptual processes, where in-
terdependence among these stages is likely. Psychophysical research
should be extended to consider more complex surfaces, and additional
methods must be developed to provide quantitative measures of the
recovery of three-dimensional structure from motion. In laboratory
settings, display technology is required which will allow researchers
to study the effects of the subtle variations in velocity and other
display parameters that affect perception in direct vision. On the
positive side, there has been major progress in both model building
and psychophysical research in this area over the last few years. As
understanding of the complexities involved in the perception of real
three-dimensional scenes continues to increase, it should be possible
to move in the direction of useful models that are validated against
human behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
The psychophysical data from studies of the recovery of struc-
ture from motion, in broad terms, indicate that human observers
can recover the three-dimensional shapes of environmental objects
and the relative distances of surfaces on the basis of very little stimu-
lus information—brief exposures and small numbers of visible points.
There are often ambiguities involving depth reversal, at least in labo-
ratory situations devised to study structure from motion in isolation;
and in some cases there are predictable errors in judging relative
depth. The small amount of information required to recover three-
dimensional structure and the achievement of solutions that contain
relative depth ambiguities (reversals of the sign of depth) are also
found in various models of the recovery of structure from motion.
These broad relationships between the mathematical models that
have been proposed and the psychophysical data are encouraging. At
present, however, no general theories of the recovery of structure from
motion have been sufficiently tested against behavioral measures to
allow for any degree of confidence that they represent human perfor-
mance. There are models developed in specific experimental contexts
that have been tested rigorously, and more general models that have
proved compatible with existing data on human performance. Most
general models of the recovery of structure from motion, however,
although they provide rigorous descriptions of what a visual system
can theoretically recover from dynamic images, have not been tested
adequately against human performance.
Some of the reasons for this lack of rigorously tested models
are historical and are being overcome at the present time. Early
laboratory research on structure from motion had its origins in a
phenomenological tradition (Metzger, 1934; Wallach and O'Connell,
1953), and only recently have models been used to make quantitative
predictions of laboratory results in this area of research (Braunstein,
1972; Todd, 1982). On the other hand, there has been enormous
progress in the development of computational models of vision in a
little over 10 years. Testing these models with human subjects would
appear to be an important direction for psychophysical research,
which should result in the availability of at feast some experimentally
validated models of the recovery of structure from m 'on by human
observers. Attempts to validate computational models, however,
have been slowed by several serious difficulties.
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First, virtually all general computational models specify com-
petence rather than predict performance. In this context, compe-
tence refers to the knowledge a subject should be able to acquire
about the three-dimensional environment from two-dimensional im-
ages, whereas performance refers to the behavior of a subject in
specific observable tasks. (See Ullman, 1986, for additional dis-
cussion of competence versus performance in structure-from-motion
models.) Competence, however, cannot be studied directly in the
laboratory. The psychophysicist can only measure performance. For
example, ULman (1979) has shown that it is theoretically possible
to recover the three-dimensional positions of four noncoplanar points
from three distinct views (orthographic projections). To determine
whether a human observer has this competence, however, some task
must be given the observer on which performance can be measured.
Linking the predicted competence to a measure of performance is
not straightforward, and various tasks are likely to result in varying
decrements in performance relative to the predicted competence, or
even in enhancements of performance over the expected competence
(Braunstein, Hoffman, Shapiro, Andersen, and Bennett, 1987).
A second difficulty arises because some models that are ap-
plicable only when certain conditions are met do not incorporate
these prior conditions. Structure-from-motion models typically re-
quire that the correspondence problem has been solved. This is
the problem of matching the points in successive two-dimensional
projections of an object moving relative to the eye, so that the
points in one view are correctly paired with the points in another
view. A correct pairing means that the matched points are both
projections of the same point in the three-dimensional scene. The
assumption that the correspondence problem nas been solved is a
very reasonable one, because correspondence is not usually a prob-
lem in human vision. However, when one attempts an experimental
test of a structure-from-motion theory, conditions must be used in
which false correspondences are avoided. This requirement severely
restricts the conditions raider which the theory can be tested and, in
most cases, eliminates any possibility of a general test. Consider a
structure-from-motion theorem in which the only constraint is rigid-
ity. A general test would require that any degree of rotation be
allowed between the successive views. To meet the correspondence
restriction, either the degree of rotation between the views must be
severely limited or severe restrictions must be placed on the location
of the points and the axis of rotation. These limitations may serve
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as additional constraints that can be used by the human observer to
recover the three-dimensional structure.
The third difficulty may be the most serious because there is no
way, in principle, to overcome it. If a behavioral task is to be used
to determine whether three-dimensional structure has been recov-
ered from two-dimensional images, the information for performing
this task must be present in those images. This means that it is
not possible, in principle, to determine whether the task has been
performed by recovering the three-dimensional structure or by us-
ing the information in the two-dimensional images in some other
way that did not require recovering the three-dimensional structure.
Often one must rely on pragmatic arguments (that any direct two-
dimensional processing of a particular stimulus would be too difficult)
or phenomenology (that the subjects reported three-dimensional per-
ceptions). These arguments can be made most convincingly when
there is an inverse relationship between the detectability of the two-
dimensional information and the recovery of three-dimensional struc-
ture. This seems to be the case for motion parallax (Braunstein and
Tittle, in press) where judgments of relative distance become more
accurate as the difference in the projected velocities of the nearest
and farthest texture elements decreases. This is, however, an un-
usual case. It is far more common for the information that leads
to more accurate judgments about three-dimensional structure to be
positively correlated with differences in the two-dimensional images
(Braunstein et al., 1987).
A fourth difficulty in psychophysical testing of mathematical
models of the recovery of structure from motion is that the most
precise psychophysical methods available may be inappropriate to
some of the important questions. Psychophysical procedures can be
classified into two types. The most familiar measures discrimina-
tive abilities of the observer, such as the ability to detect minimal
differences in illumination. To obtain optimum performance, highly
trained subjects are generally used and these subjects are Usually
given feedback. The use of feedback implies that there is a correct
answer. This type of procedure is informative about what a human
observer can do and usually provides very precise, quantitative data.
This is not the only possible question, however. It is often im-
portant to address questions about how something appears to an
observer, how it is categorized, or what perception normally occurs.
This is the question of what an observer does do, rather than can do.
Often there is no objective basis for specifying a correct answer, and
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even if there were, the use of feedback would be contrary to the pur-
pose of the study. The methods used in this type of research involve
categorization and judgments of similarity, rather than minimal dis-
criminations. Research in color vision has traditionally used these
methods. It is important to note that the distinction between dis-
crimination and categorization methods does not imply a distinction
between automatic and cognitive processing. Consider the example
presented earlier in which subjects were asked to judge which texture
elements are nearer and which are more distant in a motion parallax
display. A discrimination paradigm could be used in which subjects
are expected to give the correct answer and are given feedback, or
a categorization paradigm could be used in which the emphasis is
on categorizing the appearance of the stimuli, with no indication
that there is a correct answer and no use of feedback. In the latter
paradigm, as noted earlier, subjects are more accurate when the ve-
locity differences are small (within the range that has been studied).
When the differences are large, they are noticed as two-dimensional
velocity differences. Indeed, observers knowledgeable about motion
parallax report surprise that the faster moving elements (in two-
dimensional displays) sometimes look further away than the slower
moving elements in such displays. It is likely, for these cases, that
a discrimination task with feedback would result in judgments in
accordance with the proximal velocities, even though the subjective
experience might not be in accordance with these velocities. Such
data would be likely to indicate that subjects made more accurate
discriminations as the velocity difference increased, which is the op-
posite of the results obtained when subjects are asked to categorize
the appearance of the stimuli. A discrimination task using feedback
may thus provide misleading information about how a subject would
respond to motion parallax information in a real-world situation.
The result of these historical trends and inherent difficulties
is the -xistence of a body of rigorous mathematical models of the
recovery of structure from motion, as well as a body of experimental
literature on human performance, but very little evidence concerning
the applicability of the mathematical models to human performance.
Although progress has been slow in developing psychophysical
tests for mathematical models of the recovery of structure from mo-
tion, important progress has been made in one area—the testing of
constraints underlying mathematical models. Two constraints that
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are central to most models are rigidity and correspondence. The for-
mer constraint has been studied by a number of investigators (Braun-
stein and Andersen, 1984, 1986; Schwartz and Sperling, 1983; Todd,
1982, 1984). The latter has been thoroughly investigated by Todd
(1985). A third constraint that is central to almost all optical flow
models—smoothness of the velocity field—has been studied recently
by Andersen (1988). In all three cases the constraints have been
found to be of less general applicability than most current models
indicate. Perception is often not in accord with predictions based on
rigidity, and three-dimensional structure may be recovered as easily
in nonrigid as in rigid configurations. Structure can be recovered in
the presence of severe violations of correspondence and of smoothness
of the velocity field. These findings suggest that human perception
is more flexible than current models indicate. Progress in relaxing
assumptions such as rigidity is being made in current computational
research (especially Koenderink and van Doorn, 1986, summarized
below).
MODELS
There are a large number of analyses of the information available
in dynamic two-dimensional projections for the recovery of various
aspects of the three-dimensional environment. The following discus-
sion includes examples of such analyses representing different types of
approaches, for which attempts have been made to relate the analyses
to human vision. Other analyses, developed primarily in an artifi-
cial intelligence (AI) context, are not covered, although they have
sometimes included discussions of possible relationships to human
vision.
There are basically two types of analyses: discrete points and
views analyses, and optical flow analyses. The discrete points and
views analyses consider minimum numbers of texture elements or
feature points and minimum numbers of views or frames required to
recover depth information. under varying environmental constraints..
Most, but not all, of these analyses have employed the mathematics
of orthographic projection, employing projective properties that are
not ?ependent on variations in viewing distance. Optical flow analy-
ses, on the other hand, use the instantaneous projected velocity field
or acceleration field as the basis for recovering information about
depth relationships. Almost all of these analyses employ the geom-
etry of polar perspective and depend on the effects of variations in
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viewing distance. One exception is Hoffman's (1982) analysis, which
recovers local surface orientation from orthographic projections by
using velocity and acceleration fields.
The best known of the discrete points and views analyses is Ull-
man's (1979) proof for three orthographic views of four noncoplanar
points. The proof proceeds essentially as follows. An assumption
is made that the points are rigidly connected, that is the three-
dimensional interpoint distance between each pair of points is con-
stant across views. This assumption is expressed in a set of simul-
taneous equations. If the rigidity assumption is true, there will be
exactly two solutions (reflections about the line of sight). Otherwise,
there will be no solutions. In other proofs the number of points
and views required has been reduced by introducing additional con-
straints such as planarity (Hoffman and Flinchbaugh, 1982), fixed
axis of rotation (Hoffman and Bennett, 1986), and constant angular
velocity (Hoffman and Bennett, 1985).
As indicated earlier, psychophysical data suggest that models
based on strict rigidity may not be general enough to account for
the recovery of structure from motion by human observers. Ullman
(1984) has proposed a model that seeks to overcome some of the
objections to a strict rigidity-based analysis. This incremental rigid-
ity scheme maintains an internal model of the structure of a moving
object that consists of the estimated three-dimensional coordinates
of points on the object. The model is continually updated as new
positions of image features are considered. Initially, the object is
assumed to be flat, if no other cues to three-dimensional structure
are present. Otherwise, its initial structure may be determined by
other cues available, from stereopsis, shading, texture, or perspec-
tive. As each new view of the moving object appears, the algorithm
computes a new set of three-dimensional coordinates for points on
the object that maximizes the rigidity in the transformation from the
current model to the new positions. This is achieved by minimizing
the change in the three-dimensional distances between points in the
model. Thus, the algorithm interprets the changing two-dimensional
image as the projection of a moving three-dimensional object that
changes as little as possible from one moment to the next. Through a
process of repeatedly considering new views of objects in motion and
updating the current model of their structure, the algorithm builds
and maintains a three-dimensional model of the objects. If objects
deform over time, the three-dimensional model computed by the al-
gorithm also changes over time (Hildreth and Koch, 1987). Although
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the incremental rigidity scheme may seem plausible as a process that
could handle situations in which a precise rigidity solutimi cannot be
computed due to visual noise or deformations in the object over time,
the validity of this scheme as a model of human behavior has not yet
been demonstrated. Research in progress by Hildreth and her col-
leagues attempts to test incremental rigidity against psychophysical
data.
The optical flow approach has taken a number of forms. Some
analyses concentrate on a particular aspect of the flow field that seems
especially important for biological vision. Lee (1980), for example,
emphasizes the ratio of the projected velocity of a texture element
to its projected radial distance from the point of fixation. This ratio
provides relative distance information. Lee points out that absolute
distance information can be recovered if this relative information is
scaled according to some measure of the observer (such as eye height)
or of the observer's motion (such as the observer's velocity when the
motion in the optical array is self-generated). This seems to fit with
the concept that relationships between the environment and parts
of the helicopter are used in distance and speed judgments (Murray
and Hayworth, personal communication). This chapter is concerned
primarily with the use of optical flow to recover the structure of the
three-dimensional environment. The use of optical flow to estimate
parameters of observer motion is discussed in Chapter 8.
Analyses of the optical flow field often divide the flow field into
components. This division into components is generally in accor-
dance with established geometric concepts and not based initially
on perceptual considerations. However, a number of papers suggest
possible relationships between the geometric components and the
use of optical flow in perception. Optical flow may be divided into
divergence (div), curl, and deformation (def) components, where
div describes expansion and contraction in the image plane, curl de-
scribes rotation in the image plane, and def describes shearing motion
(expansion in one dimension with an area-preserving contraction in
the orthogonal dimension) in the image plane (see Koenderink, 1986,
for a review). These two-dimensional components can be related
to four components of three-dimensional motion—translational and
rotational components along the line of sight, as well as transla-
tional and rotational components perpendicular to the line of sight.
The relationship between the two-dimensional and three-dimensional
components has been discussed by Koenderink and van Doorn (1986).
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The same four categories of three-dimensional motion have been used
to classify psychophysical research (e.g., Braunstein, 1978).
Longuet-Ifiggens and Prazdny (1980) present two methods for
recovering the gradient of a surface and the motion of the eye relative
to a surface from optical flow. The first method uses the velocity
field generated by an observer moving relative to a stationary scene.
It requires that there be at least two points with the same visual
direction at different distances, which by definition means that all
the points cannot be part of the same flow field. This requirement
is a very reasonable one for the helicopter environment, although it
has received very little attention in the laboratory. (See Andersen
and Braunstein, 1985, and Andersen, 1988, for laboratory studies of
this type of stimulus.) A second analysis is presented for cases in
which this requirement is not met or in which there are a number of
objects in rigid motion. In this analysis, a separate computation is
required for each rigid object, and these computations require access
to both the first and the second derivatives of points in the motion
field. Longuet-Higgens and Prazdny discuss the possibility that the
human visual system possesses channels for the analysis of four flow-
field derivatives: dilation (divergence or div), two components of
shear (deformation or def), and vorticity (curl). Although, as they
note, some evidence for dilation channels exists (Regan and Beverley,
1978), there is as yet no evidence for direct sensitivity to deformation
or curl.
Prazdny's (1983) analysis of optical flows as a source of infor-
mation about the three-dimensional environment is based on the
following assumptions: (1) the availability of velccity vectors at a
set of retinal loci, (2) motion relative to a rigid environment, and
(3) metric information about the positions of these loci relative to
a two-dimensional reference frame. The retinal velocity of a visible
point is resolved into three components. Two components are due to
rotation of the object relative to the observer, and one is due to trans-
lation. One of the rotational components is due to rotation parallel
to the image plane; the other, to rotation perpendicular to the image
plane. Prazdny shows that the instantaneous projected velocity field
contains information about the relative depths of two retinal points
which are projections of points that are rigidly connected in three-
dimensional (points on the same rigid object or stationary points
relative to a moving observer). This extends earlier work by Gibson,
Olum, and Rosenblatt (1955), Lee (1980), and Clocksin (1980) from
pure translation to curvilinear motion. Local surface orientation is
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also computed at a given point. Prazdny notes that the quality
of relative depth and surface orientation decays with distance. Fi-
nally, noting studies which indicate that perceptual continuity may
be given precedence over the information in optical flow, Prazdny
(1983, p. 257) remarks that "the theoretical existence of information
in itself does not guarantee that it will be used."
Koenderink and van Doorn (1986) have presented an analysis
in which depth and shape are obtained from optical flow without
an assumption of global rigidity. Instead, bending deformations are
allowed to occur at dihedral edges between triangular facets on a
polyhedral surface. A solution is obtained from two views by using
only the def component of the image. This solution has a fourfold
ambiguity. It is reduced to twofold ambiguity by the use of curl,
with the remaining ambiguity one of relief—whether a dihedral edge
is concave or convex. The relief ambiguity can be overcome by re-
peating the analysis from a different vantage point. This method
recovers shape from two views of seven points, with no four points
rigidly connected. There is no evidence about the applicability of
this analysis to human vision, but Koenderink and van Doorn re-
port a demonstration that is suggestive of a relationship. The type
of fourfold ambiguity that occurs in the analysis, prior to the use
of curl, appeared to occur during observation of simulated bend-
ing polyhedrons, suggesting that the human observer may use the
analysis based on def but does not use curl to reduce the ambiguity.
There are a large number of optical flow analyses by other in-
vestigators, mostly emphasizing machine vision but often alluding
to possible relationships with human vision. Especially notable is a
series of reports by Waxman and his collaborators, on optical flow
alone and on optical flow combined with stereopsis (for example,
Waxman, 1984; Waxman and Duncan, 1985; Waxman and Ullman,
1983).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, general mathematical analyses are available for
determining the minimum amount of visual information required to
recover three-dimensional structure from two-dimensional images,
for an observer moving relative to a rigid environment, for an en-
vironment with multiple rigid objects, and for an environment in
which bending deformations are present. Incorporating these meth-
ods into a model of pilot performance would provide an indication
100	 STRUCTURE FROM MOTION
of what an ideal observer, under specific assumptions, might be able
to accomplish, but this would not necessarily match the capabilities
of a human observer. The human observer might not do as well, or
might do better by combining sources of information and by using
environmental constraints that have not been incorporated into a
particular theoretical analysis.
What is known at present is that optical flow provides informa-
tion for the relative distances of surfaces from the observer and may
provide absolute distance information. Human observers probably
do not use all of the available information but, in some situations,
appear to be able to use amounts of information close to the the-
oretical minima. The type of questions one would like to be able
to answer is: Giver stimuli that are above detection thresholds for
luminance contrast and motion, what surfaces will be detected, and
how quickly and accurately will they be detected?At the present
time there is insufficient knowledge about how well existing models
match human performance for specific sources of information, and
hovr different sources of information are integrated to make general
predictions from models. The development of models that are more
directly testable against human performance, and of more precise
behavioral measures to study judgments for which the most precise
psychophysical methods available are unsuitable, should result in
progress at least in the identification of part-task models. An impor-
tant intermediate step, which will be of value in developing models
which are applicable to human behavior and is important in its own
right, is the organization of the vast body of empirical data that
have accumulated in the study of structure from motion and related
perceptual issues, especially over the last 10 years. The answers to
many important design questions are likely to be found in these data
if they become accessible to designers.
RESEARCH NEEDS: STRUCTURE FROM MOTION
The discussion of structure from motion models in Chapter 2 in-
dicated that the applicability of existing  models to pilot performance
is limited by two factors. First, the models are theoretical accounts
that specify the information about three-dimensional structure that a
vision system might recover from two-dimensional images. The mod-
els have not been successfully validated against human behavior.
Second, most of the models are concerned with displays that are too
simple to be of interest in developing models of pilot performance. A
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number of steps could be taken to facilitate the development of valid
and useful models of human perception of structure from mction:
(1) Models should be developed on the basis of a systematic
consideration of human psychophysical data. This is the established
approach in many other areas of investigation, but existing structure-
from-motion models are based primarily on mathematical analyses
of what information a vision system might recover under varying
constraints. These models are often not directly testable against
human performance (as noted in Chapter 2) and, when tested, prove
to be inadequate models of human vision. Psychophysical research
must be bro!iglat in at the model development stage. This requires
collaborative efforts by researchers specializing in the development
of theoretical models and those specializing in human psychophysics,
and the training of researchers who combine these specialties. Some
of this is happening now, but not nearly enough of these combined
efforts are occuring to provide the valid models of human perception
of structure from motion that are needed.
(2) Models have to be developed, or current models extended,
to include predictions about human performance on behaAoral tasks.
This need is closely related to the first one. Because .many current
models have been developed in an Al context, they often specify
competence rather than predict performance. Rather than speci-
fying what an observer should know about the three-dimensional
environment, a testable model should specify what judgments an
observer is able to make and, even better, the accuracy with which
the observer can make these judgments. This requires further the-
oretical development, again invo.ving a combination, of expertise in
computational theory and psychophysical research to assure a match
between the types of behavior predicted by the models and the types
of responses that can be elicited from human subjects.
(3) Models must be developed that combine different percep-
tual "modules." Likely, more interaction exists among perceptual
processes than can be found in most current theoretical accounts.
There is a paucity of data and of general models of human percep-
tion that combine structur, from motion with other types of depth
information, such as stereopsis, occluding contours, shading, and
texture. It is unlikely that performance can be predicted in complex
scenes until these interactions are understood.
There is also a need for an improved understanding of how dif-
ferent types of information about three-dimensional structure are
combined. Some sources of depth information, such as orthographic
102
	 STRUCTURE FROM MOTION
projections of rotations about axes other than the line of sight,
are informative about depth relationships within objects, providing
three-dimensional shape in object-relative coordinates. Other types
of informa:+ion, such as polar projections of translations in depth, are
informative about the locations of objects in the three-dimensional
environment relative to the observer. The manner in which infor-
mation about three-dimensional shape is combined with information
about relative distance to form a unified perception of the thrre-
dimensional environment is an issue requiring further investigation.
(4) Models must be developed which integrate stages in the
recovery of structure from motion that are ne,:° treated separately.
Although it is appropriate in a theoretical analysis to make assump-
tions about the results of earlier stages, such as an assumption that
the correspondence problem has been solved, a testable model should
take into acurunt the restric-L:jns on the stimulus domain implied by
these msumpt'^ns.
(5) RPF2arch on structure from motion should be extended to
more complex surfaces than the spliares ynd cylinders typically stud:
ied. Work along these lines is just beginning to appear (Andersen,
1988; _Tandy, Sperling, Dosher, and Perkins, 1987).
(fi) Additional psychophysical methods are needed to study the
recovery of three-dimensional structure from motion and from other
sources of inform:: ;on combined with motion. For some important
research issues, su ..h as the interpolation of perceived surface struc-
ture between visible features on complex surfaces, methods would
be useful that provide some of the ,advantages of feedback without
having a predetermined correct response. interactive  graphics meth-
ods offer some excellent possibilities. The subject can be required
to adjust a display until it meets a specific criterion (e.g., apparent
smoothness of a surface). Although the experimenter would specify
the criterion, the subject would decide when the criterion has been
met. Interactive graphics provide responses that can be measured
precisely and include a form of rwi nforcement (the display appearing
correct to the subject) without the use of an externally determined
correct response.
(7) Related to the need for the development of psychophysi-
cal methods that take advantage of such technologies as interactive
graphics is a need for more extensive use of high-resolution displays in
research on human motion perception. Attempts at precise testing of
models may be misleading if displays provide only gross approxima-
tions of the visual stimulus. The issue here is not the usual "fidelity"
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issue of how much information should be displayed, but the issue of
how accurately the displayed information must be represented.
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Motion-Based State Estimation
and Shape Modeling
GREG ZACHARIAS
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A number of candidate models and algorithms for motion-based
state estimation and shape modeling are reviewed in this chapter,
along with the problem of "state and structure" through motion. To
provide a framework for discussion, an overall end-to-end process-
oriented structure for modeling the generation of state and shape
estimates from dynamic visual images is described. Three major
processing functions are identified: (1) flow-field estimation, which
generates vector flow-field estimates on the basis of the temporal dy-
namics and spatial characteristics of the image time history; (2) state-
time estimation, which generates estimates of observer rotational and
translational egomotion states, and an estimate of the instantaneous
field of "impact times" defining a scaled three-dimensional depth
map of the imaged scene; and (3) object shape modeling, which
accounts for the depth map via appropriate selection, parameteri-
zation, and localization of object models. Some of the attributes of
this processing structure are discussed in terms of its c-,.npartmen-
talization, its ability to help in the identification of information flow
and information reliability, and its potential for coupling with other
process-oriented models of human perception and performance.
Within this framework, a number of candidate models and al-
gorithms are reviewed. In the area of flow-field estimation, models
can be categorized as feature-, gradient-, or frequency-based. A
number of attractive models are found in the latter two categories:
some because of their potential for simulating errors in human flow
perception, and others because of their natural linkage to human vi-
sual frequency selectivity. In the area of state-time estimation, both
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quasi-static and dynamic algorithms are reviewed. Models capable
of extracting the egomotion information needed to subserve visu-
ally guided locomotion are identified, along with dynamic estimation
approaches which could account for the human's expectations of
state evolution in active control situations. Initial validation studies
have begun the task of matching model predictions of perceptual
egomotion errors with those seen empirically. In the area of object
shape modeling only a few models are identifit ' because the focus is
on approaches to "assembling" three-dimension.:: objects from basic
observer-centered depth information. Additional work in this area
can be found in Chapters 6 and 7.
A number of areas exist in which some of these models could
be applied to understanding and aiding the helicopter nap of the
earth (NOE) mission, specifically in visually guided flight control.
Potential areas include
o prediction of flight path control precision and speed-height
trade-offs under different workload levels;
o identification of concurrent visual environments (texture,
shape, occlusion boundaries, etc.) and maneuver envelopes (posi-
tion, attitude, and their rates) that are likely to cause disorientation
or illusion;
• evaluation of display aids to augment "weak" outside-the-
window cues, under adverse visual conditions (e.g., fog, smoke) or
under conditions of high workload that demand visual attention
sharing; and
o development and evaluation of novel dynamic pictorial dis-
plays to provide integrated situational information in a natural visual
format.
A range of other application areas can be considered special cases of
these, as discussed below.
Three basic areas that require additional research can be identi-
fied. First, current algorithms must be enhanced to provide sufficient
generality to deal with complex visual scenes and with the noisy and
less-than-ideal visual environments that might characterize an NOE
mission. Second, current models require more validation against past
and current psychophysical data, with particular attention paid to
the current research focus on "active psychophysics." Finally, there
is a need to begin integrating these perceptual models with existing
control-decision models, to begin to address the essential closed-loop
nature of visually guided flight. Coupling with control models can
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subserve flight path performance assessment, whereas coupling with
decision-theoretic models can support predictions of the pilot's sit-
uational awareness; obviously, other model couplings could subserve
the analysis and prediction of other visually driven mission tasks in
like fashion.
The following section contains an overall integrative structure for
comparing the variety of motion-based vision algorithms and models
considered here. Then individual reviews of models and algorithms
are provided, followed by model applications to the helicopter NOE
mission problem. Finally, future areas of research are identified.
FRAMEWORK FOR MOTION-BASED STATE ESTIMATION
AND SHAPE MODELING
Description of Framework
Figure 8-1 illustrates, in block diagram form, an overall end-to-
end process-oriented structure for motion-based state estimation and
shape modeling. Although fairly simple, the structure attempts to
identify the information flow (via the lines) and the processing func-
tions (via the blocks) presumed present in human visual processing
of dynamic imagery.
The processing begins with the generation of an image sequence:
a simple monocular two-dimensional gray level function I(x,y,t), de-
fined over the imaging surface (x,y), and varying with time t. This in-
tensity function can be considered essentially continuous in space and
time, spatially sampled (pixellated), or temporally sampled (frame
by frame), or both. For discussion purposes and later computational
reasons, both spatial and temporal discreteness are assumed, which
means that a discrete sequence of pixel]ated image frames is available
for processing. It is a little difficult to justify the temporal sampling,
but easier for spatial sampling, given the existing retinal photorecep-
tor array (e.g., see Williarus and Collier, 1983; Yellot, 1983). Note
also that no consideration is given to the potential contribution of
color in this processing description.
This image sequence is then processed by a flow-field computa-
tion block to generate a corresponding two-dimensional "flow field," a
vector field which specifies; the instantaneous angular rate of the line
of sight (LOS) of each imaged point in the field-of-view (FOV). The
computed field is temporally sampled with a new two-dimensional
flow-field frame computed at every image frame time. The computed
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field is also oresurned to be spatially sampled because of image pixel-
lation, so that the flow is computed only at each pixel. In effect, the
computed field provides a temporally and spatially sampled version
of the continuous flow-field associated with observer-scene relative
motion. The flow field can be specified in the image sensor plane as a
set of two-dimensional in-plane vectors (the conventional approach)
or as a set of three-dimensional angular LOS rate vectors, defined in
an arbitrary observer-referenced coordinate frame. This latter spec-
ification allows for a definition of "optic flow" that is independent of
imaging plane orientation and FOV, in the Gibson tradition.
The resulting flow-field is then processed by a state-time esti-
mation block to generate, at each frame time, estimates of the fun-
damental observer states that can be inferred from the input image
sequence: instantaneous aim point, angular velocity, and a two-
dimensional vector field of "impact times" defining the directions
and transit times to imaged points in the FOV. Because the num-
ber of input flow-field vectors is likely to be large (roughly equaling
the number of image pixels) in comparison with the number of un-
known observer states (two in heading and three in angular velocity),
the translation-rotation state estimation problem is overdetermined.
A least-squares estimation approach can provide a simple means
for dealing with this situation, while simultaneously minimizing the
effects of flow-field estimation error propagation. The resulting esti-
mates of aim point and angular velocity can then be used to compute
the impact time vector field, which defines an observer-centered, spa-
tially sampled, speed-scaled replica of the imaged scene. In effect, the
impact time field provides a scaled three-dimensional "depth map"
of the imaged scene.
The resulting impact time vector set can then be processed by an
object shape modeling block to select a "best-fit" object model and
generate corresponding parameter estimates for the selected model.
One way of accomplishing this is via another least-squares estima-
tion process, in which a fixed-form object model is adjusted, via its
intrinsic parametric specifiers and via extrinsic scaling, rotation, and
translation, to obtain a best fit to the estimated impact time vector
set over the full FOV of the imaged scene. This type of processing
has the potential for significant data compression, yielding a small
set of object parameters from a large number of impact time vectors.
Subsequent iteration over an internal dictionary of generic object
shapes could then provide optimized shape modeling over the range
of dictionary objects known to the observer.
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Some Comments on the Processing framework
Some comments on the general structure of this overall process
are in order. First, note that an explicit structure has been proposed,
consisting of three separate processing blocks, for the extraction of
motion-based state estimates and object shape estimates. In partic-
ular, a flow-field computation block has been identified, on the pre-
sumption that such processing is separate from other information-
processing requirements it may subserve such as state estimation.
Whether this reflects reality, of course, is unclear at this time. For
example, the flow-field estimates could be processed directly to ob-
tain estimates of local surface curvature, via the method proposed
by Koenderink and van Doorn (1986), to directly subserve the object
shape modeling function, while bypassing the intermediate step of
impact time estimation. The explicit separation of processing func-
tions proposed, however, allows for such a "processing shortcut,"
while still providing an end-to-end integrative framework via the
information flow links between blocks.
Second, it is appropriate to note that these links specify the
information base needed to determine both competence and perfor-
mance in a model, a requirement identified by N atson (Chapter 5).
In this context, competence is determined by an explicit specification
of the input and output variables of each block. For example, for the
state-time estimation block, an input set of the flow-field rectors and
an output set of the aim point, angular velocity, and impact time
vectors are specified. Performance's determined by an explicit spec-
ification of error propagation in these variables. Thus. for the same
block, the way in which errors in the input flow-field vectors lead to
errors in the output state-time vectors is specified. This can be done
via brute force Monte Carlo simulation techniques or more elegant
(but limited) covariance propagation techniques. The main point
is. however. that by specifying both competence and performance,
error propagation can be modeled from end to end, and "high-level"
human output performance statistics can be generated (e.g., false
alarm and missed detection statistics for target discrimination) on
the basis of "low-level' front-end sensory-perceptual characteristics
(e.g., simple foreground-background relative motion detection per-
formance). Some of these issues are discussed further by Braunstein
(Chapter 7).
Third. note that to model such "higher-level" performance. it
is necessary to add one or more blocks to model the generation of
external measurable control or response activity, driven by internal
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estimates of image flow, observer state, or object shape. Thus, for
example, to model the pilot's detection of a simple ridge line, one
could append a detection block to process the object model block
output and choose a.n appropriate set of utility functions to weight
false alarm and missed detection costs. Alternatively, to model the
pilot's visually guided terrain-following flight control performance,
one could append a flight control block to process the state estimator
output and generate appropriate pilot control actions to drive the ve-
hicle flight control system (FCS). Full loop closure would be provided
here via a vehicle dynamics model driving a scene generation model,
which would then feed back to the pilot's "imaging sensor" shown at
the left of Figure S-1. Clearly, quite complicated (and less verifiable)
models can be built up in this fashion to begin attacking some of
the performance questions of interest in this report. However, to
be able to build and verify such models requires a basic separation
of processing functions (into blocks) and an explicit specification of
information flow (between blocks).
REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN MOTION-BASED STATE
ESTIMATION AND SHAPE MODELING
Some of the more recent work conducted in motion-based state
estimation and shape modeling is reviewed briefly here. According to
the framework introduced earlier and illustrated in Figure 8-1, this
section is organized into three broad areas: (1) flow-field computation
algorithms and techniques, (2) state and impact time estimation, and
(3) flow-based object shape modeling.
Flow-Field Computation
First, studies concerned with the definition of the optic flow-field
and the development of algorithms for estimating it are reviewed
briefly. Models can be categorized as feature-based, gradient-based,
or frequency-based. Because feature-based algorithms provide flow
estimates at only a small number of points in the FOV and also suffer
from a frame-to-frame correspondence problem, only the latter two
model categories will be considered here. An additional discussion of
feature-based approaches can be found in the Chapter 7.
Prazdny (1983) reviews earlier work in the perceptual psychology
community relative to the basic information "contained" in the optic
flow-field. This reference discusses how six degree-of-freedom (DOF)
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motion of the observer with respect to the observed object gives rise
to the optic flow seen in a specified two-dimensional imaging plane.
The discussion focuses on the "forward transformation" from motion
state to observed flow, and provides only a qualitative discussion of
the "inverse transformation" from observed flow to estimated motion
state. No explicit algorithms for flow computation or state estimation
are presented.
Rieger's (1983) discussion is similar. The equations for flow due
to six DOF motion are given, but they are specialized to a partic-
ular axis system. The information "contained in" these equations
is discussed (i.e., flow-field measurements), but no algorithms are
presented for flow computation or state estimation.
Horn and Schunck (1951) and Schunck (1983) concentrate on
the computation of the flow-field itself from input image sequences
that change with time, due to the imager's (or object's) motion. The
basic algorithm is presented in Iforn and Schunck (1981). In brief,
the algorithm first computes, at each pixel, the temporal and spatial
gradients of the image intensity function. These are then combined
in a flu^v constraint equation. A flow field solution is then found
which, in a least-squares sense, best satisfies that equation, while at
the same time maintaining a reasonable "smoothness" of the flow
over the imager field-of-view. The technique requires no knowledge
of the structure of the visual world, has none of the critical reliance
on image "features" often found in other flow algorithms, and is
particularly well suited to situations in which the flow-field evolves
with time. It does have its share of problems, however, dealing with
nonorthographic projections and scenes in which occluding surfaces
are present.
Further work on the algorithm is presented in Schunck (1953),
which identifies the basic problems inherent in processing image
sequences having object occlusion boundaries. Attempts at occlusion
edge detection and regional smoothing are presented in this reference,
but the results are generally unsatisfactory in terms of improving the
algorithm's ability to work with occlusion-induced flow shear.
A very different approach to flow-field estimation is presented
by NVatson and Ahumada (1983, 1985), motivated by their consid-
erations of human motion perception and its dependence on spatial
frequency content. By working in the three-dimensional spatial tem-
poral frequency domain (defined by the moving image's two spatial
frequency axes and one temporal frequency axis) and introducing
localized direction-sensitive Gabor filter "sensors," they construct a
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spatially distributed estimator of the flow-field, tuned to a particu-
lar spatial frequency in the visual bandwidth of interest. Summing
outputs across a set of these tuned field estimators, they then obtain
a full bandwidth vector field defining the flow. Preliminary simula-
tions of the algorithm demonstrate the potential for modeling human
psychophysical performance in discrimination, perception of pattern
coherence, and the like, but further validation is needed to match or
explain the additional psychophysical data available.
A modified version of this approach is described and applied
by Heeger (1987) to a variety of synthetic and natural textured
image sequences. For cases involving simple image translation, it is
shown how the image signal-to-noise (SIN) ratio drives the flow-field
est:oration errors. However, for realistic images, Heeger (1987) notes
that the primary source of error comes from the fact that "the model
assumes image translation, ignoring motion [occlusion] boundaries,
accelerations, deformations (rotation, divergence, shear), and motion
transparency." unfortunately, these same limitations apply to many
of the other reviewed algorithms and models. Heeger closes the
paper with a preliminary comparison of model simulation results
with human psychophysical data on the coherence of sine-grating
patterns.
Jain (1984) presents an algorithm for identifying the relative
motion parameters of independently moving objects in an imager's
field-of-view. The algorithm is restricted to translational motion and
requires knowledge of the imager motion parameters. However, it
may prove to be of utility in "segmenting" more complex scenes for
modeling human performance in complex visual environments.
Kahn (1985) and Mutch and Thompson (1985) present algo-
rithms for detecting occlusion edges in dynamic scenes, algorithms
which may be directly applicable to enhanced flow-field computa-
tion models. Iialrn (1985) proposes an algorithm to estimate edge
direction and speed, based on spatial temporal variations in intensity
recorded over a triangular pixel triplet. The approach is restricted
to constant velocity straight edges, and no study of image noise
susceptibility is presented. Hutch and Thompson (1985) propose
a token (feature) matching approach to detecting and characteriz-
ing occlusion edges: any lost (created) tokens imply membership
on an occluded (occluding) surface: the boundary between surfaces
must then be the occlusion edge. An example is given and several
limitations of the approach are discussed.
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Adiv (1985) takes a more general approach to flow-field com-
putation in assuming that the flow-field arises because of observer
motion through an environment of several objects that may be in
relative motion to one another. The computation algorithm first
computes the flow-field in "segments" where, within each segment,
the flow computation is assumed to arise from the motion of a sin-
gle planar surface. The algorithm then groups segments under the
assumption that the observed flow is due to the motion of a single
(larger and connected) moving surface. The results show successful
discrimination of occluding objects and their relative motion, in the
face of sparse and noisy sequential image inputs. The results promise
a significant improvement in flow-field computation capabilities, for
more complex scenes.
Additional work in scene segmentation is provided by Murray
and Buxton (1987). A global optimization criterion is used to decide
optimum segmentation for a given (assumed) number of objects..
Convergence is slow, however, and not well predicted. More work on
this approach appears to be needed.
Terzopoulous (1986) describes the application of general multi-
grid relaxation methods to a number of image-processing problems,
one of which is flow-field computation. He demonstrates that dy-
namic superpixellation (going from a coarse to a fine pixel grid) can
be used to significantly improve the convergence characteristics of the
basic Horn and Schunck (1981) algorithm. Results indicate that an
order-of-magnitude reduction in computation time can be expected,
to obtain the same level of flow-field estimation accuracy.
Additional work attempting to improve fundamental gradient-
based methods, such as that of Horn and Schunck (1981), is presented
by Kearney, Thompson, and Boley (1987) and by Nagel and Enkel-
mann (1986). Kearney et al. (1987) use perturbation methods to
specify error propagation characteristics due to errors in the underly-
ing gradient estimates and note that the dominant error source is due
to occlusion-induced flow-field discontinuities, which violate underly-
ing continuity assumptions. Nagel and Enkelmann (1986) introduce
the notion of an "oriented smoothness constraint" to help handle
such problems, and with some additional "heuristic modifications,"
the; demonstrate reasonable flow-field estimation performance in a
case involving foreground-background relative motion.
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State and Impact Time Estimation
Studies concerned with the estimation of dynamic state infor-
mation, based on flow-field input measurements, are now reviewed
briefly. Zacharias (1982) derives basic equations defining the flow-
field for general six degrees of freedom (DOF) observer motion and
arbitrary imager geometry. The constraint equations relating flow to
state are given and then transformed to yield equivalent constraint
equations in terms of the potentially inferable states: heading, an-
gular velocity, and impact time. A discussion follows concerning
minimal flow measurement counts and observer geometries which
ensure "solvability." however, an algorithm that solves for or es-
timates observer states, given the flow-field measurements, is not
provided.
Ullman (1983) reviews earlier discussions regarding solvability
of the flow-field equations. The discussion focuses oil
motion and considers the implications of orthographic versus per-
spective projections. The discussion is qualitative, however, and no
algorithms are given.
Rieger and Lawton (1983) present an algorithm, based oil
work by Lawton (1982), for determining imager heading from the
optic flow pattern, for ar bitrary six DOF imager motion. The basic
approach relies oil fact that along all boundary, any
discrete changes in the flow-field are attributable solely to the trans-
lational contribution to flow, not the rotational. This allows for a
separation of the two contributions and subsequent stepwise solution
of each. Results are presented which demonstrate how the algo-
rithm makes use of the flow discontinuity and successfully estimates
heading with sparse pixellation and noisy images.
Bruss and Horn (1983) formally- de fine the flow-field based es-
timation problem for general six DOF motion and a planar imager
geometry. Using a least-squares criterion, they derive a set of non-
linear constraint equations that must be satisfied by the estimated
states. These are solved for simple three DOF translation and for
simple three DOF rotation, but no results are presented for the gen-
eral six DOF case. The lack of a consistent vector-matrix notation
leads to significant difficulties in following the derivation and inter-
preting the results. Only analytic results are given, many in the
form of equations specifying necessary conditic s; no simulations of
estimator performance are presented.
Broida and Ghellappa (1986) consider dynamic estimation of
the states of a rigid two-dimensional body undergoing planar four
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DOF translation and rotation. The measurements are the in-screen
locations of a small set of object feature points, in this particular
case two points. An extended Kalman filter (Gelb, 1974) is used
to estimate the object's translational and rotational states. Monte
Carlo simulations are used to generate estimation error statistics and
demonstrate the algorithm's basic ability to dynamically infer four
DOF states from two feature points. The overall approach appears
to have significant potential for incorporating a knowledge of known
observer dynamics and provides for filtering, over time, of the gener-
ated state estimates. However, the approach does require significant
Updating if it is to be extended to estimating six DOF motion pa-
rameters with a measurement set several orders of magnitude larger
than the small feature set used in the study.
Merhav and Bresler (1986a,b) also describe a dynamic filtering
approach to the state estimation problem. They apply Kalman fil-
tering to the flow-field estimation problem as well, but only along
a simple "raster line" in the field of view. Considerable potential
appears to exist for improved low-noise estimation over that seen in
conventional quasi-static modeling efforts.
Mitiche (1986) presents the most recent rederivation of the flow
constraint equations. Vector matrix notation is not used, so the
essential structure of the constraint is not apparent. The assertion
is made that only four feature points are required to estimate a
six DOF state, which is false as demonstrated by Zacharias (1982).
An algorithm is presented for solving for the state, but the author
notes that the "solution," obtained via numerical search, is highly
dependent on the initial guess. No consideration is given to the basic
problem of estimating state with a highly redundant set of noisy
flow-field measurements.
Zacharias, Caglayan, and Sinacori (1983a,b) derive a flow-field
based state estimator for general six DOF motion and arbitrary im-
ager motion. The estimator minimizes a quadratic cost function
based on the flow constraint equation residuals and, by using redun-
dant ai.d noisy flow-field measurements, estimates observer heading,
angular velocity, and impact time to all observed points in the imager
FOV. Monte Carlo simulations are conducted to generate estimation
error statistics to demonstrate performance sensitivity as a function
of pixel count and flow-field noise level. The model is used to simu-
late a simple human aim point estimation task, and model estimation
accuracy is shown to provide a reasonable match to that obtained
experimentally.
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Waxman and Sinha (1986) introduce the concept of "dynamic
stereo' as an algorithm for extracting passive ranging information
in complex dynamic scenes. When an observer is moving relative
to a group of objects, each of which is moving relative to the other,
impact times are no longer simple functions of relative range and
observer speed.Waxman and Sinha show how two imagers, moving
relative to each other by a known amount, can be used to generate
a "difference flow" that, in turn, can be used to extract the desired
scene depth information. Their emphasis is on computer vision for
autonomous vehicle navigation, but their results may be applicable
to understanding human head movement strategies when confronted
with complex dynamic scenes.
Flow-Based Object Shape Modeling
Some studies that focus on the estimation of observed object
shape, based on flow-field input measurements, can now be summa-
rized.
Clocksin (1980) describes how the flow-field depends on viewed
object shape. The discussion is primarily qualitative but points
out how (1) discontinuities in the flow-field indicate the presence
of occluding surfaces; (2) discontinuities in the flow-field gradient'
indicate the presence of concave or convex "cusps" on the surface;
and (3) values taken on by the flow-field Laplacian reflect the orien-
tation of the viewed object surface normal. The discussion centers
on the "forward transformation" from object properties to flow-field
characteristics; no algorithms are presented for the "inverse transfor-
mation" from observed flow to inferred object shape.
IIoffman (1980) presents a similar discussion of how observer
state and object shape act in concert to determine not only the ob-
served flow-field but also the first spatial derivative of this flow-field.
Constraint equations relating observer state to flow and flow rate are
derived for the special case of an orthographic projection geometry.
An argument is given for the "solvability" of these equations, but no
solutions or algorithms for solutions are given. Also unaddressed is
the problem of reliably computing the spatial derivative of a noisy
flow-field.
'That is, the spatial rate of change of the flow-field, as a function of the
line-of-sight in the observer FOV.
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Horn (1984) discusses the extended Gaussian image (EGI) and
its applicability to the representation of object surface shape. The
EGI for an N-faced polyhedron consists of the complete set of N
scaled face normals, where the scaling reflects face area. The EGI, in
theory, provides all the information needed to reconstruct the object
itself, including orientation. Extension to a continuous, smoothly
curved object is relatively straightforward. The potential for deriving
the EGI from the impact time vector set, generated by the present
state-time estimator, recommends its further study and evaluation
for three-dimensional object modeling.
Bolle and Cooper (1986) formulate an object modeling and loca-
tion algorithm that processes range measurements to generate object
surface patch primitives (planar, cylindrical, and spherical patches).
These, in turn, are "assembled" to form a more complex object, to
support three-dimensional object range estimation. The problem for-
mulation and estimation algorithm is presented, and two simulations
are given. The method appears to have considerable promise for
object shape modeling, but additional evaluation with more realistic
ranging data is called for.
MODEL APPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
A number of areas can be identified in which some of the above
models could be applied to understanding and aiding the helicopter
NOE mission. There are also a number of limitations in the use of
these models, before reasonable confidence can be placed in their
predictive abilities. Some of these areas are described briefly in the
following paragraphs.
The area in which the greatest contribution could be made ap-
pears to be in visually guided flight control. The NOE mission
provides few classic "geometric" cues to orientation or location, such
as occur in a turn to final or an approach to landing. Rather, the
cues are likely to be dominated by unstructured texture (e.g., treetop
leaves) and by dynamic rather than static attributes, so that flow-
field cues can dominate static shading or textural gradient cues. A
motion-based model of state and shape estimation would thus appear
to be particularly appropriate here.
Earlier an overall model structure was outlined which, given
a dynamic textured input image sequence, can generate several of
the required translational and rotational state estimates needed for
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flight path control: heading, angular rate, and orientation with re-
spect to the terrain-treetop surface (Murray and Hayworth, personal
communication). The key, of course, is selecting -'ra developing the
component submodels needed to flesh out the overall structure and
ensuring that they not only generate the appropriate informational
variables (satisfying the earlier competence requirement) bat also
model human pilot capabilities and limitations (satisfying the earlier
performance requirement).
In the area of flow-field estimation, a number of submodels could
be considered. The frequency-domain approaches of Watson and
Ahumada (1983, 1985) and Heeger (1987) are attractive because of
their linkage to frequency-selective processing by the nervous sys-
tem. The gradient-based approaches of Horn and Schunck (1981)
and others, although more computer vision oriented, are also attrac-
tive because of the ease with which they can be used to simulate
flow generation and error propagation. Both general approaches,
however, require further development to deal with occlusion bound-
aries and rotational motion; considerably more validation against
psychophysical data is also necessary.
In the area of state-time estimation, a number of submodels
could be considered. Th .- quasi-static estimator of Zacharias et al.
(1983a,b) generates the required heading, angular velocity, and im-
pact time estimates needed for the NOE task, and initial validation
studies have begun to match model predictions with earlier psy-
chophysical data (e.g., Warren, 1976). More recent work by Broida
and Chellappa, (1986) and Merhav and Bresler (1986a,b) demon-
strates how modern dynamic estimation theory (in the form of
Kalman filtering) can be brought to bear on the problem of gen-
erating dynamic state estimates, where the observer accelerates and
constantly changes the visual flow. This potential for dynamic fil-
tering suggests a linkage with dynamic models of the human pilot,
which noted below.
rinally, in the area of object shape modeling, only a few candi-
dates have been identified for consideration. ror the NOE mission,
sophisticated algorithms are not required because the flight control
task needs only rough estimates of upcoming terrain shape to pro-
vide the preview information necessary for short-term flight path
planning and anticipation of upcoming maneuvers. Thus, it may suf-
fice to build on the work cited earlier by Horn (1984), using extended
Gaussian image (EGI) models, or the work by Bolle and Cooper
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(1986), who construct objects from surface patch primitives. Natu-
rally, the appropriateness of any of these candidates ultimately rests
on how well they match measured human perceptual performance
in the NOE environment. Additional candidate models for object
shape estimation can be found in Chapters 6 and 7 for static and
dynamic situations respectively.
The following are four potential areas for model applications,
within the context of visually guided flight control:
prediction of flight path control precision and speed-height
trade-offs under different workload;
identification of concurrent visual environments (texture,
shape, occlusion boundaries, etc.) and maneuver envelopes (posi-
tion attitude, and their rates) that are likely to cause disorientation
or illusion;
evaluation of display aids to augment "weak" outside-the-
window cues, under adverse visual conditions (e.g., fog, smoke) or
under conditions of high workload that demand visual attention-
sharing; and
• development and evaluation of novel dynamic pictorial dis-
plays to provide integrated situational information in a natural visual
format.
A range of other applications can be considered special cases
of the above. For example, the unmask-mask maneuver sequence
performed for target acquisition can be analyzed in a model context
with regard to maneuver precision (item 1), cue insufficiency (item 2),
or utility of display aids (item 3). Likewise, evaluation of navigation
performance could consider the likelihood of correct identification of
a for aphic way point (item 2), or evaluation of dynamic visual
warning displays might be considered in the context of new pictorial
formats (item 4). It seems likely that other such specialized flight
tasks could be categorized as a special case of one of the four general
application areas identified above.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Three basic areas requiring additional research can be identified:
(1) enhancement of current algorithms for added robustness, (2)
validation of model performance predictions against psychophysical
data, and (3) integration of perceptual models with control-decision
models.
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Current algorithms still do not demonstrate sufficient general-
ity to deal with complex scenes, nor do they demonstrate adequate
robustness in less-than-ideal visual environments. Except under re-
stricted viewing conditions, performance lags behind thet of human
observers. Thus, algorithm improvements are called for.: n flow-field
computation, work needs to be done in dealing with field discon-
tinuities due to occlusion boundaries, as well as with "distortions"
that arise from complex motion patterns. In state-time estimation,
dynamic filtering approaches should be explored co see ]tote prior
expectations of egomotion can improve performance reliability. Fi-
nally, in object shape modeling, effort shoidd be placed on integrating
other static and dynamic sources of object edge-surface information.
In the meantime, judgment must be exercised in applying any model
in situations exceeding its original development assumptions.
An inadequate amount of model validation has been conducted,
probably because of the difficulty of "model-tuned" experiments
that generate the needed metrics for model versus data compar-
isons. However, a growing empirical data base is being generated
in parallel with the modeling effort, and advantage should be taken
of it. For example, the earlier work by Lee (1976) in perception of
impact time could be compared with the accuracy of time-depth es-
timates generated by a number of the models. More recent work by
Owen, Warren, and their colleagues (Owen and Warren, 1982; Owen,
Warren, Jensen, Mangold, and Hettinger, 1981; Warren, 1976), eval-
uating the effect of flow-field attributes on the perception of egomo-
tion, could serve as the direct basis for validating flow-field based
state estimation models. One such example using the data generated
by Warren (1976) is given in Zacharias et al. (1983a,b); others are
clearly called for. Finally, it should be noted that there are ongoing
empirical efforts (at NASA Ames, U.S. Air Force Army Aeromedical
Laboratory, etc.) in both the passive and the active psychophysics
of flow-field induced egomotion. Clearly, the modeling community
should be taking advantage of this growing base of empirical data.
Finally, there is a need to begin integrating these perceptual
models with existing control-decision models, to begin to address
the essential closed-loop nature of visually guided flight. The discus-
sion here has focused on end-to-end open-loop processing, but one
should begin to consider loop closures generated by active control of
the visual environment by the pilot. One approach studied (Brun
and Zacharias, 1986; Zacharias, 1985) involves coupling a flow field
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based perceptual model with a modern control model of the pilot-
vehicle system (Kleinman, Baron, and Levison, 1971), to yield a
closed-loop model that supports predictions of visually guided flight
control performance. The potential exists for similar couplings to
decision-theoretic models, to support predictions of, for example, de-
tection probabilities of a topographic way point under conditions of
limited visibility. Obviously, other model couplings could subserve
the analysis of other visually driven flight tasks in like fashion.
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Real-Time Human Image Understanding
in Pilot Performance Models'
IRVING BIEDERMAN
The need to identify objects provides a major justification for the
presence of a human in the cockpit on most aircraft missions. Ob-
ject recognition is required for the identification of potential targets
and the determination of features for navigation. Both laboratory
research and commercial film editing practice have established that
from a 100 millisecond (msec) exposure of an object or scene, hu-
mans can accurately interpret images of objects and scenes never
previously experienced. This capacity for real-time identification of
objects or scenes is readily evidenced for line drawings, suggesting
that much of human recognition is based on shape. Consequently,
most accounts of human obje•;t recognition have concentrated on
how the edges extracted from an image of an object or scene can
activate—in real time—an appropriate representation of that object
in memory.
Any theory of human object recognition must account for the
phenomena that the speed and accuracy of performance often decline
when the image is degraded, lacking parts, only moderately occluded,
viewed from a novel orientation in depth, or presented as a simple line
drawing. Indeed, a major value of placing a human visual system
in the cockpit is this remarkable robustness of visual recognition
over an extraordinary range of conditions of image perturbation and
degradation.
'The research was supported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research
Grants 86-0106 and 88-0231. Correspondence about this chapter should be ad-
dressed to Irving Biederman, Department of Psychology, University of
Minnesota, Elliott Hall, 75 E. River Road, Minneapolis, MN 55455.
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This chapter first presents an overview of recent theoretical work
on object recognition and a summary of some of the major empirical
findings. Special problems related to the perception of multiobject
and scene displays are then discussed. Throughout the chapter,
significant gaps in our knowledge are also indicated.
THEORIES OF OBJECT RECOGNITION
The theoretical work reviewed in this section is confined to ef-
forts that display a capability for handling the phenomena of human
vision described previously (e.g., robustness for images that might be
rotated in depth or degraded). The first model reviewed, and the one
discussed most extensively, is the author's recognition by components
(RBC) (Biederman, 1987a,b; 1988) because it is the most developed
effort addressed to real-time human object recognition. Models de-
veloped as machine vision efforts but inspired by characteristics of
human recognition (Brooks, 1981; Huttenlocher and Ullman, 1987;
Lowe, 1987; Pentland, 1986) are described in a subsequent section
and contrasted with BBC. Also considered are the formal characteri-
zations of images based on topological properties (Koenderink, 1987;
Pong, Shapiro, and Haralick, 1985), although these efforts have not
been developed into recognition models.
Recognition by Viewpoint Invariant Components (RBC)
Decomposition of an Image into Geons
Recognition by components is directed primarily toward offering
an account of how humans can rapidly and accurately classify images
of objects at a basic level. "Basic level" is the most general level of
a class that specifies shape information. The words for this level,
such as "giraffe" or "telephone," typically specify almost as much
shape information as a subordinate term, such as "articulated gi-
raffe" or "desk phone," respectively. Basic level terms appear earlier
in a child's vocabulary and are used far more frequently to refer to
a class than either subordinate or superordinate level terms. Super-
ordinate terms, such as "mammals," "instruments," or "modes of
transportation" do not specify shape information. When instances
of a basic level such as "penguin" or "ostrich" for the class "BIRD"
do not share a common shape description with the basic level, they
are handled, not as subordinate, but as their own basic level class.
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RBC assumes that complex visual entities are decomposed into
simple components, typically at regions of matched concavities. Such
concavities are almost always produced when parts are arbitrarily
joined (Koffman and Richards, 1985). The resultant components
activate the closest fitting member of a particular set of 24 convex or
singly concave edge-based volumetric primitives that can be modeled
as a family of generalized cones called "geons" (for geometric icons),
such as bricks, cylinders, cones, and wedges.
Viewpoint-Invariant and Categorical Origins of Geons
The image properties from which geons are activated are view-
point invariant (VIP), or nonaccidental, (Lowe, 1984) and highly
resistant to degradation. Viewpoint-invariant properties (VIPs) in-
clude such characteristics as whether an edge is curved or straight,
the type of vertex (fork, arrow, L, or tangent Y) at the termination
of edges, and whether pairs of edges are parallel or symmetrical. For
example, a cylinder differs from a wedge in that the former has a
curved cross section, parallel sides along its axis, and tangent Y ver-
tices that are absent in the wedge. By deriving the geons from simple
contrasts in VIPs (such as whether the cross section is straight or
curved and sides parallel or not), the geons themselves become invari-
ant under changes in viewpoint and visual noise, and allow objects
so represented to possess the same invariance. Geon determination
requires only categorical classification of edge characteristics, such
as whether the edge is straight or curved, rather than precise metric
specification, such as degree of curvature or length. Metric judgments
cannot be made with sufficient speed or accuracy by humans to be
the controlling processes for real-time human object recognition.
Relation to Brooks's (1981) ACRONYM
Perhaps the closet model to RBC is Brooks' (1981) ACRONYM.
Like RBC, ACRONYM posits a generalized cylinder characterization
of the parts of objects. Unlike RBC, the critical visual information
for ACRONYM is the ellipses and ribbons that characterize the cross
section and sides of generalized cylinders. These differ metrically so
recognition for ACRONYM depends critically on accurate assess-
ment of such quantities. RBC emphasizes nonacci,..ental qualitative
contrasts of edges and classification of vertices. The origin of the
different approaches taken by ACRONYM and RBC may lie in the
IRVING BIEDERMAN	 129
former's attempt to classify aerial images, where vertices may not
be available, into subordinate types such as different models of air-
planes, where the determination of metric variation may, in fact,
be required because such classes have similar geon descriptions. In
contrast, RBC, seeks to model recognition at the entry (or basic)
level only. Subordinate level classifications often depend on metric
variations.
Relations Among Geons and Models
Simultaneously with the activation of geons, the relations among
joined pairs of geons are also detected. The actual composition of
these relations is still under development, but RBC assumes that the
relations are also viewpoint invariant and categorical, such as "top
of" and "center connected". The same subset of geons represent
different objects if they are in different relations to each other. Geons
thus play a role highly analogous to the role played by phonemes in
speech perception. A description of the input consisting of geons plus
relations is termed an object model, and it is assumed to activate
a similar type of description in memory. For example, one kind
of lamp can be described as a cylinder "centered under the larger
end" of a cone. Activation is graded in that the activation of a
representation will be slower (and of lower maximum value) when an
image description differs in geons or relations from the model stored
in memory.
Connectionist Implementations of RBC
Distributed Implementation
A six-layer fully distributed connectionist implementation of
RBC is currently being developed (Hummel, Biederman, Gerhard-
stein, and Hilton, 1988). The model takes as input the end points of
edges in the central 4 degrees of the visual field. At the lowest level
are units that can detect the orientation and termination of image
edges at three spatial scales. A hexagonal array of these units feeds
into a single unit at the second hidden level. This layer is trained,
through back propagation, to develop distributed representations of
the local viewpoint-invariant characterizations (namely, vertices) of
the image edges. Layer three codes parallelism; the fourth level codes
independent distributed representations of geons, geon orientation;
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and geon aspect ratio. The fifth level provides a translationally in-
variant representation of the geons (so that the same representation
might be activated regardless of where the image is located on the
retina) and their relations. The sixth layer represents objects.
Local Cascade Implementation of RBC
A local cascade simulation of RBC (Biederman, 1987a, 1988)
may actually allow closer evaluation of human factors variables in
the pilot performance modeling ef fort. This model assumes that the
time course of object recognition is a cascade of three stages: (1)
an initial image feature activation layer; (2) an intermediate geon-
determination stage (corresponding to layers 2-4 in the distributed
model described in the previous section), in which image features
activate nodes corresponding to individual geons; and (3) a final
stage in which the nodes represent objects. The image of an object
is represented by an image-feature vector which specifies the values
for the vertices, edges, and geon relations of the object. The model
posits that the earlier geon node of image features is transmitted
to the activation of nodes representing objects. A given geon node
may transmit activation to all object nodes that contain it and
inhibition to nodes for objects in which it is not present. An object
node will have excitatory connections from those geon nodes That
are compatible with it and inhibitory connections from those nodes
that are inconsistent with it. The representation of both geons and
objects is local in that a single node is presumed to represent a given
geon or object. (Although not yet included, relations among geons
will be represented by a set of input nodes directly connected to the
object layer.) This model is similar to the McClelland and Rumelhart
(1981) model of word perception.
Factors reducing image quality, such as contour interruption
from small particles (produced, for example, if the object is behind
light foliage), low pass filtering, lowered contrast, or small size, are
assumed to affect the activation of the image feature nodes that would
affect the activation of the geon nodes. In this case, there should be
slow growth in the activation of the geon nodes. However, once all
the geon nodes are activated, there should be fast and maximum
activation of the object node. Factors affecting the similarity of the
image to a representation of the object in memory, such as whether
an object is missing parts, is occluded by a large surface, is viewed at
an unusual angle, is rotatAd in the plane, or is an unusual exemplar,
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are assumed to affect a later stage where activation from the geon
(and relations) layer activates the nodes at the object layer. Under
these conditions there should be rapid geon activation for the geons
that are in the image but slow activation of the object node. If
geons are missing in the image, then there will be less activation
relayed to the object layer from the geon layer. In the present
context where missions will often be performed under conditions of
reduced visibility, much of the nonoptimum perceptual performance
will be a consequence of diminished quality at the first (feature)
stage, rendering it difficult to determine the geons. However, cases
in which objects are occluded by surfaces so that no contours of a
part are present in the image, for example, will reduce activation at
the object layer. Given the availability of image enhancement and
restoration by machine, much of the reason for having a pilot in the
cockpit is his capability for second-stage processing.
The model, although somewhat elaborate to present in a con-
densed verbal form, provides a general basis for combining factors
that affect image quality WAIL factors that affect the similarity of the
image description to the description of objects in memory. Although
convenient for summarizing the effects of variables, the local charac-
ter of the model renders it less realistic as a detailed characterization
of human image understanding compared to the distributed model.
Principles of Geon Recovery
It has been estimated that much of basic level recognition can be
handled with a vocabulary of not more than 106 object models. Are
24 geons sufficient for modeling this many objects? With 24 geons
and four classes of viewpoint invariant relations (giving 108 possible
combinations of relations), 1.4 billion 3-geon objects models can be
generated. A derivation from this analysis is that 3 geons should
suffice for the rapid entry level classification of almost any object.
The theory thus suggests a principle of geon recovery: if an
arrangement of two or three geons can be recovered from the image,
objects can be recognized quickly even when they are occluded,
rotated in depth, novel, extensively degraded, or lacking customary
detail, color, and texture.
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MODEL-BASED MATCHING: LOWE'S SCERPO AND
ULLMAN'S ALIGNMENT MODELS
RBC is a one-way, bottom-up model, proceeding from image to
activation of the representation of the object. Edge extraction is
assumed to be accomplished by a module that can proceed indepen-
dently of the later stages, except for likely effects of the viewpoint
invariant property of smooth curvature.
Does object recognition always proceed as a largely one-way
street? Probably not. When edge extraction is difficult, top-down
effects are likely to be revealed. Such effects could be of two types:
(1) a general source from the viewpoint-invariant properties of coter-
ruination, parallelism, and symmetry or from the geons themselves,
and (2) from object models. The latter route is termed model-
based matching. Two detailed proposals for such matching have
been advanced recently by Lowe (1987) and by IIuttenlocher and
Ullman (1987). Both the Lowe model and the Huttenlocher and Ull-
man model differ from RBC in their allowance for transformations,
such as rotation, that place the image in spatial correspondence to
the model. RBC dispenses with the requirement for such transfor-
mations by positing viewpoint-invariant primitives (the geons) and
appeals to such transformations only when the initial activation is
unsuccessful.
Lowe's SCERPO
A major difficulty for any implementation of a model of recog-
nition is the large number of possible object models that must be
evaluated. Lowe's (1987) SCERPO model offers the possibility of
constrained search in reducing the computational load posed by large
numbers of models.
Lowe's SCERPO model is primarily directed toward the determi-
nation of the orientation and location of objects, even when they are
partially occluded by other objects, under conditions in which exact
object models are available. The model detects edges by finding sharp
changes in image intensity values as reflected in the zero crossings
of a VG convolution across a number of scales. The edges are then
grouped according to viewpoint-invariant properties of collinearity,
parallelism, and cotermination. A central assumption in this effort is
the viewpoint consistency constraint: "The locations of all projected
(object) features in an image must be consistent with projection from
a single viewpoint" (Lowe, 1987, p. 57). From the initial detection
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of nonaccidental erjperties of edges, SCERPO proposes a tentative
match to an ,,bject at a particular orientation (via the viewpoint
consistency constraint) and uses predictions from that object to test
for additional object features. These matches provide segments not
detected initially by the zero crossings and discard edges that were
initially detected but are not part of the object model, such as those
produced by glare. Matching proceeds in this iterative fashion. A
few of these image features are then tentatively matched against a
component of the object model in which the orientation of the object
that would maximize the fit of those image features is determined.
SCERPO and the alignment model described in the next sec-
tion may provide a plausible scheme for characterizing human per-
formance under conditions in which the initial extraction of image
edges is uncertain (e.g., conditions of poor visibility), the orientation
of an object is unfamiliar, or the object is occluded in an unusual
fashion.
Alignment
The Huttenlocher and Ullman (1987) alignment model first re-
orients all the object models that might be possible matches for the
image and tests for the fit of the image against the aligned models
in memory. The alignment capitalizes on a recent result: three non-
coplanar points are generally sufficient to determine the orientation
of any object. In practice the three points are typically viewpoint
invariant in that they are selected at a point where there is a cotermi-
nation of edges. However, any salient points or even general features
such as a. "wiggly" region would be sufficient for alignment. Although
it appears unlikely that people rotate (align) all possible candidate
models in memory prior to matching, the alignment model offers
a possible account of those cases in which recognition depends on
reorientation of a mental model.
Although both of these models show great promise for machine
vision, their applicability for real-time entry level classification re-
mains to be evaluated. Unlike humans, neither the Lowe model nor
the Huttenlocher and Ullman model reveals any marked difficulty in
handling rotation in the plane relative to rotations in depth. Part
of the problem is that relations such as "top of may be made at
a level of description other than that of the coding of the contours
themselves. These models also do not readily reveal the similarity
among instances revealed in human judgment and discrimination.
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For example, the alignment .nodel readily rejects a Saab from a sim-
ilar looking Volkswagon, although people would have some difficulty
making that discrimination. The reason for this is that the model
relies on metric differences in curvature and extent—judgments that
people perform only with great difficulty. The remarkable ability of
humans to classify objects based on similar part structures is not
obviously captured by these modeling efforts.
Summary of Distinctions Among the Various Models
The theories considered above can be roughly distinguished in
t;'"Le extent to which they posit decomposition, a limited number of
primitives, and spatial transformations:
• Decomposition : nto parts: Brooks, Biederman and Pentland
assume that complex images are decomposed into parts (e.g., gener-
alized cylinders). Lowe, as well as Huttenlocher and Ullman, assume
snatching at the level of individual segments (Lowe) or any salient
characterization of the object (IIuttenlocher and Ullman).
• Limited number of primitives: Biederman assumes a lim-
ited number of primitives to characterize the image (or parts). The
matching of exact metric variation is assumed by Brooks, Ullman
and IIuttenlocher, Pentland, and Lowe.
• Transformations: Huttenlocher and Ullman, as well as Lowe,
assume transformation operations for rotation, size scaling, and de-
formation. Biederman assumes that depth invariance is provided by
viewpoint-invariant properties without rotation. Biederman, Pent-
land, and Brooks assume different models for significantly differing
views of a given object.
These assumptions are clearly not mutually exclusive, and it
should generally be possible to construct a more elaborate model by
specifying the conditions under which one or the other assumption
might be appropriate.
Gaps in Research on Quantitative Modeling
of Human Object Recognition
Much remains to be done to achieve a working quantitative
model of human image understanding. Two important points are
listed here:
I
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• early to intermediate vision: How does one go from presumed
early filters (e.g., Gabor detectors) to edge extraction and effects of
scale and size?
• relations: How can relations among parts of an object be
modeled?
Machine Identification of Targets in Low-Resolution Images
All the human and machine models described above have been
applied to images that had sufficient resolution for accurate edge ex-
traction, as noted previously. In many of the operating environments
for the pilot performance modeling project, recognition will have to
be made under conditions of low visibility, (e.g., darkness or fog) or
else from a sensor (e.g., infrared, radar, or a laser range finder) that
might have low resolution.
Traditional models of pattern recognition and signal p• ocessing
attempt to classify an image in terms of any set of image val ies which
can provide a diagnostic set of cues for a particular subset of objects
that constitute the relevant domain. No attempt is made with these
models to reflect human perceptual performance or intuitions. For
example, some investigators have sought to correlate components of
the spatial frequency spectra of an image with the output of a sensor.
Another attempt correlates a global measure, such as the center of
mass of a radar image, with possible object classes. Others capitalize
on arbitrary features. For example, if only one object has a hole,
then this would be used as a diagnostic cue for that object. None of
these efforts have been able to achieve accurate classification when
the object was rotated in depth or occluded, or when new instances
were added to the set of possibilities.
More relevant are those models that seek to achieve recognition
through a classification of topological properties of the images (e.g.,
Koenderink, 1987; Pong et al., 1985). A smooth surface may be
classified as a peak, ridge, saddle, flat, ravine, or pit, for example, by
the scheme of Pong et al. (1985). The role of smooth surface char-
acterizations in recognition has not been investigated extensively,
but a study by Rock and DaVita (1987) indicated that such char-
acterizations (without a readily available geon model) could not be
recognized when viewed from another perspective in depth.
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Empirical Studies of Human Image Understanding
An extensive series of experiments on the perception of briefly
presented pictures by human observers has provided empirical sup-
port for the theory. In these experiments the subject names or verifies
briefly presented (100 ms) object pictures. Reaction times and errors
are the primary dependent variables. The following are some key
results:
• Simple line drawings showing only the edges of the major
geons are identified as rapidly as full-color, textured images (Bie-
derman and Ju, 1988). This documents the sufficiency of edge-based
descriptions over surface (gray scale) variation in accounting for the
initial activation of a representation of an object. In general, hu-
mans have difficulty in perceiving three-dimensional structure from
smooth gray scale variations (without an attached edge) (Todd and
Akerstrom, 1987).
• When only two or three geons of a complex object (such as an
airplane or elephant) are visible, recognition can be fast and accurate
(although, predictably, not as fast as with the complete image). This
supports the derivation of the sufficiency of three geons.
• Complex objects requiring six or more geons to appear com-
plete are not recognized any more slowly than simple objects (such as
a flashlight or cup). This is consistent with a model positing parallel
activation of the geons in favor of a serial contour tracing process,
such as eye movements or the kinds of serial routines posited by
Ullman (1984).
• If contour is deleted so that an object's geons cannot be
recovered from the image (by deleting cusps for parsing and altering
vertices), the object is rendered unrecognizable. If the same or a
greater amount of contour is deleted but in such a manner that the
geons can be recovered through smooth continuation, objects remain
identifiable. This result establishes the necessity of the contours
posited by RBC.
0A surprising finding in the previous experiment was the large
disruptive effect on error rates and reaction times of interrupting
(deleting) contour, such as would occur when an object is viewed
behind light foliage, even when the contour could be restored by
routines for smooth continuation. This suggests that the routines for
contour restoration are not particularly rapid.
• In the studies described in the previous paragraph, the con-
tour that was removed was removed from every geon in the object.
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Identification performance is also slowed when objects are missing
geons (parts), with the rest of the object intact, which would occur
if the object was partially occluded by a solid surface. According
to the local connectionist model described previously, the effect of
missing or occluded geons is on the matching stage, ra ther than on
the initial determination of the geons.
From separate studies with familiar objects, it can be con-
cluded that rotation of the object in the plane slows recognition to
a much greater extent than rotation in depth (in contrast to most
robot vision models). However, it is important to determine if this
effect holds for unfamiliar objects. According to RBC, rotation in
the plane affects the "top of relation, but the geon descriptions
themselves are largely unaffected by rotation in depth.
Gaps in Empirical and Theoretical Research on Object Recognition
A number of important gaps exist in the research on object
recognition.
Segmentation: How is segmentation of an object into its
parts achieved? Although part segmentation at regions of matched
concavities (cusps) is often subjectively compelling, such that a given
edge is grouped with its appropriate geon, what are the algorithms
by which this is actually achieved ? Although cusps offer a strong
basis for segmentation, other factors contribute to segmentation as
well. In the absence of a concavity, a variation in a nonaccidental
property—the change in parallelism at the junction of the base to the
nose cone of a rocket, for example—provides a basis for segmentation.
Also, parts tend to be fit to elongated regions that are approximately
parallel. Is it even necessary to perform segmentation as a separate
step? An alternative account is that the image features in a region
activate a geon without an independent segmentation process.
• Scale: The human appears to be able to organize the im-
age formation at the appropriate scale, ignoring minor, irrelevant
variations in the image. How is this achieved?
Edge extraction: There are acceptable (but not perfect) ma-
chine routines for the extraction of edges in an image (e.g., Canny,
1986), but the way in which this is achieved biologically has not
been determined. A related problem is how the human manages to
distinguish texture and crack edges from boundary edges.
Metric variations: Although there is clear evidence for the
rapid use of nonaccidental properties, metric variations also have an
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effect. For example, if an object has a cylinder as one of its parts,
the cylinder will typically be of some aspect ratio. How does per-
formance degrade with departures in aspect ratio from the original
value? What is required is a theory that combines the qualitative
nonaccidental contrasts with metric variation. The theories reviewed
previously provide some initial progress on this problem. Also, differ-
ent cortical loci have been implicated for these two classes of visual
behavior: the inferior temporal cortex is critical for recognition; the
posterior parietal cortex for spatial (metric?) processing (Mishkin
and Appenzeller, 1987).
• Spatial relations: The edges and vertices that comprise a geon
exist in some relation to each other. Similarly, the geons comprising
an object are in specified relations to each other, such as "top of
or "side connected." What are these relations, and how are they
determined and represented?
• Degraded images: Most of the research on object perception
has employed displays with clear edges, but people can classify a low
pass filtered image. How is this achieved? Is performance predictable
from the information available (e.g., blob aspect ratio) from the gen-
eral model (see below), or is another mode of recognition employed,
perhaps topological characteristics? This problem is of particular
importance to the pilot performance modeling project.
• Texture: Many objects include surface texture in their speci-
fication. How is texture to be represented?
PERCEPTION OF MULTIOBJECT DISPLAYS
Objects rarely occur in isolation. In some of the multiobject
displays currently envisaged, up to 70 potential targets are displayed
in a busy environment. How is object recognition affected by the
presence of other -visual entities in the display? This problem can be
decomposed into several subproblems, as suggested by the following
outline.
1. potential uncertainty
• resolution effects dues to retinal eccentricity
• display load effects independent of eccentricity and camou-
flage;
2. scene constraints;
3. segmentation effects: camouflage.
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Positionai Uncertainty
Various sections of the above outline are briefly considered here.
Eccentricity
The problem posed by the presence of multiple objects in a
display is that the pilot is uncertain as to which one(s) might be
target(s). The most obvious effect is that the target may fall outside
of foveal vision as the pilot looks at some other object. Knowing
where to look for a target results in dramatically higher detestabil-
ity than when the target's position is uncertain (Biederman, 1972).
The fall off in acuity with increasing eccentricity has been well doc-
umented, but surprisingly few studies have measured that effect in
the context of viewing of a scene. Biederman, Mezzanotte, Rabi-
nowitz, Francolini, and Plude (1981) showed that there was a rapid
decline in target detestability even in the modest region between
foveal fixation 0-1 1 and 6-8° degrees eccentricity. This effect was
magnified if the targets were small, camouflaged, or incongruous in
the scene. This incongruity effect suggest that humans can rapidly
employ scene constraints to bolster their parafoveal performance.
This human capacity is likely to be most resistant to automation.
Display Load
With fixed eccentricity, is there an effect of the number of other
objects in the display on the detection of a particular object? The
search literature (e.g.. Treisman and Gelade, 1980) suggests that tar-
gets can be detected without any effect of the number of distractors
if the target differs from the distractors in a feature not shared by
the distractors. Thus there will be no effect on the detection of an X
because of the presence of O's in the visual field. Search is then said
to be "automatic" (Schneider and Shifirin, 1977). If the target is
defined by a conjunction of independent attributes such as color and
shape (e.g., a red X target among green X and red O distractors),
then there will be a linear increase in search times as a function of the
number of distractors (Treisman and Gelade, 1980) and search is said
to be capacity limited or "attentive." The issue for the present case
is whether objects generally possess attributes that allow them to be
distinguished from other objects, or whether the shape primitives are
shared, as suggested by RBC, so that attentive search is required.
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Biederman, Blickle, Teitelbaum, Klatsky, and Mezzanote (1988)
have demonstrated the latter in that there was a marked linear
increase in search reaction time, as well as in errors in the detection
of target objects in a 100 msec display of one to six objects arranged
at the positions of an imaginary clockface. The large magnitude
of these effects suggests a serious limitation on human performance
and the critical need for cuing relevant targets and exploiting scene
constraints.
This chapter has focused on the processing that occurs during
a single visual fixation at a scene (or object). Overall visual perfor-
mance will consist of a series of saccades as the pilot picks various
regions of his visual world (including his displays) to fixate. For the
most part these fixations cannot be made at a rate greater than 3 to
4 per second. Whether the pilot has to linger longer than the 250 to
333 msec per fixation will depend on the difficulty of resolving image
details and the number of objects in the scene that are not integrated
by the scene constraints that are discussed below.
Scene Constraints
When an arrangement of objects does not form a scene, as with
the clockface displays in the Biederman et al. (1988) experiment,
performance degrades rapidly with increasing display size. At the
other extreme are scenes that can be perceived "at a glance," with
no obvious increase in recognition latency as a function of the number
of entities in the scene. The mystery about such scenes is that the
exposure duration required for an accurate, integrated representation
of their content is not much longer than that typically required to
perceive an individual object. However, the recognition of a visual
array as a scene requires not only the identification of the various
entities but also a semantic specification of the interactions among
the objects and an overall semantic specification of the arrangement
(e.g., as a kitchen).
Moreover, the perception of a scene is not, in general, derived
from an initial identification of individual objects in that scene. That
is, generally we do not first identify a stove, refrigerator, and coffee
cup in specified physical relations and then come to a conclusion that
we are looking at a kitchen (Biederman, 1988).
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Some demonstrations and experiments by Mezzanotte (described
in Biederman, 1987b, 1988) suggest a possible basis for understand-
ing rapid scene recognition. Mezzanotte showed that a readily in-
terpretable scene could be constructed from arrangements of single
geons that just preserved the overall aspect ratio of the object. In
these kinds of scenes, none of the entities, when shown in isolation,
could be identified as anything other than a simple volumetric body
(e.g., a brick). Most important, Mezzanotte found that such settings
were sufficient to cause interference effects on the identification speed
of intact objects that were inappropriate to the setting.
The rapid recognition of an arrangement of objects as a scene
may be mediated by clusters of the largest geons from a familiar
arrangement of interacting objects. For example, a vertical slab
appearing behind alarge brick is readily interpreted as a desk and
chairback. In such cases, the individual geons are insufficient to
allow identification of the object. However, just as an arrangement
of two or three geons almost always allows identification of an object,
an arrangement of two or more geons from different objects may
produce a recognizable combination. The cluster acts very much as
a large object. If this account is true, fast scene perception should
be possible only when such familiar object clusters are present. This
account awaits empirical test.
Segmentation
Another effect of the presence of more than one entity in a scene
is the possibility that the difficulty of segmenting an object from its
background may increase. The potential heterogeneous nature of the
source of this difficulty has not been well explored. For example,
in some cases the difficulty arises because of reduced differentiation
between target and immediately adjacent contour, as when adjacent
objects share the same texture. In other cases, the neighborhood
is organized in such a way that the target is incorporated into the
context, as can be produced with patterns in the Embedded-Figures
test.
Gaps in Knowledge of the Perception of Multiobject Displays
Several important gaps exist in our knowledge of multiobject
display perception:
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Tests of geon clusters: The geon cluster hypothesis for inte-
grated scene perception requires empirical confirmation.
Attentional costs: Why is there no evidence for attentional
costs in the perception of complex objects compared to simple ob-
jects? Are attentional costs balanced by greater information, or does
the attention to a region overcome the effect of the number of geons?
Accessing scene constraints: How can the human's extraor-
dinary knowledge of real-world scenes be represented and accessed
efficiently? How might it be exploited to overcome the effect of
attentional load?
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Manipulation of Visual Information
LYNN A. COOPER
SUMMARY
The ability to transform or manipulate visual information is a
perceptual-cognitive skill of central importance in normal percep-
tual processing and in perceptually driven tasks requiring the use
of imagery or the comparison of spatially transformed visual input
to a representation of that input in memory. In most cases, image
transformation occurs at a level of processing following and relying
upon object identification; however, some forms of manipulation of
visual information (e.g., integration and transformation of different
views of an object) may be involved in the process of identification.
For certain pilot performance problems (including those consisting
of detection and identification), image manipulation is unlikely to
be an important component of operation. For other tasks facing the
pilot (including aspects of navigation, localization of a target in a
visual array, and comparison of current visual input with previously
available views), transformation of visual information may play a
central role in performance.
A substantial body of experimental work exists on perceptual
and cognitive tasks requiring the transformation of visual information
and is briefly reviewed in this report. Research has, for the most
part, been directed toward delineating the information-processing
consequences of transforming spatial information in terms of time
and accuracy constraints on performance. There is considerable
evidence concerning the effects of various display and task parameters
on the amount of time in which, and the accuracy with which,
visual information can be transformed. Furthermore, the process
of image transformation can often be shown to conform to highly
regular and mathematically straightforward relationships. For cases
144
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in which errors of transformation occur frequently, the magnitude
and direction of error often follow a highly predictable pattern. Yet,
despite the large body of systematic experimental results, general
computational models are still scarce. Those models that have been
specified suffer from being stimulus or task specific, and they have
generally been based on some single index of task performance.
In sum, although there has been considerable progress in under-
standing—at a quantitative level—the nature, time course, and lim-
itations on the ability to manipulate spatial information, as well as
the various factors that affect different aspects of performance on
tasks requiring spatial transformations, as yet no set of large-scale
models of image manipulation exists. A further limitation on the
applicability of current data and models to pilot performance tasks
is the reduced conditions under which data have been obtained in
terms of both display richness and concurrent processing demands.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter briefly summarizes relevant empirical research and
formal models of performance in laboratory situations that are re-
lated to certain pilot performance problems. In particular, the re-
search and models reviewed address perceptual and cognitive capabil-
ities of human observers in transforming or manipulating information
presented in the form of a visual display. Most of the research has
been directed toward characterizing at a quantitative level the na-
ture and magnitude of errors produced in spatial manipulation tasks.
The limits of performance and a delineation of stimulus and task
conditions that lead to breakdowns in performance are emphasized.
Models of performance and of task conditions are scarce, often taking
the form of simple equations to fit observed performance functions.
So, although considerable empirical research has been undertaken,
there are few computational models available for consideration. In
addition, no small leap of faith is required to apply the research
reviewed to problems encountered in real-world pilot performance.
Experimental work has generally been done in several limited dis-
play environments, with little or nothing in the way of additional or
competing tasks (except a single judgment about the transformation
of a single object) to be performed.
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first and most
substantial section, research on and models for the manipulation
of information presented in a static visual display (mental rotation
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tasks) are discussed. In the second, relevant work on memory for
spatial positions in sequences of static displays is described. In
the third, recent research is presented that directly examines the
abilities of observers to extrapolate trajectories of projections of
objects displayed dynamically. In the fourth section, work on the
computation of object structure from partial information about views
is considered. The goal is to present a reasonably comprehensive (but
not exhaustive) review of relevant literature, highlighting the most
significant empirical findings and pointing to models in domains
where they have been developed.
TRANSFORMATIONS ON INFORMATION PRESENTED
IN A STATIC VISUAL DISPLAY
One of the more robust findings in the literature in cognitive psy-
chology concerns the relationship between performance (measured in
time and accuracy) in judging some aspect of a disoriented visual dis-
play of an object and the extent of displacement of the object from
a canonical or a previously learned position. The amount of time
required to determine, for example, whether an object is "standard"
or "reflected" in parity increases linearly with the magnitude of the
angular difference between the object's displayed orientation and a
familiar position. This basic linear relationship between processing
time and angular difference holds whether visual stimuli are presented
simultaneously (Shepard and Metzler, 1971) or successively (Cooper,
1975)—requiring a comparison of an object with a stored memorial
representation, whether the objects transformed are portrayed as two
or three-dimensional; whether the rotational transformation itself is
in the picture plane or in depth; and, to some extent, regardless of the
visual complexity of the objects (Cooper and Podgorny, 1976). Shep-
ard and Cooper (1982) provide a relatively comprehensive, though
slightly dated, review of this literature.
This basic finding suggests that the computational cost of men-
tally transforming a disoriented object can be expressed simply by the
linear reaction time function. Although the stimulus parameters dis-
cussed above do not, in general, affect the shape ofthe performance
function, they do have discernible effects on both the slope of the
function (inferred to measure the rate at which correctional transfor-
mations can be carried out) and the intercept (a measure of the time
to encode the visual display). Mode of presentation can affect both
the slope and the intercept; stimulus complexity and the presence of
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landmark features can affect the rate of transformation (Hochberg
and Gellman, 1977); and stimulus and transformational dimensional-
ity have questionable effects on both slope and intercept. Estimated
rates of mental rotation reported by various investigators for a host
of stimulus and presentation conditions range from approximately 60
degrees (for perspective drawings of three-dimensional objects and
three-dimensional transformations) to over 500 degrees (for highly
practiced subjects transforming simple two-dimensional stimuli) per
second.
A theoretical framework that has been proposed to account for
these data, which generally takes the linearity of the relation between
time and angular displacement as evidence for an internal analog or
simulation of the process of physical rotation in the specific sense of
passing through intermediate positions in a transformational trajec-
tory that correspond to intermediate stages in the physical rotation of
an object, has been demonstrated (Cooper, 1976). The basic finding
of Cooper's experiment was that the time to respond to a disoriented
object is essentially constant if the object is presented in an expected
position, in the sense of being congruent with the currently assumed
position of an internal representation of the object that the subject
imagined rotating at a particular rate in a particular direction.
Simple linear relations between time for correctional processing
and spatial extent have also been reported for transformations other
than rotation. Bundesen and Larson (1975), Bundesen, Larson, and
Farrell (1981), and Sekular and Nash (1972) have all demonstrated
linear relations between the time required to compare two objects of
different size and the ratio of the size differences (but see Kubovy
and Podgorny, 1981), and combinations of size and rotational trans-
formations contribute additively to comparison times under some
circumstances (Bundesen et al., 1981). Kosslyn (1973; Kosslyn, Ball
and Reiser, 1978) has shown a linear relation between the time re-
quired to "mentally scan" from one location to another in an array
of objects and the metric distance between the objects in the scan
path. Further evidence for the analog nature of translational mental
operations is provided by Shulman, Remington, and McLean (1979)
in a task requiring the shifting of attention from one location to
another.
A host of additional questions that could bear on pilot per-
formance issues can be asked about the nature and time course of
correctional mental operations on disoriented or misaligned visual
displays. Two that are presently unresolved in the literature but
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that have produced some empirical evidence concern (1) whether
transformations take time in proportion to proximal or to distal vari-
ables and (2) whether transformations of abstract frames of reference
can be carried out. With respect to the relative importance of prox-
ima and distal distance, the original mental rotation experiments
(Shepard and Cooper, 1982; Shepard and Metzler, 1971) suggest
strongly that the relevant distance between two positions over which
reaction time increases linearly is the distance between the posi-
tions of the two objects in three-dimensional space, rather than the
distance between the two objects as projected on the retina (when
the two sorts of measured distances are different). Corballis and
his associates (Corballis and Roldan, 1975; Corballis, Zbrodoff, and
Roldan, 1976) have asked whether mental rotation of a disoriented
object occurs to the retinal or the gravitational upright, when the
two are different by virtue of head tilt. For visual patterns of familiar
objects with an overlearned canonical position in the world, rotation
appears to be to gravitational upright, but with unfamiliar complex
dot patterns, rotation is carried out to achieve congruence with the
retinally defined vertical. Other investigations of the operation of
proximally defined versus distally defined distance (in the context
of a mental scanning task) indicate that instructions can effectively
alter the character of the scan path: when a subject is instructed to
imagine scanning between two objects located in three-dimensional
space, time increases with distal distance; however, when a subject
is instructed to scan from the visual direction of one object to the vi-
sual direction of another, time increases linearly with distance in the
two-dimensional projection (Pinker, 1980; Pinker and Finke, 1980;
Pinker and Kosslyn, 1978).
With respect to the question of whether transformations can
be carried out on an abstract frame of reference as opposed to a
representation of a particular visual object, experiments by Cooper
and Shepard (1973) suggest that such an overall transformation of a
coordinate system cannot be done effectively to prepare for the pre-
sentation of a disoriented test object. Providing time and the proper
information to enable the transformation to be done in advance low-
ers subsequent reaction time, but the decrease does not change with
the magnitude of the angular displacement of the prepared-for po-
sition. Subsequent experiments by Jolicoeur (1983) indicate that
frames of reference can be transformed in advance when the type of
stimulus and type of orientation are known, and the transformation
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involves assuming the next in a series of well-defined spatial posi-
tions. Note that manipulation of a frame of reference could be an
important component of performance in reorienting after "pop-up";
thus, it is important to have a more definitive evaluation of this issue
at the basic research level.
In addition to the basic analog model of rotation and related
spatial transformations proposed by Shepard, Cooper, and their col-
laborators, other sorts of models have been offered to account for the
data from transformation experiments that assume a discrete repre-
sentation of a visual object and incremental transformations applied
to subparts of the representation (e.g., Anderson, 1978; Just and
Carpenter, 1976). The most detailed of these alternative models has
been presented by Just and Carpenter (1976) and Carpenter and Just
(1978) and is based on an analysis of patterns of eye fixations made
during performance of a mental rotation task, similar to that studied
by Shepard and Metzler (1971), in which two visual displays differ-
ing in orientation are compared with respect to shape. The process
model that these investigators propose postulates three successive
stages in carrying out transformations on objects presented spatially.
In the first "search" stage, sections of the figures that are in poten-
tial correspondence are located. In the second "transformation and
comparison" stage, segments that are taken to correspond in the two
figures are mentally rotated, and a sequence of comparisons is made
to determine when the orientations of the segments correspond. The
transformations and comparisons are incremental, occurring about
every 50 degrees of rotation. In the final "confirmation" stage, a
determination is made of whether the other segments of the figure
correspond as a result of the transformation. Thus, although this
model departs substantially from the analog account, it does fulfill
the criterion of an analog process outlined by Cooper (1976) and
Cooper and Shepard (1973), but the succession of intermediate po-
sitions assumed is by a representation of portions of a visual figure
rather than of an integrated representation. More recently, Just and
Carpenter (1985) presented a detailed account of performance on a
cube comparison task that requires transformations on visual ob-
jects. The model is designed to describe differences in performance
between individuals of high and low measured spatial aptitude, and it
is embodied in a running simulation. The central difference between
the two aptitude groups resides in the coordinate system adopted
for representing and transforming spatial objects. Note that since
this model is designed specifically to account for group differences by
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strategy differences, its usefulness in predicting across performance,
given a particular stimulus as input, is minimal.
A final example of a model that might be applied to transforma-
tions on visual information has recently been proposed by Kosslyn
(1987). This qualitative model is a very general account of perceiv-
ing and imagining which assumes that different (neural) subsystems
encode relations among parts of an object in a categorical fashion
(i.e., top-bottom, right-left relations) and in terms of their actual
coordinates (metric relations). Presumably, both subsystems are in-
volved in the realignment of disoriented objects, with the categorical
relations subsystem enabling comparisons of current relations with
stored ones and the coordinate encoding subsystem enabling a precise
computation of the position of all parts of an object in space.
MEMORY FOR POSITIONS IN A SEQUENCE
OF STATIC DISPLAYS
A second body of empirical work that may be relevant to pilot
performance issues addresses accuracy of memory for the last of a
series of visual stimuli presented in a sequence of ordered positions
with temporal parameters such that the sequence implies directional
motion at a particular rate. In this work by Freyd, Finke, and
their collaborators (Finke and Shyi, in press i
 Freyd, 1983, 1987;
Freyd and Finke, 1984; Freyd and Johnson, 1987), observers view
a sequence of rectangles or dot pattern stimuli discretely presented
in successive orientations that specify rotation in the picture plane.
Some variable time after offset of a final stimulus in the sequence,
a test stimulus is presented, and observers must judge whether or
not it is in the same position as the final stimulus in the sequence.
The general finning is that errors in memory for the final position
are not randomly distributed, but rather have a tendency to occur to
test stimuli in positions slightly ahead of the actual position of the
final stimulus. This distortion in memory for final position appears
to be attributable to the implied motion of the sequence of discrete
inducing displays haF been called representational momentum. The
theoretical framework in which these memory distortions have been
cast views representational momentum as very loosely analogous to
physical momentum, and there is some evidence for a weak form
of this analogy. In particular, the memory distortions increase in
proportion to the implied velocity (Finke, Freyd, and Shyi, 1986),
and when the applied velocity changes (suggesting decelerating or
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accelerating motion), the distortion is related to the final velocity
implied by the inducing sequence (Finke et al., 1986).
Freyd and Johnson (1987) have specified quantitative models of
the physical process of stopping that predict both the slope of the line
relating magnitude of memory distortion to implied velocity and the
asymptotic level achieved for different (retention) intervals between
the final display in a sequence and the test display. Their preferred
physical model, combined with a model that specifies a memory aver-
aging component, does a reasonable job in accounting for dwte from
a series of parametric experiments manipulating inducing interstim-
ulus intervals and retention intervals. Models such as these, based
on equations familiar from physics, may be candidates for describing
position errors. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of
the "error" is small (the largest estimate reported is 2 degrees, and
most estimates are well below 1 degree (see Cooper, Gibson, Mowafy,
and Tataryn, 1987), and the distortion is revealed by asymmetries in
performance functions, rather than by shifts in peaks of responding
from the correct position to the distorted position. Furthermore,
the estimates of memory shifts are obtained by fitting the data with
quadratic equations, which generally do not provide impressive fits.
EXTRAPOLATION OF PERCEPTUALLY DRIVEN
SPATIAL TRANSFORMATIONS
A perceptual situation somewhat similar to the memory tasks
described above, but which approximates better possible demands
on pilot performance, is one in which observers must extrapolate the
trajectory of an object shown undergoing a spatial transformation.
Cooper (in press) and Cooper et al. (1987) have provided reports of
the initial results of such a program of research. In the experimen-
tal situation observers view a drawing of a three-dimensional object
rotating rigidly; at some randomly determined point in the rotation
the object disappears. Some time after the disappearance, the object
reappears, and observers must judge whether or not the position of
reappearance is at the correct point in the transformational trajec-
tory, if the rotation continued at constant velocity during the blank
interval.
The general finding of these experiments is that observers judge
as "correct" reappearances, undershoots of the actual position at
which the object should reappear. The magnitude of the extrapola-
tion error is approximately 6 degrees of negative displacement from
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the correct point of reappearance but increases as the duration of
the blank internal increases from 300 to 1200 milliseconds. The ex-
trapolation error is substantial and robust. It is reflected in a true
shift in the peak of the response function; that is, the probability
of responding "correct" to a displacement of -6 degrees is greater
than the probability of responding "correct" to the true position of
extrapolated reappearance. The negative shift is obtained both for
rotations in the picture plane (in which the projected structure of
the object does not change at different reappearance positions) and
for rotations in depth (in which the projected structure does not
change at different reappearance positions). The extrapolation error
does not appear to depend on the amount of immediate exposure to
the display, because it occurs in a similar fashion when the blank
interval is placed in the first or in the second revolution of the object.
Furthermore, over a still limited range of velocities examined, the
error does not appear to be influenced substantially by the constant
depicted velocity of the rotating object.
These data are not well accounted for by models based on the
projected two-dimensional distance between corresponding edges of
the object before and after the blank interval; as with the mental
rotation work, distally measured distance provides a better account
at all values of the blank interval. Furthermore, these data are con-
sistent with those reported by Finke and Shyi (in press), who find
that slight undershoots characterize the nature of memory errors
when the static, sequential "representational momentum" task is
performed with instructions to extrapolate the position of the last
display in the sequence in judging the accuracy of the position of the
test display. However, Cooper et al. (1987) have reported that perfor-
mance is extremely poor when subjects are instructed to extrapolate
the implied motion of sequences of static displays.
Considerable additional work is needed before the conditions
under which extrapolation errors occur and their dependence on
stimulus and judgmental factors can be modeled. Other work in
which extrapolation of single objects moving at constant velocity has
been assessed has generally shown quite accurate performance (e.g.,
Cooper, 1976; Jagacinski, Johnson and Miller, 1983; Rosenbaum,
1975). However, the experimental situations used in these other in-
vestigations differed substantially from those of the Cooper (Cooper,
in press; Cooper et al., 1987) experiments.
One general limitation on models proposed to account for data
from extrapolation experiments or the "representational momentum"
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phenomenon discussed in the previous section concerns the task
specificity of such models. That is, most accounts of errors in re-
membering or extrapolating trajectories of motion make reference to
the internalization of some principle or set of principles governing the
physical motion of objects in the world. However, which principles
of physics are internalized, and how, or under what circumstances,
does such internalization occur? Shepard (1984) has offered a general
argument and empirical support for the position that the perceptual
system (and the cognitive system, in the absence of external per-
ceptual support) has internalized principles of kinematic geometry.
Work on the conceptions that naive subjects have concerning the con-
tinuing trajectories of moving objects (e.g., Caramazza, McCloskey,
and Green, 1981; McCloskey, Washburn, and Felch, 1983) suggests
that errors of judgment occur frequently and may be systematic. In
the absence of a principled theoretical account of which physical laws
are internalized in perceiving, remembering, and reasoning about the
motion of objects in space, models of processes like extrapolation and
memory for position will necessarily remain specific to the particular
display and task features of the experiments in which these processes
are assessed.
JUDGMENTS OF OBJECT STRUCTURE
FROM PARTIAL VIEWS
One final line of research only marginally related to transforma-
tions on visual objects, but potentially relevant to a class of pilot
performance problems, concerns the extent to which the structure of
visual objects can be determined from partial information. The types
of partial information used in these experiments (Cooper, Mowafy,
and Stevens, 1986) are those that might be sampled as an observer
moves in the environment or views an object in motion, rather than
the kind of partial information that occasions low levels of illurnina-
tion or brief stimulus exposures. Subjects solved problems based on
orthographic views of objects and were then asked to make forced
choice recognition of isometric views of the objects that would have
been formed by the orthographic views shown during problem solv-
ing and structurally similar distractor isometrics. Performance on
the recognition task was excellent, even though no previous exposure
to the isometric views of the objects had occurred. This suggests
that the process of reasoning with flat, separated orthographic views
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involves the mental construction of a three-dimensional or isometric-
like model of the object that is structurally veridical enough to permit
discrimination from a similar distractor structure.
Of particular interest for purposes of the present chapter, is that
the recognition of correct isometrics was quite accurate, even when
those isometrics depicted views of the object that did not correspond
to the particular set of orthographies presented during problem solv-
ing. That is, subjects could correctly discriminate isometrics that
shared only two views in common with the particular orthographics
previously displayed at a level almost equal to that obtained when
the test isometrics shared all three views in common with the set of
orthographics. There is computational cost involved in inferring this
"hidden" structure of constructed mental representations of objects:
the time required to make the discrimination increased considerably
when only two (as opposed to all three) surfaces were shared. In
addition, as the number of shared sides fell below two, accuracy also
declined until performance was essentially at a chance level when
the test isometrics shared no surfaces in common with the isomet-
ric that corresponded to the three orthographic projections initially
displayed. Results such as these indicate that inferences about the
spatial structure of objects not immediately externally available can
be made at some level of accuracy. However, both the extent to
which underlying mental representations of objects can be character-
ized as view independent and the nature of constraints on the ability
to make these inferences about partially concealed structure remains
unclear.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Many of the limitations of existing models and data on manip-
ulations of visual information for application to pilot performance
problems have been mentioned in previous sections; these limitations
provide some guidelines for future research directions.
First, although considerable experimental data exist that could
be useful in partial simulation, static analysis. and rapid experimen-
tation on pilot performance problems, these results have generally
been obtained in severely constrained display and task environments.
It is commonplace to assert that psychological research should strive
to be more "ecologically valid"; in the case of the research reviewed
here, even minor modifications of visual displays and perfor nance
demands could have substantial consequences for applicability of
A
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data to pilot performance situations. Most of the data that serve
as a basis for models of transformations on visual objects in space
have considered only single transformations applied to single objects.
There are notable exceptions (e.g., the work of Kolers and Perkins,
1969, on transformations on entire lines of text and literature on
"cognitive maps," not reviewed in this chapter), but research on
transformations on arrays of objects and observers in relation to ar-
rays of objects that might be encountered in a natural scene would
seem to be a promising direction. In addition, the transformations
studied have generally involved rigid rotation, translation, size scal-
ing, or (rarely) some combination of ib.ese simple transformations.
The use of multiple and more complex transformations, including
nonrigid transformations, would seem important at a theoretical as
well as at the practical level of providing more realistic simulations of
what a pilot might actually be exposed to. Coupling tasks requiring
judgments about transformations on objects or extrapolations of tra-
jectories of motion with additional attention-demanding tasks could
also provide information about how concurrent processing demands
influence both the time and the accuracy of performance. All of the
research directions mentioned constitute fairly natural expansions
and extensions of a number of ongoing programs.
In addition to enriching the data base from which models can
be developed, a more vigorous modeling effort is required. Further-
more, models should reflect human performance characteristics and
provide insight into the nature of internal representations and mecha-
nisms that produce the observed performance. Mary current modals
are qualitative or simple quantitative descriptions of psychophysi-
cal functions. Enlarging the scope of these models and providing
more comprehensive models of interactions between transformation
processes and processes of object identification, for example, is an
important goal for future research efforts.
There is a need to provide general and principled theoretical
accounts of which kinds of physical processes operating on objects in
the world might be internalized by the perceptual system, and of how
and why such internalization takes place. Finally, the extent to which
accurate anticipation of the transformations of objects might occur
in perceptually guided situations, but not in situations requiring
reasoning or cognitive activity removed from immediate perceptual
input, should be examined both experimentally and theoretically.
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Combining Views
JULIAN HOCHBERG
Two quite different kinds of processes for combining views are
required in the set of problems associated with nap of the earth
(NOE) helicopter design: (1) the integration of successive views into
a large or more inclusive perceived layout and (2) the combination of
binocular views into a single cyclopean field from which information
from the two individual views may or may not be retrievable. Models
seem possible in restricted areas of both processes, but none currently
meets the criteria listed in the introduction.
INTEGRATION OF SUCCESSIVE VIEWS
The necessity of combining information from successive views
pervades virtually all perceptual tasks: in any single glance, the
eye provides detailed vision from the larger surrounding periphery.
When more information is needed than can be obtained in one glance,
the eye moves by ballistic saccades, at rates usually less than 4
per second, bringing to the fovea a preselected part of the field
previously seen in peripheral vision. Therefore, information about a
single object, layout, or event is usually obtained by means of several
glances, each directed at a different place in space.
Ubiquitous though it is, this complex performance concerns the
designer and the pilot performance model primarily in three ways:
• In relation to free viewing, the complex movements of the
eye, body, and target, compounded by interrupted illumination, may
make it difficult or impossible to relate successive visual samples to
each other within a coherent directional framework. Some of the
potentially offending conditions can be identified and are probably
relatively easy to model: for example, the way in which brief flashes
of light, or stroboscopic presentations, confuse the registration of
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gaze direction (Matin, 1986) and defeat size constancy (Rogowitz,
1984).
Designer remedies may include judicious distribution of land-
marks throughout the field of view in question (e.g., the cockpit
interior) that are readily distinguished in peripheral vision, can be
rapidly identified in search, and form an easily learned spatial map
(cf. Finke and Shepard, 1986; Henderson, Pollatsek, and Rayner,
1987; Hochberg and Gellman, 1977; Treisman, 1986). Although there
is scattered research literature on many of the components needed
to model these processes (see Finke and Shepard, 1986; Humphreys
and Quinlan, 1987; Stevens, 1987; Treisman, 1986; Ullman, 1985;
Wickens, this volume pp. 191-193 for recent reviews), nothing that
approaches an overall model that could be image driven and that
would provide quantitative output appears to exist today.
Given the substantial time required by each glance, the num-
ber of saccades, their frequency, and the fixation dwell times that
they need must be taken into account in the design wherever visual in-
formation is densely packed and widely spread, as in low-redundancy
text or alphanumeric arrays that require foveal detail such as instru-
ments or details of the environment. The number, sequence, and
distribution of glances executed and the time devoted to each glance
are variables that depend complexly on task, stimulus variables, and
viewer variables (see reviews by Moray, 1986; Senders, 1983; Wick-
ens, this volume pp. 191-193).
The most active models here are those pursued in attempting
to predict dwell time in reading (for reviews, see Carr, 1986; Just
and Carpenter, 1980; Rayner, 1978) in a tradition that goes back to
Judd and Buswell (1922). These attempts may provide a foundation
for, but are not themselves directly applicable to, the informational
arrays of cockpit instruments on the helmet display.
• Artificial displays that sample the field of view (or scroll
through an alphanumeric array in a saltatory manner), including mo-
tion pictures, often do so through markedly discontinuous changes. In
movies, these are "cuts", and there is much lore about how to make
them comprehensible (Bordwell, 1985; Hochberg, 1986; Monaco,
1977; Reisz and Miller, 1968; Vorkapich, 1972). In computer-
generated images (CGI) and in cockpit video, they may reflect low
update rates chosen to accommodate limited bandwidth or computer
speed (as in simulation, night views, and enhanced terrain displays);
or they may occur because of abrupt changes in remote camera di-
rection; and they are often used deliberately to present layouts that
JULIAN HOCHBERG	 161
are larger than the display screen (cuts, saltatory scrolls and zooms,
etc.) or merely when changing from one array to another.
In normal vision in the world, abrupt view changes result pri-
marily from saccadic eye movements. The problem of combination
of views has been approached almost exclusively in terms of using
information about those preprogrammed movements to compensate
for the image's spatial displacement (see Matin, 1986, for recent re-
view). When the view change is part of the display and not the result
of programmed eye movements, some other explanation of our ability
to integrate the views is needed.
A first step toward an explanation (but not a model) is Gib-
son's proposal that the visual overlap between views "specifies" the
overall optic array that those views sample (Gibson, 1950, 1979).
This does not indicate when and why the process fails, or what
kinds of perceptual errors then arise. To do that, a quantitative ac-
count is required of the various ways in which such information can
be provided and used (e.g., low-level apparent motion, landmarks,
swishpan; Hochberg, 1986). No single model has been formulated
that will do this. Indeed, several distinct levels are involved in the
process: some of the early levels have been modeled, essentially pro-
viding for apparent motion (Braddick, 1974; Watson and Ahumada,
1983) between local features that may or may not belong to corre-
sponding objects in the successive views (Braddick, 1974; Hochberg
and Brooks, 1974; Kolers and Pomerantz, 1971; Navon, 1976; Or-
lansky, 1940). Especially in artificial situations, these can provide
for failures and errors of integration and, indeed, may underlie most
of the motion picture lore about movie editing and cutting (Brooks,
1984, 1985; Hochberg 1986; Hochberg and Brooks, 1978). It seems
likely that the dangers of such errors depend sufficiently on currently
measurable stimulus properties, and rest on sufficiently simple and
early relationships, that they can be modeled and ameliorated.
However, that cannot tell us what the integrated product of
successive glimpses will be. This distinction is analogous to not-
ing that mere spatial knowledge about the location on the page of
text at which some set of glances has been directed is not the same
as knowing the central idea of that tev*. ?ii_l cr ^
	
-_- Or
ject recognition and representation are clearly involved here, and
although it seems plausible that models can eventually be developed,
as Chapters 9 and 10 show, they do not yet exist.
Moreover, it should be noted that the higher or more complex
levels are primary in determining the sequence in normal looking:
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where one looks (indeed, whether one looks) is a measure of the
course of attention in the execution of an information -gathering task
and is more a question of cognition than of vision (see Chapter 15).
In summary, the integration of successive glances cannot be
modeled in any overall sense at this time. One can now merely list
the classes of error that occur, describe the circumstances in which
they are likely to happen, and suggest that models of some of the low-
level processes responsible for error may be attainable. Where such
errors are likely to be made, it should be noted that film directors
have learned that in such cases, enough context —and enough time to
assimilate the view change —help to achieve accurate comprehension.
BINOCULAR COMBINATION
Qualitatively speaking, when the two eyes receive disparate views
that can be combined into a single layout or scene, "fusion" is said
to occur, and the individual views are more or less lost in a sin-
gle cyclopean percept (although with local disparities that exceed
Panum 's limit, diplopia can be detected within the otherwise-fused
field). When the views cannot be so combined (still speaking loosely),
rivalry occurs between them; they alternate —usually locally—in a
piecemeal fashion, or more rarely, the view of one eye or the other
dominates completely for some usually short time period. Still the
most general, but noncomputational, attempt at a model is Sperling's
(1970), although sections of that have been pursued in computer sci-
ence ( Marr and Poggio, 1976; Frisby and Mayhew, 1980). Dormant
for some decades, attempts to model whether fusion or rivalry will
occur are presently being refined from their rather vague starting
point, (Blake, in press; Wolf, 1986). They are currently not image
driven and have not yet been fully worked out.
When rivalry does occur, which view dominates in any region
appears to be determined largely by relatively local measurable stim-
ulus variables (Asher, 1953; Berliner, 1948; Blake, in press; Levelt,
1965), and it should be possible to provide models (perhaps princi-
ples, as well as empirical bases) that will account for and predict local
uo , :x:^c__. -I?: - i rrot a trivial matter, if pilots continue to be fed
different information to eacli" eye and need some auxiliary procedure
to bring rivalry under voluntary control. Shifting attention between
rivalrous views is a fatiguing task for the pilot, which apparently
only gets worse with time and experience (Murray and Hayworth,
personal communication).
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Afterword
Do models exist that meet the four requirements listed in the
introduction? In Chapter 5, there seem to be some that are in fairly
close to usable form and will simulate performance that depends
primarily on aspects of early vision. It may also be possible to
model aircraft state estimation, and some related responses, from
two-dimensional optical flow information in certain restricted cases,
as described in Chapter 8, although more validation against human
performance is needed. Other processes in early vision, which may
affect the integration of successive views and binocular rivalry, as
mentioned in Chapter 11, seem amenable to modeling.
A recurrent theme through all the preceding chapters is that of
insufficient, totally absent, or failed attempts at validation against
human performance. There are two other problems that are similar
to each other in their consequences. When "later" or higher-level
visual and cognitive functions, which might be thought to rest on '.he
early processes (some psychologists would disagree), are considered in
Chapters 6, 7, 9, and 10, the verdict is almost uniformly negative: no
usable, valid, image-driven models are within immediate or, in many
cases, even fairly close reach. Where the early visual processes are
to make their contributions to performance through their effects on
higher perceptual processes, the fact that the former can be modeled
is somewhat impaired by our present inability to model the latter.
The second problem is this: numerous gaps exist between the
functions that can be modeled, so that they do not form a chain or a
seamless repertory that can be drawn on automatically in any task.
Given the likelihood noted above that many perceptual functions
important to pilot performance cannot yet be suitably modeled,
it seems clear that a workstation cannot at present be trusted to
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perform a full and unsupervised pilot performance model simulation
or evaluation of an arbitrary mission in any given cockpit design.
If such limitations on applicability and validity as have been
described are accepted however, it would still seem profitable to set
up a test system that models what can be modeled. In this way, a
more realistic basis will exist for assessing the relative importance of
what can and cannot yet be done. This will also enable us to test the
nonvisual or cognitive components of any such system.
Paxt III
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Introduction to Cognition Models
At the cognitive level, the architecture that enables us to roughly
associate models by stages of processing, as was true for visual mod-
els, is no longer available. Furthermore, for the accomplishment of
any real task, the functional components of human processing exist
in complex interaction with each other, making it difficult to sepa-
rate out models of the components that are predictive. An added
difficulty is that the data structures for models of cognition must
often be complex.
Mitigating these difficulties of modeling at the cognitive level are
several factors. First, for simple, fast behaviors, say on the order of
a second, pieces of the underlying mechanisms of cognitive action
show through and can be modeled (although the relationship of
these models to interaction in sustained, naturalistic situations may
still be problematic). Models of working memory and attention are
examples. Second, more complex behavior tends to be in the service
of some goal and under constraints in the environment. Detailed
studies of the courses of action open in this environment and the
"task analysis," "knowledge-oriented," or "rational action" modeling
of the environment (and the information possessed about it), together
with relatively simple assumptions about the underlying mechanisms
of cognitive action, can be used to predict behavior. Decision theory
models, problem-solving models, or time line analysis models are
examples of this type. The doctrinal and heavily engineered nature
of procedures for helicopter flight is an asset here for modeling.
The chapters in Part III move in a progression between these two
levels--from models of mechanisms of the human cognitive architec-
ture to models of rational action in a described environment. Thus,
some models early in the progression are at the component (or the
architectural) level, whereas later models are based almost entirely
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Cognitive Architectures
STUART K. CARD AND ALLEN NEWELL
The models in this chapter describe aspects of the human infor-
mation processing system. Each model attempts to explicate mech-
anisms of the human processor that give rise to surface behavior. Of
course, in reality there is but a single human processor, all of whose
mechanisms all fit together. The overall structure of this processor—
its architecture—is an object of study in its own right. Recently,
the cognitive part of this architecture has been the subject of active
study. Most of these proposals are reported in the proceedings of
a recent conference on cognitive architectures (CMU, in press), to
which the reader is referred. This section does not attempt to review
current proposals for cognitive architectures, but rather, gives a brief
sketch of the space of alternatives.
Models of architecture are important for several reasons. (These
are derived from Newell, Rosenbloom, and Laird, in press): (1) The
architecture is the frame in terms of which all processing is done, the
locus of structural constraints on cognition; it is a piece of the puz-
zle in its own right. (2) Gross parameters of the architecture, such
as working memory size, can be used to summarize approximately
the constraints acting on general cognition. (3) The architecture
provides a means of integrating the mechanisms (and reducing their
number) identified by other models and of explicating their input,
output, and shared resource connections. (4) The architecture is a
means of revealing hidden connections and constraints among activ-
ities which, on the basis of context and situation, may seem quite
distant from each other. (5) The architecture is a means of removing
theoretical degrees of freedom from modeling the mechanisms behind
specific behavlors; otherwise, the modeling of these is often severely
underconstrained.
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FIGURE 14-1 Schematic diagram of cognitive architectures.
figure 14-1 is meant to suggest some dimensions of variation
in the space of cognitive architectures. To define the space, a few
specific architectures are included. The clearest contrast is between
those architectures that model human processingin terms of symbolic
processing (symbolist architectures) and those that use some sort of
subsymbolic processing, represented in graphs with weighted links
(connectionist architectures). Intermediate between symbolist and
connectionist architectures are proposals that combine some features
of both and are, therefore, termed hybrid architectures. The technical
development of connectionist architectures is more recent (although
they have roots in associationist philosophy of great vintage and the
neural models of the 1950s). Because their development is in major
flnx, they are drawn as a cluster of related models on the horizon
and are not differentiated further in Figure 14-1. The symbolist
architectures have had more tine to reach technical maturity; they
are, therefore, drawn in the foreground and further differentiated
according to the integration of the architectural mechanisms.
SYMBOLIST ARCHITECTURES
The most integrated of the symbolist architectures are ACT'
(Anderson, 1983) and SOAR (Laird, Nowell, and Rosenbloom, 1987;
Newell, in press). ACT* has three memories: (1) a declarative
long term memory (a semantic net of nodes with weighted links),
(2) a procedural long-term memory (condition-action productions),
I
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and (3) a working memory. Elements in both long-term memories
have strengths associated with them, and those in declarative long-
term memory can have a level of activation associated with them.
Working memory is the set of activated elements from declarative
long-term memory (including goal structures) plus the set of actions
that create new structures in working memory. Activation spreads
through declarative memory as a function of element strength. New
productions can be created from the effects of previous activity that
has made it to declarative long-term memory.
SOAR has two memories, a single long-term memory of produc-
tions and a working memory that contains a goal structure, infor-
mation associated with the goals, preferences about what should be
done, perceptual information, and motor commands. Working mem-
ory serves as a sort of bus, receiving inputs from sensory elements,
exposing these inputs to parallel-acting decoding productions, hold-
ing inputs and outputs from cognitive productions, exposing these
to parallel-acting encoding productions, and holding outputs for ac-
tivation of the motor system. All tasks are modeled as searches in
some problem space. Productions contribute preferences for the next
substeps in this search (choice of goal to work on, choice of state
to work on, choice of operator). If there is no clear-cut set of pref-
erences for these choices, the system is at an impasse, leading it to
generate a new goal and problem space to solve the impasse itself.
This mechanism allows the system to reflect on its own processing,
leading it to search both through and among problem spaces. An
individual move in a problem space can itself lead to a new prob-
lem space to solve the problem of how to make this move. New
productions are continuously created that embody the results from
successful searches.
At the opposite extreme from integrated symbolist models, such
as ACT* and Soar, are models like the model human processor (Card,
Moran, and Newell, 1986) that use a few parameters to character-
ize the architecture instead of detailed interacting mech,,nisms. The
model human processor has four memories (long-term memory, work-
ing memory, the visual image store, and the auditory image store)
and three processors (cognitive, perceptual, and motor). Each of
these is characterized by parameters. For example, the visual image
store decays exponentially with a decay constant of 200 milliseconds
(cosec). Ranges are provided for all the parameters so that upper and
lower bounds can be computed to take into account the approximate
nature of the analysis and the state of knowledge in the literature.
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A set of accompanying laws of behavior (e.g., Fitts's law, Hick's law,
Snell's law) augments predictions from first principles.
There also exist symbolist architectures that are intermediate
along the parametric-integrated dimension of Figure 14-1. An exam-
ple is the Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (1986) theory of
induction. General knowledge, in their architecture, is embodied in a
set of condition-action rules, which can represent both time-invariant
information (dogs are animals) and information about future states
of knowledge (if a person annoys a dog, it will growl). These rules
form clusters, either explicitly through linking together of the rules
or implicitly because the rules share data structures. In particular,
rules can be clustered into superordinate categories, which give rise
to a default hierarchy of rules (a dog has four legs because a dog is a
mammal and a mammal has four legs), together with rules that ex-
press exceptions to this default hierarchy. Such sets of rules express
the `mental models' people have about the world. Induction consists
of mechanisms for revising the strengths of individual rules and for
devising plausible new rules, based on experience. These mechanisms
are triggered by failed or successful predictions. Other more or less
integrated symbolist architectures exist, largely developed around
some particular set of tasks, for example, learning subtraction for
VanLehn's (1983) SIERRA architecture or reading for Just and Car-
penter's (1987) CAPS architecture.
CONNECTIONIST MODELS
In contrast to the symbolist architectures in which the mind is
assumed to be a physical symbol-processing system, connectionist
systems are networks of large numbers of interconnected "units."
Each unit can have associated with it a certain amount of activa-
tion. Connections to other units are given explicit weights (including
negative weights). Activation spreads from one unit to another as a
function of the weighted links. For example, the function of a typical
link might be to multiply the input activation by its weight and then
apply a threshold function. A typical unit would sum all of its input
activations, then divide this among all its links. The weights on the
links are adjustable with experience. Some of the links may represent
sensory inputs from the outside world; some may represent output to
effectors to the outside world. Units in connectionist models are usu-
ally taken to be below the level of a symbol. For example, different
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units may represent visual features of a letter such as verticalness or
roundedness.
Connectionist models are attractive because they appear to offer
the beginnings of a computational architecture that is more neural-
like. They seem to show how complex mental operations can be
derived from slow, simple mechanisms, and they seem naturally to
relate perception to cognition. They have had some initial successes
in modeling behavior (see McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986; Rumel-
hart and McClelland, 1986; Smolensky, 1988). These issues, however,
are heavily contested (see Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). Connectionist
models have been most successful at pattern recognition tasks. It is
not known whether they will have adequate computational power to
model higher-level cognitive behavior (Smolensky,1988). At present,
the state of connectionist models is changing so rapidly that detailed
commentary on particular lines of research would be out of date
immediately.
Hybrid architectures, containing both symbolist and connection-
ist aspects, have also been proposed (e.g., MacKay, 1987; Schneider
and Detweiler, 1987; Schneider and Mumme, 1987). For example,
in Schneider's connectionist/control architecture, connectionist units
model specific sorts of cells in the known neurophysiology. The units
are organized into modules, each capable of representing some mean-
ingful piece of information. Modules are connected by bundles of links
called message vectors. Information processing occurs by level, with
visual feature modules feeding into letter modules, which feed into
word modules for example. Each module contains an attenuational
control unit and a control box. These allow higher-level modules to
control the availability of message vector outputs and also allow a
mechanism for sequencing. At the highest level, different modalities
are tied together with the output of a context module. Learning and
sensory automaticity occur by changing weights between a message
vector and an output unit.
The use of one of the aforementioned cognitive architectures
for the integration of human performance theory in a computer-
aided engineering system could be pursued at the present time as
a research project, but not as an engineering component on which
other work depends. Furthermore, the project would be feasible
for researchers associated with one of the teams now working on
cognitive architectures. However, this may change in the next five
years, after research on these models has matured. Advances in
cognitive architectures can be expected to lead to across-the-board
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improvements in the ability to use human performance models for
engineering work because they address directly one of the primary
difficulties—the complex interactions that occur among interactions
for a human engaged in any macrolevel task.
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Resource Management and Time-Sharing
CHRISTOPHER D. WICKENS
OVERVIEW
The domain of this chapter is models that predict the loss of
quality of processing information from multiple channels, or multiple
tasks, which occurs as a direct result of that multiplicity. It is
often assumed, therefore, that this multiplicity induces competition
for some scarce commodity called "resources." At issue is whether
one can predict the loss in quality, given characteristics of (1) the
processing on each channel (or task) in isolation and (2) the relation
between channels (tasks).
There are a number of psychological models of the resource al-
location process. Unfortunately, it appears that those models which
have the most precise quantitative formulation and have received the
strongest empirical validation, have been derived in domains that
may be furthest removed from the complex, heterogeneous task envi-
ronment of the rotorcraft cockpit; whereas those that have addressed
task environments of greatest complexity are furthest removed from
a quantitative formulation (or alternatively are models that have yet
to be validated). This disparity is unfortunate because it is clear
that the objective should be one of obtaining quantitative models in
wt.ich levels of performance in heterogeneous environments can be
predicted from quantitative specification of task parameters.
Two general characteristics of the resource process have been
addressed by models: (1) the allocation of resources—the selective
aspects of attention—and (2) the sources of variance in competition
between channels or tasks—the "scarcity" commodity of resources.
Within each category, further discrimination may be made between
two classes: (1) those models that assume, for convenience, a se-
quential mode of processing and address the logic of switching, or
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TABLE 15-1 The Domain Of Models
Resource
	
Allocation
	 Competition
Serial
Aspects
Time-
sharing
(Parallel
Aspects)
Visual Scanning: Moray Switching: Gopher
Senders faBerge et al.
Harris and Spady Kristofferson
Allen eta].
Task Selection: Chu and Rouse
Tulga and Sheridan
Zacharias(PROCRU)
Siegel and Wolf
Wortman et al. (SAINT)
Wherry (HOS)
Multichannel Shaw Multiple Wickens
Detection: Swets Resources: Friedman et al.
Navon and Gopher
Manual Levison and Tanner North
Control: Levison Laughery et al.
Performance Sperling and Dasher Confusion: Carswell
Operating
Characteristics: Integration: Wickens
the serial aspects of performance. These models are not concerned
directly with the level of performance, but rather with the timing
of when tasks will be initiated. They may be contrasted with (2)
those that do not make the serial assumption, that address domains
of time-sharing and concurrent processing, and that make specific
predictions about performance levels.
A 2 by 2 structure of the domains of models is presented in Table
15-1 in which the dichotomy of serial-parallel processing is crossed
with that of allocation-selection versus competition. Within each cell
key terms are identified that characterize the phenomena associated
with the modeling efforts, along with key references or sources.
It is important to note that a number of elegant efforts have
discussed models of the strategic or microscopic processes by which
performance is produced—e.g., whether processing is serial or paral-
lel (Kantowitz, 1986; Townsend, 1974; Townsend & Ashby, 1983) or
whether information integration and selection are early or late (Kan-
towitz, 1986; Norman, 1968; Pashler, 1984; Shaw, 1982). Therefore,
a distinction must be drawn between models of how performance is
produced and models that predict how performance will vary as a
function of task characteristics. The latter are clearly relevant to
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design environments. The former will be relevant only if the modeled
mechanism has robust and important implications for the level of
performance obtained.
This chapter reviews the models that exist in terms of the four
cells of Table 15-1 and concludes by describing in more detail the hy-
brid model that is considered to be most appropriate for the current
applications.
SERIAL ALLOCATION
In 'he upper left cell of Table 15-1 are those models that have
dealt	 biguously with the serial allocation of some processing
resourc. •. ch as the availability of foveal vision between saccades
o.c the coriplete allocation of cognitive effort to one task rather than
another. From the standpoint of these models, the issue of whether
processing may be parallel is simply not relevant. They focus on
those aspects of processing that are distinctly and unambiguously
serial (i.e., that require decision of where to allocate over time).
Visual Sampling
There are two critical aspects of the visual sampling process to
be modeled: the scanning process that assesses the transitions of
visual fixations from one display to another and the fixation itself,
which is characterized by a location, a useful field of view (diameter
around the central location from which information is extracted), and
a dwell time. Visual sampling has been examined both in supervisory
control tasks employing fixed displays such as an aircraft instrument
panel, where potential information sources are known in advance to
the operator, and free field search, in which an area is searched for
a target of unknown location, and sometimes uncertain form (e.g.,
the radiologist examining an x-ray plate, or the airborne observer
engaged in search for a crash site or ground installation). Some
successful quantitative models have been applied to the first domain,
and a number of useful principles have emerged from the second,
which can provide the foundation for effective model development.
The foundation for models of display scanning in supervisory
control were provided by Fitts, Jones, and i•.lilton (1949), who an-
alyzed the frequency of fixations and transitions between cockpit
instruments during flight. Senders (1966, 1983) provided a quanti-
tative basis for an instrument sampling model which was based on
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information theory. Ile reasoned that instruments which varied ac-
cording to their bandwidth or autocorrelation (information delivered
per unit time) would be sampled with a frequency in direct pro-
portion to that information. Empirical validation revealed that this
sampling model accounted for instrument scanning data reasonably
well, although operators tended to sample more frequently (relative
to optimal) from sources with low information content and sample
less frequently from those sources with high content.
Senders' sampling model has been elaborated by Carbonell
(1966) to include elements related to the subjective uncertainty of a
given information source. According to this elaboration, the source
is assumed to have zero uncertainty immediately after it is fixated.
Uncertainty then grows over time as a result of two factors: the
bandwidth or autocorrelation of the signal, and the decay properties
of working memory (see Chapter 16). The next fixation of a given in-
strument will occur when the 1r Orel of uncertainty reaches an internal
criterion whose level is based upon the expected cost of not sampling
the instrument, and therefore missing a critical event. Carbonell,
Ward, and Senders (1968) obtained reasonably good validation of
the fixation model using experienced pilots flying an aircraft sim-
ulator. Moray (1986) described validation of many of the model's
characteristics in describing the radar scanning behavior of fighter
aircraft controllers. To date, however, eye fixation models of su-
pervisory control in aviation have addressed issues of instrument
scanning and have not considered sampling of motion gradients in
visual contact flight.
Scanning behavior in free field search has been less successfully
modeled than in supervisory control, in part because search patterns
and inspection performance tends to be quite heavily influenced by
individual differences. Drury (1975), however, reports the validation
of a combined search and decision model of sheet metal inspection
in which operators search for flaws of unknown location. Williams
(1966) describes a generic target search model that focuses on the role
of target conspicuity in search tasks. An important characteristic of
both of these models is the non-linear (logarithmic) function relating
detection probability to search time allowed.
In addition to all of the models described above which can be
applied to helicopter cockpit instrument scanning, or out of the
cockpit search, there are a number of general principles of visual
scanning that have emerged from the considerable body of research
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in the area (see Abernethy, 1988; Moray, 1986; Sheridan and Ferrell,
1974, for good reviews). These are
1) The operator's search strategy is driven in large part by his
expectations, or a "mental model" of where information is likely
to occur on a display. (This model is formalized and quantified in
the bandwidth characteristics of signals in the supervisory control
models.) Differences in the mental model account for differences
in search behavior between novices and experts (the latter having
a better formed set of expectancies), and fur the fact that higher
information areas on a display (greater element density, contours)
tend to be fixated more frequently. Expert-novice differences in
scanning vehicular environments have been examined by Harris and
Spady (1985) in aviation and by Mouront and Rockwell (1972) in
automobile driving.
2) The fact that scanning behavior is internally driven by cog-
nitive factors, rather than externally driven by display factors, is
apparently responsible for substantial individual differences in scan
patterns, particularly in search tasks. Unfortunately, these strategic
differences impose difficulties in developing models that capture a
higher degree of variance. Nevertheless, certain additional general-
izations of search behavior across individuals can be made.
3) There is a tendency to avoid searching near the edges of a
display even when targets may be likely to be located there (Para-
suraman, 1986).
4) Fixation dwell times vary in their duration between 200 msec
and approximately 1 second. Within this range there is no system-
atic evidence that longer dwells lead to more efficient search in free
field tasks. however, in information extraction tasks, dwells are typ-
ically longer on displays that are less legible and from which more
information is extracted. For example, Harris and Christhilf (1980)
noted that primary flight instruments necessary for control (e.g., the
attitude display indicator) are sampled with longer dwells than those
employed for check reading.
5) In search tasks, each fixation is characterized by a useful field
of view (UFOV, Mackworth, 1976) which may vary in its diameter,
depending on the density of material to be searched. Successive scans
will not overlap UFOVs. The UFOV may range between approxi-
mately 2 and 4 degrees of visual angle. Combinations of the UFOV
and the maximum fixation rate (2 to 3 saccades per second) constrain
the amount of area that can be searched per unit time. IHowever, even
with sufficient time to search, it appears that operators do not cover
CHRISTOPHER D. WICKENS	 185
an entire area with UFOVs, and targets may be fixated (sometimes
frequently) and yet not detected.
6) In many scanning tasks, some use may be made of peripheral
vision, not necessarily to detect targets, but to guide the destination
of the next fixation.
The extent to which these general principles may be incorpo-
rated into the quantitative predictive models of free-field scanning
and target search formulated by Williams (1966) and by Drury (1975)
remains unclear. The identification of these factors remains an im-
portant step, but the ultimate degree of success of the predictive
models will clearly depend upon the ability to characterize the op-
erator's internal model of an environment (for search task) or of a
system (for supervisory control tasks) that guides sampling behavior
via cognitive factors.
Task Selection
The characteristics of task selection on the basis of expected
utilities and costs also lie at the core of the concurrent performance
assumptions made by many of the predictive models of complex task
performance (Pew, Baron, Feehrer, and Miller, 1977), such as the
human operator simulator (HOS) (Harris, Iavecchia, Ross, and Shaf-
fer, 1987; Strieb, Lane, Glenn, and Wherry, 1981; Wherry, 1976),
SAINT'(Laughery, Drews, and Archer, 1986; Wortman, Duket,
Seifert, Hann, and Chubb, 1978;), PROCRU (Zacharias, Baron, and
Muralidharan,1981), STALL (saturation of tactical aviator load lim-
its; Chubb, Stodolsky, Fleming, and Hassoun, 1987), and those mod-
els developed by Siegel and Wolf (1969), Corker, Davis, Papazian,
and Pew (1986), Chu and Rouse (1979), and Tulga and Sheridan
(1980). Essentially these models assume that when two (or more)
tasks compete for attention (call for completion at the same time), an
algorithm assesses the order in which the tasks are to be performed.
This algorithm is based on user-defined priorities (HOS; Harris et al.,
1987), on computation of expected costs of ignoring those activities
not immediately performed and expected benefits of undertaking the
action that is highest in the priority sequence (PROCRU; Zacharias
et al., 1981), or on the application of strategy-driven decision rules
'SAINT is not actually a model of complex task performance but rather a
structured programming language that allows user-defined task sequences to be
played out.
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and the differing degrees of competition fostered by greater or lesser
similarity between tasks. In this regard they represent more complex
elaborations of single-channel models of attention that were devel-
oped in psychology (Welford, 1967). However, recent elaborations of
some of the models have begun to address the issue of concurrent
performance, as described later in this chapter.
PARALLEL ALLOCATION
The emphasis of models in the lower left cell of Table 15-1, is on
the loss of information-processing quality that results from concur-
rence and from shifts in resource allocation, rather than the forces
(such as expectancy and utility) that predict when a sequential shift
will take place. Furthermore, in contrast to models in the first quad-
rant, these models assume that parallel processing between tasks is
ongoing and, hence, that interference effects result from competition
for something more than time (or, at least, from more than time at
a relatively low sampling frequency). Basically, these models have
taken two generic approaches. One approach is to model perfor-
mance on two perceptual (detection or recognition) tasks of equal
priorities, as a function of such variables as signal strength, signal
uncertainty, and signal differences (Shaw, 1982; Swets, 1984; Tay-
lor, Lindsay, and Forbes, 1967). Several examples of this approach
have been based upon the theory of signal detection. The empiri-
cal data to validate these models have been collected under fairly
carefully defined conditions (near-threshold stimuli in constrained
display locations), and these factors may constrain their relevance to
the helicopter environment.
The second approach focuses on the differential allocation of
resources to different channels or tasks, modeling this allocation
from the standpoint of economic theory as a utility-based decision
problem. Sperling (1984; Sperling and Dosher, 1986) provides an
elegant integrative treatment of the factors underlying this modeling
approach. This approach has its origins in the assumption that
resources are continuously allocatable commodities that facilitate
performance through a function referred to as the "performance
resource function" (Norman and Bobrow, 1975). Performance is
seen to improve or degrade on the basis of the allocation of something
other than or in addition to time. Here again, reported data do not
extend far beyond simple detection and recognition tasks.
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One important quantitative modeling approach to time-sharing,
however, that is applicable to a more diverse set of complex tasks
is found in the multitask extension of the optimal control model of
manual control (Levison, 1982; Levison, Elkind, and Ward, 1971).
Fundamental to this model is a parameter of "observation noise" that
is assumed to perturb the internal representation of analog signals
used for tracking and monitoring. Observation noise is typically
expressed as a ratio to relevant signal amplitude; that is, as an
"observation noise ratio." On the one hand, the effects of changes
in this observation noise ratio on tracking error may be predicted
quantitatively within the model (Levison, 1982). On the other hand,
the causes of change in noise level are incorporated in an attention
sharing model by the formula Pr = P olF;, in which Po is the single
task observation noise ratio, Pi is the observation noise ratio under
multitask conditions, and F; is the fraction of attention allocated to
the task.
The quantitative aspects of Levison's approach have been val-
idated (e.g., Stein and Wewerwinke, 1983), but the constraints are
clear as well. The observation noise ratio is applicable only to tasks
whose inputs are linear spatial quantities (position, velocity) and not
qualitative or configurational feature-defined patterns, such as those
used in symbolic or verbal processing or in object recognition.
While the model of attention modulation of the observation noise
ratio was originally developed in the context of multiaais tracking
tasks, it is important to realize that the model is applicable to any
task in which actions are taken on the basis of signals of ranging
magnitudes. Thus, it may be applied to monitoring and decision
tasks as well as to tracking, as has been done by Levision and Tanner
(1971) and in the PROCRU model of Corker et al. (1986) to be
described in the following section. It should be noted that this
quantification of visual resolution from time-sharing is an important
component of the model integration effort under this project. It
stands as a parameter that can be passed to the visual models.
SERIAL COMPETITION
On the right side of Table 15-1 are models that focus on the na-
ture of the competition between channels, as a consequence of struc-
tural similarities and differences between tasks or channels. When
such processing is serial, as in the top right cell, any competition
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must then be the result of a discrete attention switch, whose prop-
erties have been modeled by Sperling and Dosher (1986), LaBerge
(1973), and Kristofferson (1967). These switching costs, however, are
sufficiently small that the time actually involved in the switch itself
will have a minimal effect on operational performance. In contrast,
whether a switch does or does not take place is, of course, critical to
operational performance. This issue is dealt with in the section on
serial allocation.
PARALLEL COMPETITION
More relevant are the efforts to account for the competition
between heterogeneous tasks carried out in parallel (or at least in
such a way that long intervals of neglect do not characterize the
performance of one task or the other).
Computer Simulation Models
Three of the computer simulation network models described ear-
lier have recently taken a step toward acknowledging that not 011
performance is serial and that task demands vary in intensity as well
as in time. The HOS model is currently being revised (Harris et
al., 1987), and the revision, which will be available in a user-friendly
microcomp-.Aer form, explicitly allows parallel processing of acti\:
ties. Thus, for example, the model allows the operator to reach while
scanning or to encode while controlling. However, parallel processing
is assumed to be perfect processing. There is no mechanism for spec-
ifying interaction between tasks. The activities that are processed in
parallel are user defined, as is a preemption mechanism that termi-
nates a particular activity when one of higher priority is imposed. In
addition, the software is designed to be flexible enough so that the
user's own model may be substituted.
A recent elaboration of SAINT has also spawned a microcom-
puter version known as MICROSAINT. Laughery et al. (1986) have
used the programming capabilities of MICROSAINT language to
expand upon previous developments in two important respects:
s They accommodate demand specifications of tasks (or mentsl
operations) that are not defined only in terms of time. Rather, the
model employs a set of tabled demand values for different tasks,
ranging from 0 to 7. These values were generated by expert pilots
and compiled by McCracken and Aldrich (1984) and by Aldrich,
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Szabo, and Bierbaum (1988). For example, the activities "monitor,
scan, survey" have a demand level of one. "Trace, follow, track" have
a demand level of 3. "Read, decipher text, decode" have a demand
level of 7.
They acknowledge the multiplicity of processing resources by
assuming that task demands will interfere on particular combina-
tions of channels, but not on other combinations. Four "channels"
are defined: visual, auditory, cognitive, and psychomotor (VACP)
(McCracken and Aldrich, 1984). Within each channel, simultane-
ous demands are summed, and values of greater than 5 on the visual
channel are assumed to exceed a threshold that requires the abandon-
ment of monitoring to support situational awareness. The Aircrew-
Aircraft Integration (AsI) model developed by Corker et al. (1986)
makes similar assumptions about,Ahe association of tasks and task
demands to the four channels. An assumption made in this model is
that demands greater than 7 in any channel will lead to a temporary
postponement of the last task added, which caused demand to exceed
the threshold.
Although the developments reported by Laughery et al. (1986)
and by Corker et ed. (1986) are a marked advance over previous
efforts, they still suffer from a number of limitations. First, the
demand level codings of activities within a channel do not appear to
acknowledge the degree of difficulty of tasks within a level. Thus, for
example, detecting a change in size (coded demand 2), if it is a subtle
change in a dynamic environment, could be far more difficult than
reading a simple one-word message (which is coded demand level 7).
Second, the assumption of parallel processing between channels
(demand levels do not add across channels) appears to be unwar-
ranted. For example, there is clear experimental evidence that audi-
tory and visual tasks interfere, as do perceptual (both auditory and
visual) and cognitive ones (Wickens, 1984). However, no assumptions
are made regarding this sort of interference.
Finally, a concern directed toward all of the modeling efforts,
echoing a lament voiced by Meister (1985) in his comprehensive re-
view of these simulation models, is the lack of validation data. In the
absence of empirical data necessary to determine if the predictions
of the models are accurate, no firm evaluation can be offered.
It should be noted that there are at least two reports of validation
of the four-channel (VACP) approach to complex task prediction
in complex aviation simulations (Bateman and Thompson, 1986;
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Laughery et al., 1986). Unfortunately, both used as criteria pilot-
generated subjective ratings of task workload, rather than actual
performance. Because subjective ratings and performance may differ
from each other in important ways (Yeh and Wickens, 1988), some
caution must be taken in accepting these as full validations.
Psychological Models
A contrast can be offered by the models of time-sharing that
have grown directly out of the psychological laboratories. Here, val-
idation data exist, but the direct applicability to systems design
issues remains less well developed. The model in this domain that
has received the greatest degree of validation and is also most ap-
propriately tuned to the current application is probably the multiple
resource model (North, 1985; Tsang and Wickens, 1988; Wickens,
1984, 1987, 1988; Wickens and Liu, 1988). Because the model can
be used to improve upon existing simulation models, it is described
here in some detail.
According to the multiple resource model, two tasks will suffer
interference to the extent that the component tasks are more difficult
(demand more resources) and that they compete for overlapping
resources.
These resources are described at a more general level (e.g.,
spatial-verbal) than are the processing mechanisms of the tasks them-
selves. The current version of the multiple resource model proposed
by Wickens (1987; Wickens and Liu, 1988) defines three dichoto-
mous dimensions, each of which defines two resources. These are
processing codes (spatial-analog versus verbal-Linguistic), processing
modalities (auditory-speech versus visual-manual) and processing
stages (perceptual-cognitive versus response). However, it is possi-
ble, particularly in the helicopter environment, that a dimension of
ambient-focal vision, which contrasts orientation judgment with ob-
ject recognition, postulated by Leibowitz and Dichgans (1980) and
by Christensen, O'Donnell, Shingledecker, Kraft, and WiLiiamst n
(1985) might well be relevant. Validation of the model in basic labo-
ratory experiments has been carried out by a number cf studies (e.g.,
Tsang and Wickens, 1988; Wickens, 1980; Wickens and Liu, 1988;
Wickens and Weingartner, 1985). Validation in a more complex avia-
tion simulator environment has been carried out by Wickens, Sandry,
and Vidulich (1983) and by Wickens, Harwood, Segal, Tczkavic, and
Sherman (1988).
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North (1985, North and Riley, 1988) incorporated many of the
assumptions of the multiple resource model into a predictive workload
index algorithm known as WINDEX. Applicable to cockpit design
modifications, WINDEX assigns resource demand levels (rated 1-5)
to different channels or processing systems (e.g., window, helmet-
mounted display, cathode-ray tube (CRT), auditory, stick, keypress,
speech, and cognitive activity). Critical to the operation of WINDEX
is a conflict matrix by which concurrent activities in different chan-
nels will interfere more or less, depending on their similarity in the
multiple-resource space. This feature was absent from the Laughery
et al. (1986) version of the MICROSAiNT simulation and from the
A'I application developed by Corker et al. (1986). Thus, for exam-
ple, in the WINDEX conflict matrix, large penalties are assigned
to tasks that impose concurrent demands on two visual channels
(e.g., window and helmet-mounted disi play). Reduced, but still sub-
stantial, conflicts may apply to simultaneous use of the window and
auditory channel (both involving perceptual encoding), to the speech
and key press channel (both involving responses), or to speech output
and verbal rehearsal (both involving verbal processing). Minimum
penalties would be assigned to concurrent use of the auditory and
stick channel, which lie "far apart" in the multiple resource space.
Although the model has been applied to the design of the light heli-
copter family (LHX) prototypes by McDonnell Douglas, the results of
this application (and resulting validation of the model) unfortunately
remain proprietary.
More recently, the WINDEX-type model has been applied in a
competitive validation effort to data collected in a helicopter flight
simulation (Wickens et al., 1988). Algorithms involving the complex-
ity of multiple resource competitions were compared with simpler
ones based on adding task demands and on pure time line analysis.
The multiple resource algorithms were found to provide significantly
(and substantially) better predictions of the performance data.
Three limitations of the multiple resource model make it diffi-
cult to move from a qualitative to a quantitative domain. These
limitations are inherent in the model's efforts to address interfer-
ence between heterogeneous tasks, but they are limitations for which
potential solutions exist.
• The amount of resource overlap between tasks depends on
careful definition of what constitutes a resource. Wickens' (1989)
heuristic specification of resources defined by three dichotomous di-
mensions, allows for some quantification to be accomplished at four
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levels of resolution, according to a "shared features" approach. For
example, two tasks may compete for resources on zero, one, two, or
three dimensions. Using this approach, Derrick and Wickens (1984)
and Gopher and Braune (1984) have obtained reasonably good pre-
dictions of the degree of interference between a collection of hetero-
geneous tasks.
Even more serious is the lack of a single metric that can be
used to quantify the demand for resources (i.e., task difficulty) ap-
plicable across different component tasks. However, four possibilities
exist. First, single-task performance differences imposed by a change
in demand can be used to predict dual-task interference. Second,
a relatively generic task analytic metriz such as information rate or
working memory load ..,n be employed to quantify demands. Third,
subjective ratings or estimates of single-task difficulty levels can be
used. Fourth, it is possible to depend on expert opinion ratings to
code demands (i.e., 0, 1, or 2). This technique is used by Gopher
and Braune (1984), and advocated by North (1985; North and Ri-
ley, 1988), Laughery et al. (1986) and Corker et al. (1986) in their
applications of WINDEX or MICROSAINT, respectively. All three
rely on the tabled values proposed by McCracken and Aldrich (1984;
Aldrich et al., 1988) for coding these demand levels.
• There is yet no invariant metric for scaling the decrement
or interference between tasks that may involve different performance
measures (for an informative debate on this point, see Kantowitz and
Weldon, 1985; Wickens and Yeh, 1985)1
SYNTHESIS OF THE OPTIMAL MODEL
Table 15-2 presents a general review and comparison of several
of the performance models described. It focuses on the assumptions
made by the models about attention with regard to their serial or
queuing characteristics (the logic by which tasks are selected to
be performed), their parallel or resource assumptions (how many
channels or resources, and whether tasks are defined in terms of their
demand levels), and any assumptions the models make regarding the
effects of workload on performance. As can be seen from the bottom
of the table, an unfortunate facet of all models is the absence of
available performance data necessary to validate them.
From the larger set shown in Table 15-2, 3-1/2 plausible mod-
els can be identified for potential application to the current design
problem. These models are shown in Table 15-3. Each model has
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TABLE 15d Models With Potential Application To The Current Design Pmblem
WINDEX
	
A31	 LAUGHERY	 HOS
Subtask
Models
NA Strategy-based
skill-rule-
knoModge
Cost to rule
implementation
SAINT-.
User-specified
if-then
selection rules
User-
specified
if-then
selection rules
Conflict Parallel Parallel User-
matrix between between specified
Partial parallel VACP channels VACP channels parallel or
processing serial
processing
McCracken and McCracken and McCracken and
Aldrich Aldrich Aldrich
demands demands demands
Timeand Time and Timeand Resident
resource resource resource in HOS
demand demand demand
Task
Selection
Decision
Workload
and Time
Sharing
its strength and weaknesses; provided below is some specification of
the attributes in which they differ, so that rational selection of the
optimal model can be facilitated.
The 3-1/2 models listed in Table 15-3 are described in terms of
three relevant attributes: their task selection logic, their workload
and task interference assumptions, and their mechanism for specify-
ing performance of the component tasks. As is immediately apparent
from the table, WINDEX in its current form contains no decision
mechanism for the selection of tasks in a serial mode of processing.
However, because it is the model that goes farthest toward mak-
ing plausible theory-based assumptions regarding the interference
between concurrent tasks, it is recommended that the logic of the
conflict matrix underlying WINDEX be incorporated into whichever
of the other three models is ultimately chosen.
The remaining three model approaches may be contrasted first
in terms of the task selection algorithms that they adopt. All three
involve user-specified rules for task selection. For example, a rule
might be "if a target is not visible, then continue to navigate to
bring it within visual range. If it is visible, then activate aiming
device." All models allow for some specification of the priorities of
actions when there is a choice, and HOS allows preemption of ongoing
activities of lesser importance by those of greater importance. The
A'I model, however, differs from the other three in terms of the
sophistication of its assumed decision mechanism. The model allows
for action choices to be made at three levels of Rasmussen's (1983)
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decision continuum of skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based behavior.
This continuum describes the number of contingent conditions that
must be considered before arriving at a decision. Increasing levels of
contingency yield decisions that take longer and are more demanding
of cognitive effort, factors which feed directly into the predicted
workload.
The second attribute in Table 15-3 concerns the workload or
resource model adopted. Here, it would appear that the A 3I model
and the SAINT/Siegel and Wolf adaptation of Laughery et al. provide
some advantage over the HOS model. This is primarily because the
former have incorporated the shell, if not the appropriate details,
of a multiple resource approach through the inclusion of the visual,
auditory, cognitive, and psychomotor (VACP) channels, and the
specification of task demand coding. Furthermore, both approaches
appear to allow the number of these channels and the degree of
interaction between channels (the latter nonexistent in the current
versions) to be modified easily according to user preference. Hence,
it would be feasible to modify workload computation algorithms to
incorporate the multiple resource assumptions and conflict matrix
inherent in WINDEX (North, 1985).
Although the HOS model appears to be less sophisticated (and
modifiable) in terms of the dual-task assumptions, it appears to have
a greater degree of sophistication built into the operator performance
models, which are specified at levels of detail related to retaining
information in memory, absorbing information, performing mental
computations, and so forth. However, the assumptions lying behind
these models do not appear to be documented in the open literature,
nor is the most recent version of HOS IV available at this time for
public distribution.
Hence, a final recommendation would appear to he in the choice
between the Bolt Beranek and Newman A 3I model of Corker et al.
and the Laughery et al. SAINT/Siegel and Wolf simulation. Factors
favoring the former are (1) the greater sophistication of the task se-
lection decision logic, a logic which is based on plausible assumptions
and empirical data, and (2) the fact that the simulation wa- ex-
plicitly developed for an A 3 helicopter simulation environment and,
therefore, is directly compatible with the goals of the current project.
Factors favoring the model of Laughery et al. are the relatively long
history of development and application of the SAINT/Siegel and
Wolf approach, as well as the commercially available documentation
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and user friendliness of the MICROSAINT software. A final recom-
mendation is that both of these approaches be examined seriously
and compared with regard to (1) their feasibility for incorporating
WINDEX multiple resource assumptions and (2) their compatibility
with other human performance models to be used in the simulation.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is a trade-off between the degree of quantifi-
able prediction achieved (and perhaps possible) by models of inter-
ference and interaction, and the level of environmental complexity
and heterogeneity at which those models are suited to operate. Three
approaches are possible to extend quantitative prediction to the level
of complexity existing in the helicopter cockpit: (1) Attempt to
build quantitative elements into a multiple resource/element simi-
larity model. (2) Attempt to extend the more quantitatively precise
models of multichannel detection and recognition (e.g., Shaw, 1982;
Sperling and Dosher, 1986) to heterogeneous task performance. (3)
Establish how accurately complex performance can be accounted for
by serial queuing models with assumptions of single-task neglect.
Each approach has its own costs and benefits. The first approach
is bound to fall short of precise prediction because of the complexity
and heterogeneity of the task environments that its goal is to predict.
Yet, clearly, the helicopter pilot will often have to time-share different
tasks or mental activities that are heterogeneous in their demand.
The second alternative awaits verification: to establish whether,
for example, the prediction of performance on a detection task when
time-shared with a second simultaneous detection task will generalize
to instances when the synchrony in timing is less precise or the
concurrent task is of a different qualitative sort (i.e., tracking). The
Optimal Control model is a good step in this direction. The third
alternative already offers promise as far as it goes, but it is not
designed to handle those aspects of time-shared performance that
are truly parallel (e.g., flying while communicating). As a final
note, whatever combination of approaches is chosen, researchers must
increase their tolerance for models that less than perfectly account
for the data and allow for adequate, rather than precise, fits.
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Models of Working Memory
STUART K. CARD
Working memory refers to a functional part of human memory
that accomplishes "the temporary holding and manipulation of in-
formation during the performance of a range of cognitive tasks such
as comprehension, learning, and reasoning" (Baddeley, 1986, p. 34).
At least three different functions performed by working memory, as
expressed by models of cognitive processing, can be described in com-
putational terms. Working memory functions as (1) a place to hold
operands, things to be operated on by the operations of cognitive
processing; (2) a cache to hold in a rapidly accessible state recently
input or used information; and (3) a buffer between processes that
happen at incommensurate rates.
In addition to its functions, working memory has also been char-
acterized from 'wo other points of view: time and structure. From
a temporal point of view, working memory is the memory people
have for information that lasts a few seconds. In this case it is called
short-term memory, as distinguished from long-term memory which
lasts hours or years. It is also distinguished from very short-term
memory which lasts for only a fraction of a second. From a struc-
tural point of view, working memory is described in terms of a fixed
number of slots, a set of activated nodes, or some other mechanism.
In this case, it is usually given a name such as the short-term store
(STS) and distinguished on the one hand from a long-term store
(LTS) and on the other from sensory buffers, such as visual image
store (VIS) or auditory image store (AIS). In structurally oriented
descriptions, working memory is sometimes described not as a sep-
arate structure but as part of the state of a single, unified memory.
For example, working memory may be described as the set of all
nodes in a semantic memory that are activated.
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Although distinctions among the several kinds of memory and
between the two viewpoints for describing them are clear in principle,
and are of the sort found in all systems of information storage (such
as modern computers), the several memories function together in an
integrated way so as to make explication of their interrelationships
a difficult problem. Tiie observed behavior of people is the result of
the combined mechanisms at work.
Modeling working memory is important because working mem-
ory is limited. These limits produce errors or require the use of meth-
ods that function within the limits of memory. In cockpit design, the
limits of working memory are manifested in pilot errors, especially
those induced by high workload and are a strong constraint on the
design of cockpit procedures.
PHENOMENA OF WORKING MEMORY
While a number of partial models of working memory exist, they
do not yet embrace in a computational framework all the phenomena
related to it. This is not surprising when one considers the close
coupling of working memory with other cognitive functions. Com-
prehensive models for working memory may need to co-evolve with
comprehensive models of human cognitive architecture, rather than
being developed as isolated pieces of that architecture.
Nevertheless, a fair amount of knowledge has developed about
the functioning of working memory, at least in the handling of verbal
tasks (and, more recently, for certain visual tasks). Some of this
informatior oay be used in the design of cockpits. Models exist
that account for some of these empirically derived phenomena and
constrain the properties that comprehensive cognitive architectural
models would have to exhibit. These phenomena, and references in
the literature discussing them, are listed below. Some 32 phenomena
can be classified into (1) the size and decay of verbal working memory,
(2) contextual effects, (3) representational effects, (4) chunking, (5)
skilled memory, (G) spatial working memory, and (7) phenomena
related to long-term memory.
Size and Decay of Verbal Working Memory
The phenomena of size and decay are more or less directly related
to limits imposed by working memory on the processing of verbal
information.
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1. Short-term memory (STM) decay: When peeple are given
a list to recall (and prevented from rehearsing), the amount they
can recall decays exponentially with the time elapsed before recall
(Baddeley, 1986; Peterson and Peterson, 1959).
2. Immediate memory span: When people are given a list to
recall, the number of items they can recall is about five to nine (Miller,
1956), or three to four reliabiy and seven to nine probabilistically (50
percent of the time) (Broadbent, 1975).
3. Buffer span (or running span): When people are given an
information-processing task that prevents the use of long-term mem-
ory, the number of things they seem to be able to keep track of is
approximately two to four items (Card, Moran, and Newell, 1983;
Crowder, 1976).
4. Effect of item type on span: The working memory span
depends on the type of material being memorized (Cavanaugh, 1972).
5. Effect of word length: People asked to repeat sequences of
words are much more likely to do so correctly if the words are short
than if they are long (Baddeley, Thomson, and Buchanan, 1975).
6. Temporal span: People remember the number of words they
can read in approximately 1.6 seconds or the number of words they
can speak in 1.3 seconds (Baddeley, 1986; Vellar and Baddeley, 1982).
7. Articulation rate effect: People who can articulate more
rapidly tend to have a longer working memory span (Baddeley, 1986).
8. Performance despite loading: People required to keep in
memory as many items as their memory span can h old nevertheless
perform many other tasks (Baddeley, 1986).
9. Suffix effect: An irrelevant item at the end of an auditorily
presented list reduces recall of the last few items on the list (Crowder
and Morton, 1969).
Context Effects
Context phenomena concern the effects of earlier or later items
in working memory on each other.
10. Recency effect: The last members of a list of items are
recalled better than the others (except for those near the beginning).
The closer they are to the end, the better these items are recalled
(Postman and Phillips, 1965).
11. Primacy effect: The first members of a list are recalled
better than the others (except for the ones near the very end). The
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closer they are to the beginning, the better these items are recalled
(Glanzer, 1972).
12. Release from proactive interference: When people are given
a list of similar words to recall and rehearsal is prevented, recall is
decreased with each sequential item. However, if an unrelated item
occurs on the list, recall for that item is nearly as good as for the
first item (Loess, 1968; Wickens, 1970).
13. Episodic memory: A task that is interrupted by another
task which consumes the full immediate memory span does not h%ve
to be restarted from scratch, but can be resumed after some effort
(Tulving, 1972, 1983, 1984).
Working Memory Representation
Representational phenomena cincern the way in which items in
working memory are actually coded or represented.
14. Phonological similarity effect: When people are given a list
to recall immediately, they tend to confuse items that sound the
same, reducing the number they can remember. This is true even if
the list is presented visually (Baddeley, 1986; Conrad, 1964).
15. Unattended speech effect: When people are given a visual
digit to remember in the presence of background noise consisting of
spoken digits, recall is reduced and reduced much more than if the
unattended audio input had been simply white noise (Salarna and
Baddeley, 1982).
16. Sequential output bias: When people are given a list to
recall, it can be recalled forward much more easily than in reverse
(Anders and Lillyquist, 1971).
17. Independence of item order information: When people re-
member lists, order information is lost more rapidly than content
(Healy, 1982).
Chunking
The next set of phenomena arises because items in working
memory comprise links to elements in long-term memory, rather
than the elements themselves.
18. Chunking of recall: When people are given a list to recall,
they naturally group the items in time into groups of three to four
elements (Johnson, 1970, 1972).
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19. Between-chunk pauses: When recalling information, people
pause longer between, than within, chunks. Pauses between chunks
tend to be around 2 seconds (Broadbent, 1975; Chase and Simon,
1973; McLean and Gregg, 1967; Reitman and Reuter, 1980).
20. Opaqueness of chunks: Retrie wing a chunk at one level does
not give one direct access to the content of the chunk at the next
lower level (Johnson, 1970, 1972).
Skilled Memory
Phenomena of skilled memory relate to a few ways in which
humans can optionally control processes in working memory so as to
improve recall.
21. Efficacy of rehearsal: Items can be retained in immediate
memory indefinitely if rehearsal is allowed (Baddeley, 1986).
22. Efficacy of mnemonics: The use of peg words (e.g., one is a
bun, two is a shoe) or the method of loci can improve recall (Bellazza,
1981,1982; Bower, 1970).
23. Efficacy of elaboration: Elaboration of associations improves
storage and hence recall of information (Craik and Lockhart, 1975).
Spatial Working Memory
The following phenomena reflect working memory for nonverbal
information.
24. Multiple buffers: The number of items people can remember
is larger if they can simultaneously make use of several modalities
(visual, motor, auditory) (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974).
25. Spatial memory disruption: Tasks involving spatial memory
disrupt the simultaneous performance of other spatial tasks (Badde-
ley, 1986).
26. Spatial imagery interference: A concurrent spatial task dis-
rupts the attempt to use an imagery-based mnemonic technique
(Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley and Lieberman, 1980).
Long-Term Memory Effects
The following phenomena relate to operations with working
memory
 that give rise to effects in long-term memory.
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27. Total time hypothesis: 'file amount learned is proportional
to the amount of time spent learning (Cooper and Pantle, 1967).
28. Elaborative versus maintenance rehearsal: The longer an
item spends in working memory under elaborative rehearsal (in which
its associations are elaborated), the greater is the probability that it
will be recalled. However, maintenance rehearsal, in which an item
is rehearsed without thinking about it, does not improve the chances
of later recall (Craik and Lockhart, 1975).
29. Long-term recency effect: People rer_-all more recent items
better than earlier itauas, even extending over lengthy periods, pro-
vided the events concerned constitute a sufficiently separable cate-
gory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley and Hitch, 1977).
30. Simultaneous long-tern, recency effect: Long-term recency
effects can occur separately for separate categories of events remem-
bered (Watkins and Peynircioglu, 1983).
31. Learning despite impaired working memory: Some neurolog-
ical patients with impaired working memory appear to have normal
long-term learning (Baddeley, 1986).
32. Weber's law time discriminability: The probability of recall-
ing an item is proportional to log (DTIT), where DT is the time
interval between the presentation of items and T is the total elapsed
time at recall (Baddeley, 1986; Glenberg, Bradley, Stevenson, Kraus,
Tkachuk, Gretz, Fish, and Turpin,1980).
MODELS OF WORKING MEMORY
A number of models have been devised to handle these memory
phenomena. Five models cover the major types: (1) Waugh and Nor-
man (1965), (2) Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968), (3) Baddeley and Hitch
(1974; Baddeley, 1986), (4) Anderson's ACT" model (1983), and (5)
Schneider and Detweiler's connectionist/control model (1988).
Waugh and Norman's (1985) model includes a short-term store
(their version of working memory) and a long-term store. The short-
term store is a limited memory with a small number of fixed slots.
Items enter the short term store and can get lost either by decay
over time or by being displaced by new items. They can be retained
through rehearsal. The rehearsal process also allows items to be
transferred to the long-term store.
Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968) model is similar but more differen-
tiated. In addition to the short- and long-term stores it has a sensory
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store that is presumed to hold information from one sense modal-
ity. The sensory store feeds information into the short-term store
that acts as a working memory for various cognitive processes. The
longer information is retained in the short-term store, the higher its
probability of being transferred to the long-term store. This model
also distinguishes between processing structure (the architectural,
involuntary structures through which information is processed) and
control processes (retrieval strategies, problem-solving techniques,
etc.). This model handles many of the basic effects but has difficulty
explaining some types of neurological disorders, the lack of certain
kinds of incidental learning, long-term storage-based recency effects,
and the fact that codes other than phonological coders can be used in
the short-term store (see Baddeley, 1986, for a review).
Baddeley and Hitch's (1974; Baddeley, 1986) model of work-
ing memory assumes a central executive and two "slave" processors,
an "articulatory loop" and a "visual-spatial sketch pad." The ar-
ticulatory loop consists of a phonological store and an articulatory
refreshing process. The visual-spatial sketch pad consists of a spatial
memory and an eye-movement-like process. The articulatory loop
stores basically verbal information; the visual-spatial sketch pad is
specialized to maintain and manipulate visual-spatial images. A cen-
tral executive coordinates information from the two, allocates atten-
tion, and is the medium for what Atkinson and Shiffrin called control
processes. This model is broader in its coverage than the others and,
in particular, addresses some problems of working memory for im-
ages. Although the model gives insights into an impressive number
of experimental results, it has unfortunately not been reduced to
computational or mathematical form.
Anderson's (1983) ACT* model contains three memories: work-
ing memory, declarative memory, and production memory. Declara-
tive memory contains knowledge in the form of chunks (called "cogni-
tive units" in this model). Cognitive units are such things as propo-
sitions, strings, or spatial images. Each cognitive unit in declarative
memory can have associated with it a certain level of activation.
Activation of a cognitive unit spontaneously decays at a certain rate.
Chunks have links of different strengths to other cognitive units,
and activation spreads along these links depending on their strength.
Working memory is simply the set of all cognitive units in declarative
memory activated at some particular time.
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MODELS
WORKING MEMORY PHENOMENA
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SD = Schneider and Detweiler (1988).
FIGURE 16-1 Approximate coverage of working memory phenomena by mod-
els-
STUART 6, CARD	 211
Schneider and Detweiler's (1988) connectionist/control model
represents the contents of working memory as weights of arcs con-
necting neural-like units. Individual units of knowledge (e.g., the
letter A) are represented as vectors of activation, such as 0 1 1 1
1 (where the zeros and ones represent the absence and presence of
features such as vertical lines, horizontal lines, etc.). The model is
described at three levels of detail: a microlevel neural-like network
that can produce associative processing and attentional phenomena,
a macrolevel that describes attentional control and communication
within the system (e.g., how memory scanning works), and a system
level that represents interactions between major parts of the system
(e.g., the coordination of visual and auditory signals). Simulations
have been run with this model to explain a number of the working
memory effects listed earlier.
These five models can be divided into two groups: those that are
largely models of the working memory component itself ( Ifflaugh and
Norman, Atkinson and Shiffrin, Baddeley and Hitch) and those in
which the working memory model is part of a larger human cognitive
architecture (Anderson's ACT' and Schneider and Detweiler). In ad-
dition, the second group of models is more computationally oriented
than the first. Fig-ire 16-1 shows the approximate coverage of the
working memory phenomena listed for the five models considered.
Although it has not been possible to assign individual entries with
complete certainty, because there is room for controversy on exactly
what certain models predict for certain phenomena, it seemed de-
sirable to give some indications of coverage of the various models.
A solid square indicates coverage of the phenomenon by the model
(although not necessarily computational coverage). A white square
indicates lack of coverage. A square shaded gray indicates partial
coverage. The figure is intended to suggest which models might he
considered depending on what phenomena are important in design.
Baddeley's model is a development of, and dominates, the other
two traditional psychological models in terms of coverage. Its main
problem, in the current context, is that it is not computationally ex-
pressed or part of a cognitive architecture. Anderson's ACT' model
is attractive because of its integration with such an architecture. Its
main drawback is its lower coverage of phenomena. Schneider and
Detweiler's model appears to have the most detailed computational
coverage of working memory phenomena, although it is not yet part
of a comprehensive cognitive architecture.
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For a review of the current state of the literature on working
memory, the reader is directed to Baddeley (1986), Murdock (1974),
and Crowder (1976). For a review of a computational model of
working memory, the reader is directed to Schneider and Detweiler
(1988).
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Training Models to Estimate Training Costs
for New Systems
WALTER SCHNEIDER
OVERVIEW
The current theory used to project learning time for systems does
not allow detailed projection of training times for systems based on
theoretical analysis alone. Some modeling techniques may provide
ballpark estimates of learning time that are likely to correlate with
true learning times. Learning functions can be reasonably extrapo-
lated from pilot training data. Such estimates could greatly improve
the accuracy of projected training times.
Learning time is very dependent on the criterion for performance
and the combination of tasks. The time needed to acquire a compo-
nent skill at alevel sufficient for correctly choosing the correct answer
on a multiple-choice exam may represent only a small percentage of
the time needed to perform the task quickly under high workload; for
example, Simon (1986) has estimated that eight seconds is required
to learn a new production in long-term memory versus 300 trials if
the task is to be performed under high workload (Schneider, 1985).
Training for a single task may not transfer well to performing the
same task in combination with other tasks (Schneider and Detweiler,
1988).
The problem of accessing skill maintenance is critical to pre-
dicting human performance. Some skills decline markedly without
practice (Annett, 1979; Farr 1986). Many critical combat skills (e.g.,
launching a missile) are practiced rarely, with long periods between
the training and the critical execution of the skill. Maintenance
training is expensive and may require redesign of the equipment
(e.g., embedded training).
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Cognitive psychology offers a variety of basic research models
that provide an interpretation of how practice changes performance.
However, these models cannot usefully predict learning time esti-
mates for tasks performed in a virtual cockpit by a virtual human.
Several engineering approximation models can be used to esti-
mate or extrapolate learning times for tasks. The basic approach to
these modeling techniques is to estimate the number of components
that must be learned, assess the learning time of a subset of the
components for a few subjects developing a modest skill level, and
then project the total training time for the average subject learning
all the components to the desired skill level.
It is important to note that there are few if any "constants" in
human learning time. Human learning time depends on the similarity
of the new material to previously learned material: the compatibility
of the material; and the speed, reliability, and resource (attention) re-
quirements of the task. Human learning needs to be characterized in
a high-dimensional space with all the dimensions interacting. Hence
one must be very cautious when making a projection of learning
time based on a small sample of the learning space. It is important
to identify any boundary conditions and the expected error of any
projected learning time.
SKILL DEVELOPMENT
In general, skills are developed via execution of the skill in the
target task or in a task very similar to the target. Many researchers
(e.g., Anderson, 1983; James, 1980; LaBerge, 1976; Posner and Sny-
der, 1975; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) conclude that skills can
be characterized by at least two stages. Some models have broken
down skills to as many as five stages (i.e., Schneider and Detweiler,
1987). The two major stages will be referred to here as controlled
and automatic processing (Anderson, 1983, uses the terms interpre-
tive and compiled processing of productions). Controlled processing
is characterized as the slow, serial, effortful form of processing typ-
ical of a novice performer. For example, dialing a novel telephone
number requires control processing to rehearse the number and enter
the random string of digits. Tasks requiring variable responding of
the processing of degraded stimuli are likely to require attentional
resources even after extended training (e.g., inconsistent arming se-
quences for different weapon systems required to identify a target in
camouflage). Automatic processing develops after extended training
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and is characterized as fast, parallel, reliable, low effort, and some-
what difficult to inhibit. Dialing a well learned telephone number is
an example of an automatic process. Dialing can be fast, requires
little effort, can be done while performing other tasks, and may occur
when not intended (e.g., dialing your home number when meaning
to dial a related number).
The training requirement and resource demands of performing
a task vary greatly depending on whether the task is performed in
a controlled or automatic mode. Most simple rule tasks (e.g., a
10-step procedure for setting a radio to receive messages) can be
acquired in a few trials as long as the subject can attend fully to
the task and not be distracted by having to perform other tasks.
However, if the subject must perform the task after months of delay
while engaged in a concurrent high workload task, hundreds or even
thousands of trials may be needed to learn to develop the task
reliably. For example, Schneider and Fisk (1984) trained subjects
to perform a category search task (e.g., respond to animal names).
When subjects were allowed to attend to the task, they could perform
the task accurately after a single trial. However, if subjects had to
concurrently perform a digit search task, they required eight hours
of training before category detection was high while performing a
concurrent category/digit search task. Depending on the criterion
(e.g., good performance in an attended state versus heavy dual-
task load), the required number of learning trials can vary by a
factor of 100. This large variability makes it difficult to estimate
learning time without precise specification of the performance criteria
(response time and accuracy), task environment (concurrent tasks),
and similarity of the task to other tasks.
Engineering design decisions can have a large effect on whether
automatic processing is possible for a task and on the amount of
training necessary to make the task automatic. For automatic pro-
cessing to develop there must be a consistent relationship between
the internal (e.g., operator's goal state) and external states (e.g.,
press the "Esc" key to exit the current function); if the exit goal
processing can be learned quickly, it could transfer to all other sit-
uations, and processing could become automatic. Unfortunately, all
too often, different programs use different sequences. Thus, when
users need to perform a function they must remember to recall what
program they are in and what the exit function is for that program.
If distracted, they will tend to enter the keys for the most frequently
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exited program. In cockpit design, it is essential to maintain compat-
ibility across controls and between control and real-world consistency
(e.g., some locks lock by turning the key clockwise; others, counter-
clockwise). Operators can work with systems for years and still have
to consciously recall tasks before each execution (or perform multiple
tasks such as turning the key in the lock both ways).
Providing the user with a consistent response set can have order
of magnitude effects on performance speed, resource load, effort, re-
liability, and retention. Schneider and Fisk (1984) have studied the
development of automatic processing using a consistent and varied
mapping paradigm. They typically use a search task in which sub-
jects respond when stimuli of a particular class match (e.g., respond
if an animal word appears). In a consistent mapping, subjects al-
ways respond to the stimuli in the same way (e.g., always respond
to animal words and not to color words). In a varied mapping, the
assignment is altered across trials (e.g., on one trial search for ani-
mals, ignore colors, on the next trial do the opposite). After several
hundred trials of consistent mapping, automatic processing usually
develops. In contrast, practice in a varied mapping task remains
controlled even after months of training (see Schneider and Shiffrin,
1977).
There are large qualitative differences between controlled and
automatic processing. In memory comparison (Fisk and Schneider,
1983, searching for semantic categories) controlled processing was
100 times slower: 202 milliseconds for controlled versus 2 millisec-
onds for automatic (Figure 17-1A). In dual-task memory comparison
and digit search, control processing was 25 times more sensitive to
the additional workload of the dual task (61 percent decrement for
the controlled versus 2 percent for the automatic (Figure 17-113). The
rated subjective workload category was much higher for controlled
processing (Vidulich and Pandit, 1985) than automatic. Automatic
processing is more reliable: resistant to the effects of heat stress,
alcohol intoxication, and fatigue (see Hancock, 1984; Hancock and
Pierce, 1984). In an inconsistent response search task, a 0.1 percent
blood level alcohol caused a relative deficit of 37 percent in a con-
trolled processing task and zero percent in an automatic processing
task (Fisk and Schneider, 1982). Recent research has shown that
automatic processing is retained well after long periods of inactivity.
For example, Healy, Fendrich, and Proctor (1988) found no loss in an
automatic detection skill after fifteen months with a single refresher
session at 6 months. Bahrick (1984) has shown that well learned
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EXPERIMENT 1	 EXPERIMENT 
VM SEARCH	 CM SEARCH
MEMORY SET SIZE
FIGURE 17
-1A Search reaction time in Experiments 1 (VM) and 2 (CM) as a
function of the memory set size with a display size of two items for the last ten
blocks. (VM = varied mapping; CM = consistent mapping). SOURCE: Fisk
and Schneider (1983).
material (terms remembered from a high school Spanish language
course) can be maintained after 49 years with little loss (see Eric-
sson and Crutcher, 1988, for a review). In contrast, tasks that are
practiced only until they can be performed at a control process level
can show rapid decay (e.g., learning the programming commands to
implement an averaging algorithm) and often not be retained from
the previous night's cramming session for an exam the next day.
Extensive consistent practice can make complex tasks easy. Colle
and DeMaio (1978) found that highly trained pilots could perform
complex supersonic aircraft formation maneuvers (in a simulator)
with no measurable deficit resulting from performing a concurrent
digit canceling task. Allport, Antonis, and Reynolds (1972) found
experts could sight-read music without deficit while repeating au-
ditory information. Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack, and Neiser
(1980) found that some subjects could read one passage, while si-
multaneously taking dictation on an unrelated passage, as well as
they could perform each task individually. The importance of these
results for predicting pilot performance is that arty count of the num-
ber of components needed to perform a task which does not deal
with the nature of the consistency of the task will provide a poor,
and probably useless, prediction of actual performance.
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search; VM = variably mapped semantic search.) SOURCE: Schneider and Fisk
(1984).
MODELS FOR PREDICTING HUMAN PERFORMANCE
Although there are no global models for accurately simulating
the virtual human, a variety of functional relationships can be used
to estimate and project performance, given some sample data from
the domain. These allow extrapolations of performance to be made,
and may provide estimates of training time and performance levels
from data developed on a virtual design. A common practice in en-
gineering is to fit some approximation function (e.g., a Taylor series)
to predict the behavior of a system that is not characterized precisely
in terms of underlying functional relationships. In psychology, a va-
riety of modeling approaches have demonstrated their effectiveness
at characterizing performance.
Basic research models of human learning and performance are
generally computer simulation models that perform the target task
and predict human performance and learning data. None of these
models has beer developed on a scale that could be applied to the
task of flying an aircraft. However, the techniques could model
component tasks (e.g., setting up a radio).
"A
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Curve-Fitting Techniques
The major techniques of modeling learning have been based
on fitting acquisition and decay functions. The major modeling
classes currently available are random process models, learning curve
models, and identical component models.
Random process models assume human learning to be a random
process in which the learner goes from an unlearned to a learned
state (see Atkinson, Bower and Crothers, 1965; Coombs, Dawes,
and Tversky, 1970; Wickens, 1982). A typical example is to fit
human performance to a Markov model with a number of knowledge
components; for each learning trial, there is a certain probability that
the knowledge state will change to a learned state. The transition
probability must be derived empirically for a given problem area.
However, once this has been derived it can be used to project the
number of trainees that will have a given knowledge level as a function
of the number of knowledge components to be trained and the number
of trials to be learned. This has been successful in estimating training
time (e.g., Rigg, Gray, Tillman, and Pryor, 1982) and in determining
how to change practice sets in computerized training systems (e.g.,
see Suppes and Ginsberg, 1963).
The second curve-fitting technique involves modeling learning
and retention functions as a negatively accelerated function. Learn-
ing is typically modeled as a power, exponential, hyperbolic, or
logarithmic function (for a review, see Lane, 1986) of the number
of training trials. Depending on the specific data, these all fit ap-
proximately equally (in terms of variance accounted for), generally
accounting for more than 90 percent of the practice variance. The
power law (Figure 17-2) and negative exponential fit equally well
(almost always within 1 percent of variance accounted for; see Lane,
1986). For purposes of projecting training time, either function could
be used. Recently, the power law has been the most popular rep-
resentation of performance. Plotting the log of reaction time as a
log function of trials produces a straight line for a power law. The
remaining discussion focuses on the power law, but the same com-
ments apply to the other functions. Newell and Rosenbloom (1981)
reviewed dozens of studies ranging from cigar rolling to playing bridge
and showed that all the data were well fit by a power law.
It is important to note that the parameters for the power law
must be determined by empirical data. There are at least two param-
eters in the power law: (1) the time to perform the trial the first time
and (2) the learning rate, the amount of reduction in learning time.
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FIGURE 17-2 An example of the Power Law of Practice. Improvement of
reaction time with practice on a 1023-choice task. Subjects pressed keys on a
ten-finger chordset according to pattern of lights directly above the keys. After
Klemmer (1962). SOURCE: Card, Moran, and Newell (1983).
In many situations one must estimate two additional parameters for
the number of pretralning trials and the asymptotic performance
level of the task. In the Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) review, the
initial response time parameter ranged from 0.68 to 1,763 seconds.
Such a wide range of variability illustrates the need for empirical data
to estimate the learning rate for a given task component. One can
get a reasonable approximation of these parameters by measuring
the behavior of only a few individuals performing a modest number
of executions (e.g., 100) of the task. This provides data that en-
able predicting performance improvement as a function of extended
training.
In addition to predicting response processing, one must be able
to predict error rates. A power law can be used to predict the log of
the error rate as a function of the log of the number of trials (e.g.,
Anderson, Conrad, and Corbett, in press). The predictive validity of
fits to the accuracy data has not been studied extensively. Accuracy
is difficult to predict in situations of high workload because single-
task accuracy is often a poor predictor of task performance under
high workload. (see Schneider and Detweiler, 1988).
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Simulation Models
Computer simulation models have been developed to understand
and predict human learning and performance. These models gener-
ally involve developing a cognitive architecture to accomplish a task
and then fitting parameters of the model to the human data to
predict performance on a variety of tasks and practice levels.
The most active learning effect models can be divided into pro-
duction system, connectionist, and hybrid models. Each of these
developed in some branch of cognitive science to simulate human
learning. The models are generally developed as an existence proof
to show that the assumptions of the model are sufficient to perform
the task.
Production System Models
Production system models model human performance in terms
of a series of "if-then" rules that operate in a working memory to per-
form tasks. Operations involve changes in memory, goal states, and
actions. The process of modeling involves specifying the productions
necessary to perform a task, the resources available to store interme-
diate results, and the learning and decay rates of various operations
of the system. Developing a model involves building a program to
perform the task. The models are similar to expert system models of
performance.
The range of phenomena that can be modeled is limited in the
same sense that expert system modeling is limited. If one could
build a complete expert system for a pilot, one could simply replace
the pilot, rather than having to develop a model to predict learning
time. Given the current limitations of modeling, the full task cannot
be modeled. However, models can provide estimates of learning time
and performance of the procedural tasks (e.g., how long it would take
to learn the engine start-up procedure of a variety of configurations).
A variety of models are production system oriented. The model
most directly oriented to solving engineering models is the GOMS
model of Card, Moran, and Newell (1983). This model has been
applied to evaluating human computer interfaces to determine the
relative merits of editor command sequences. Building the model
requires identifying the set of goals, operators, methods of achieving
the goals, and selection rules for choosing among competing goals
(hence, the name GOMS). To model a series of computer word-
processing tasks required a model with 20 goals, 13 operators, 6
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methods, and 4 selection rules. Detailed second-by-second protocols
were collected on 2 operators performing the tasks. The parameters
were estimated based on the protocols. The coding process is very
time-consuming, typically requiring hundreds of hours of coding time
for a single study. The time for each of the component operations
was estimated from the protocols. The duration of operators varied
over two orders of magnitude (e.g., from 0.13 to 9.72 seconds). This
illustrats the critical need to estimate the parameters. No global
operator constant would produce a useful prediction. The model
was tested by having it predict new unit tasks not originally used to
estimate the parameters. The model was able to predict new unit
task performance time within 35 percent and total time to perform a
20 minute editing to k within 4 percent. Developing and validating
the model is a time-con—timing process.
Once the model has been developed, simulations ccu be per-
formed to predict behavior on new configurations and at various
skill levels. This involves specifying what operators are needed to
perform the tasks with different designs (e.g., how can you replace
a word in different editors) and then running the simulation. The
relative merits of different designs on a variety of work tasks can then
be estimated without further empirical study. One can also run sen-
sitivity analyses on the model to determine the potential gain from
changes in the engineering design. The GOMS model illustrates the
potential gains and the large front-end costs to develop the model
and estimate the parameters from protocols required for this class of
modeling.
A variety of cognitive learning models can be used to estimate
learning time. For example ACT" (Anderson, 1983), SOAR (Laird,
Rosenbloom, and Newell, 1989), and SIERRA (VanLehn, 1983) all
model human learning. ACT`, for example, has been applied to
learning ranging from LISP programming to basic addition. These
models predict how humans develop new productions during prob-
lem solving behavior; they might allow the benefits of practice in
developing the skill to be predicted.. Developing models for specific
tasks is time consuming (e.g., requiring five man years for the LIST?
learning model) but allows estimation of the practice functio.is and
can often be the basis for developing an intelligent tutoring system
(e.g., Anderson et al., in press).
Polson and Kieras (1985) have used a production system model
to predict learning times for various editor commands. The model
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and empirical validation show that tasks which share similar produc-
tions exhibit a large degree of transfer. This technique may provide
an estimate of learning time for tasks without requiring empirical
data on every component.
Connectionist Modeling
Recently, connectionist modeling has generated a large amount
of interest in cognitive science (see Rummelhart and McClelland,
1987; Schneider, 1986). These models represent learning as a process
of changing connection weights between simple neuron-like units
and might be applied in two ways in future engineering modeling.
First, the gradient descent learning algorithms might be used as
a nonlinear curve-fitting technique to predict learning time. Such
models are currently being used in diverse areas (e.g., to predict
chemical properties of new molecules or loan qualifications based on
simple features). Perhaps such techniques could be used to predict
the learning times of new tasks. However, in order to fit the many
parameters of such models, very large data bases are required with
clear measures of performance. Note that in many real-world tasks,
it is difficult to obtain clear quantitative measures of performance.
The second use of connectionist models is to model human cogni-
tive functioning. In sharp contrast to production system models, all
the information in connectionist models interacts. All the knowledge
is stored in a small number of connection matrices. For example, all
associations between the acoustic and semantic representation of a
task would be stored in one matrix. The implication of this is that
all knowledge interacts. These models clearly show a wide variabil-
ity of learning times for new components as a function of similarity
to previous material (e.g., in NET-TALK, Sejenowski and Rosen-
berg, 1987). New words with similar phonemic relationships can be
learned with little or no training (e.g., three trials or less) whereas
new words with dissimilar patterns may require hundreds of trials.
Basic research understanding of these models may provide a useful
prediction of new learning as a function of its similarity to previous
learning. The inability to predict the effects of similarity is probably
the greatest hindrance to predicting human performance. It is im-
portant to note, however, that it may be years before such models
can deal with similarity effects in real-world learning environments.
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Hybrid Architectures
Recent, hybrid models have combined elements common to both
production system and connectionist models. These hybrid mod-
els promise a better understanding of the stages of skill acquisition.
Initial learning and performance appear to be based on rules. As
practice continues, connectionist associative retrieval is substituted
for rule-based execution. The Hunt and Lansman (1986) model has
a production rule interpreter that directly associates the input to
output across processing stages (e.g., a visual cue evoking a cogni-
tive process). Schneider and colleagues (Oliver and Schneider, 1988;
Schneider, 1985; Schneider and Detweiler, 1987, 1988) have devel-
oped a connectionist/control architecture that models controlled and
automatic processing. Initially, performance is rule governed. How-
ever, as practice occurs, performance passes through five phases as
automatic processing develops. This approach may allow interpre-
tation of why single-task training is such a poor predictor of high
workload performance (see Schneider and Detweiler, 1988). As with
connectionist models, models in this area must be developed sub-
stantially before they can be applied directly to estimating human
learning.
ENGINEERING GUIDANCE WITHOUT
AN ALL-INCLUSIVE MODEL
There are, at present, no complete models of cognitive processing
that can predict total task performance in tasks having the complex-
ity of flying an aircraft. However, there is substantial knowledge
about the impact of engineering decisions on training time. This
knowledge can provide guidelines to better develop skill learning.
Traditional workload analysis has proceeded without an all-inclusive
model to identify points of unreasonable workload in a design (e.g.,
having to perform two different movements at a given point in time).
For projecting training time, one can analyze the static parameters
of the design, determining the number of component tasks to be per-
formed and using an approximation model to estimate learning time.
One can determine which component tasks must be done with con-
current workload and which are compatible with previous responses.
It is important to remember that training time is determined by
many dimensions of the task, most of which have strong interactions
(e.g., compatibility between tasks is more important than the raw
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number of tasks, see Polson, 1988). To keep the user of such infor-
mation aware of the limited variance accounted for, it is important
to provide standard error estimates, as well as mean training times,
and to validate any model with human data.
Trade-offs in design must be addressed. For example, in current
cockpit designs information appears on virtual displays. Complex
systems may have a few to dozens of display modes. Information
that is in the computer but not attended to (either due to operator
inattention or to the operator's not displaying the appropriate screen)
results in poor performance. Data on the learning time and operator
requests for screens might be used to limit the number and types of
virtual displays employed during critical segments of missions.
An initial workup of a design should include a number of factors.
For example, how many new component steps must be learned to per-
form the task (e.g., firing a gun requires a given number of steps)?
How many of those steps are new relative to previously learned tasks?
How many are incompatible with other operations? Will these steps
be performed under heavy workload or in degraded stimulus condi-
tions? What information must be maintained in working memory,
and how rapidly must the operations be performed? What is the
frequency of the operations in normal training, operations, and time-
critical combat situations? What is the cost of errors of the system?
USE OF RAPID PROTOTYPING AND
QUICK EMPIRICAL EVALUATIONS
The inability to make accurate projections of training time em-
phasizes the need to obtain empirical data early in the design pro-
cess. Rapid prototyping of design systems with quick empirical tests
of loaded pilot performance would allow evaluation testing of de-
signs. It is important to note that most critical combat-related tasks
must be performed under conditions of high workload. In combat,
the aircrew is always engaged in navigation, threat avoidance, and
flight control, which severely limits the resources available for other
tasks. Evaluation tests should simulate such a load either in a sim-
ulated environment or in a calibrated secondary task load situation.
Training tests should include initial acquisition, reliability under high
workload conditions, and skill maintenance assessment.
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NEEDED RESEARCH
To more accurately project training costs and human perfor-
mance in systems, more research is needed to develop approximation
models of training performance, and detailed empirical and theoret-
ical understanding of skill acquisition and retention are required.
Currently available techniques allow extrapolation of training
time only after extensive collection of empirical data on either real
or simulated systems. Training performance is determined by the
interaction of the number of components to be trained, component
consistency-compatibility, workload, similarity to other tasks, and
retention periods. These dimensions are highly interactive, and no
validated modeling technique can currently relate all of them.
Attempts should be made to develop and evaluate projection
models of training time. An example of the beginning of such an
attempt is the Knerr, Nadler, Dowell, and Trifano (1983) army
project. The modeling might be either in the factor analytic tra-
dition or in nonlinear factor analysis (e.g., connectionist modeling)
techniques. Attempts to predict software development costs and
time (e.g., Brooks, 1975; Putman, 1983) might provide an example
of analogous prediction problems. In all such cases, the development
of an empirical data base to validate such a model is critical (Mait-
land, 1982; Neal, 1982). The current lack of training cost projection
models leaves the system evaluator with no objective criterion for
assessing the potentially most expensive aspect of a design.
Better basic research understanding and modeling of skill ac-
quisition, particularly under high workload situations, is critical. If
researchers cannot predict multitask performance based on single-
task performance (see Schneider and Detweiler, 1988) or if adding a
new task substantially alters the rank ordering of all previous tasks,
the accuracy of prediction is severely limited. Simply collecting more
data from empirical research on training is unlikely to help. There
have been three decades of research on part-task training that pro-
vide only broad guidelines (Adams, 1987; Stammers, 1982). Research
must focus on characterizing the learning space in quantifiable dimen-
sions and predicting skill acquisition times as a function of training
time and procedures. The understanding of cognitive architectures
via computer simulation provides methods of testing the learning
theories of skill acquisition. Models are required that can identify
predictor variables of learning time with all the interacting variables
present in real-world design trade-off situations.
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Modeling Scenarios for Action
STUART K. CARD
To bring human performance (or other) models to bear at de-
sign time, it is necessary to predict the interactions of pilot, aircraft,
and environment. This can be done roughly, and at great time and
expense, by humans in simulators. It would be more effective if a
greater portion of the task could be done analytically and computa-
tionally. Computational methods have potentially great advantages
over empirical human simulations: (1) they might be made vastly
cheaper; (2) they might be much faster to use; (3) many more contin-
gencies might be explored; and (4) the need for measurement, data
reduction, and interpretation (e.g., by eye-movement cameras) might
be replaced by simple data capture. The problem is that pilot behav-
ior depends on higher-order perceptual and mental functions just
the part of the system that is most difficult to model. This chapter
collects some of the modeling techniques potentially applicable to
this problem.
FIXED SCENARIOS
The standard technique that has evolved to model pilot action
is based on fixed scenarios. Each scenario consists of a list of actions,
fixed by the analyst, that accomplishes some mission. The actions
are then used as input for later analyses. For example, a scenario
might involve all the perceptual, control, and communications actions
required to take off, fly to a certain destination, and land. From
the detailed scenario, the analyst could then pursue other time line
construction, workload analysis, anthropometric analyses, or analysis
of eye-scanning patterns.
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Scenarios come in a number of formats ranging from tables of
actions to graphical versions. Figure 18-1 is a summary of a sce-
nario for all flying a logistical mission (Murphy, Pizzicara,
Hamson, and Bernberg, 1967). Figure 18-2 gives a fragment of the
scenario detail. The full scenario extends 40 pages, includes 626
named actions, and is one or 3 scenarios used for this cockpit analy-
sis. The scenario includes perceptions (e.g., "assess fuel flow rates"),
actions (e.g., "adjust rpm, egt, epr, and oil temperature, pressure,
and quantity"), and communications (e.g., "report intelligence to
Cl?"). Figure 18-3 shows control, display, and automation analyses
that have been expanded around Task 56 ("adjust throttle"). One
analysis (Figure 18-3A) considers what sort of display is needed, how
frequently it will be read, and how critical it is; another analysis
(Figure 18-3B) considers how the throttle will be controlled; and
a third (Figure 18-3C) what kind of automation to provide for the
control.
Tile use of fixed scenarios is a simple, but tedious, technique to
model enough of the interaction between the pilot and his environ-
ment for other analytical methods to be applied. In fixed scenarios,
the analyst transforms a general and brief plan of interaction, such as
that in Figure 18-1, into detailed lists of actions by imagining what
would happen if one were to interact in the specific situation. Some
degree of variability is handled by using sets of different scenarios,
strategically chosen so that interesting realms of interaction will be
traversed. The scenario technique depends on the fact that the world
and the behavior of interest are composed of skilled, routine tasks
with desired methods (e.g., landing an aircraft) and that sampling
a set of tasks from this world can help identify the major infelicities
of the test cockpit.
There are several strong limitations to this approach, however:
1. An analyst might not expand the scenario correctly or might
miss the use of items in the environment for memory.
2. Because no contingencies are permitted, even minor changes
to the mission, such as flying over new terrain or the addition of
other actors, require new analyses.
3. Some inputs, such as determining how high a helicopter would
have to pop up to see over a hill, might be tedious to perform.
4. No contingent interactions, such as having a human pilot
perform one of the roles of the mission or having the simulation
respond to the terrain or to the actions of other actors, are possible.
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5. The entire analysis is tedious, slow, expensive, and impracti-
cal to update.
SCENARIOS WITH SIMPLE CONTINGENCIES
Especially in tasks that involve largely routine skill, it is possible
to go beyond fixed scenarios to add simple contingencies. An early
example was the SAINT system in which, whenever workload became
sufficiently high, the simulation would compress the time for actions
or even skip steps if necessary.
A more recent example is the GOMS (Card, Moran, and Newell,
1983) analysis in which a task is analyzed in terms of goals, opera-
tors, methods, and selection rules. Operators are actions that can be
p erformed directly. Goals are actions that can be broken down fur-
ther and often have alternative ways of being accomplished. Methods
are procedures composed of goals and operators and simple control
structures that can be used to achieve goals. Selection rules are rules
for choosing among alternative methods for accomplishing goals. For
example, the major contingencies in using a computer-based text
editor to edit a manuscript might he described as follows:
GOAL: EDIT-MANUSCRIPT
GOAL: EDIT-UNIT-TASK .	 repeat until no more
unit tasks
GOAL::kCQUIRE-UNIT-TASK a	 if task not
remembered
GET-NEXT-PAGE .	 if at end of
manuscript page
GET-NEXT-TASK
GOAL: EXECUTE-UNIT-TASK .	 if an edit task was
found
GOAL: LOCATE-LINE .	 if task not on
current line
[select USE-QS-METHOD
USE-LF-METHOD]
GOAL: MODIFY-TEXT
[select USE-S-COMMAND
USE-M-COMMAND]
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In this case, goals are explicitly indicated by the tag GOAL: and
GET-NEXT-PAGE and GET-NEXT-TASK are operators. USE-QS-
METHOD, USE-LF-METHOD, USE-S-COMMAND, and USE-M-
COMMAND are methods. An example of a typical set of selection
rules for GOAL: MODIFY-TEXT is
Rule 1:Use the S-COMMAND method as a default.
Rule 2: However, if the correction is at the very
beginning or the very end of the line,
then use the M-COMMAND method.
Similar methods have been used to describe other tasks (Kieras
and Polson, 1985; Carroll and Olson, 1987; Singley and Anderson,
1985) and even routines in other cultures (Randall, 1987).
A similar representation was used to supply simple contingencies
for early versions of the NASA Aircrew/Aircraft Integration (All)
helicopter simulator (Corker, Davis, Papazian, and Pew, 1986). For
example, the goal structure for a scenario fragment in which a he-
licopter pops up high enough for the pilot to see certain objects of
interest is described:
POP-UP-AND-SCAN
POP-UP-FOR-SCAN
[in-parallel-do:
LOOK-FOR
POP-UP]
STABILIZE-CRAFT
HOVER-AND-SCAN
[in-parallel-do:
HOVER
SCAN]
In this case, goals and operators, as in the GOMS analysis, are
distinguished mainly by whether they are considered primitive or
whether they can be expanded. LOOK-FOR, POP-UP, and SCAN
are primitive operators. Alternative methods for the actions with
selection rules are not given, but some actions are allowed to proceed
in parallel. As in the GOMS analysis, each of the goals or operators
can handle a set of arguments (possibly through an inheritance hi-
erarchy). For example, the goal-like action POP-UP-AND-SCAN is
implemented (slightly simplified) as:
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(deffiavor POP-UP-AND-SCAN
(scan-list nil)(max-elevation 100)
(sequential-forms
'((POP-UP-FOR-SCAN
:maximum-elevation max-elevation :agent agent
:scan-list scan-list)
(STABILIZE-CRAFT
:elevation (send agent :z) :agent agent))))
The action for a primitive operator is not further expanded in
terms of other modeled actions but is implemented directly in terms
of internal system primitives. The primitive action POP-UP, for
example, is given by:
(deffiavor POP-UP
(vacp '(5 0 5 3))(max-elevation 200)(pop-up-rate 3)
(tick-procedure '(send agent :alter-vertical-
velocity (min pop-up-rate (- max-
elevation (send agent :z)))))
(termination-conditions '((G= (abs (- (send
agent :z) max-elevation))(send agent
:vertical-acceleration)))))
In this case, a fixed constant is used to estimate the visual (v =
5), auditory (a = 0), cognitive (c = 5), or perceptual (p = 3) loading
of the action. These fixed constants could be replaced by modeled
parameters supplied by computational human performance models.
As these examples show, a number of simple scenario contingen-
cies, such as how high to pop up or actions contingent on being able
to see other objects, can be handled. Some other simple decisions
based on doctrine can also be handled by building the doctrine into
the model. Behavior that depends on problem solving cannot be
handled in this fashion, but stochastic elements can be added to the
models (e.g., Card, Moran, and Newell, 1983, Chapter 6). Learn-
ing and transfer of training analyses can also be done from such an
analysis (Kieras and Bovair, 1986). The approach has only limited
application to the analysis of errors.
MODELING MORE COMPLEX SCENARIOS
Several techniques exist that are potentially applicable for set-
ting more complex scenarios of high-level interactions between the
Ad
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pilot and the environment. These look promising but are not in es-
tablished use: opportunistic planning and blackboard architectures,
modeling of informal procedures by agent commitment, and artificial
intelligence (AI) planning models.
Opportunistic Planning and Blackboard Architectures
The GOMS sort of analysis models the activities of settled skill
in more or less routine environments. By contrast, the planning of
novel action has been modeled by what has come to be called `op-
portunistic planning" and is based on a "blackboard architecture" of
control (Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth,
1978, 1979; Hayes-Roth, 1980). This model is applicable when the
agent is trying to combine multiple sources of knowledge that put
constraints on one another. The idea is that the different sources of
knowledge independently add information to a global data structure
known as blackboard. These data are then independently available
to, and serve as a constraint on, other processes that use the black-
board. The blackboard concept derives from the Hearsay-II speech
understanding system (Hayes-Roth, 1985; Lesser, Fennell, Erman,
and Reddy, 1975) where it was used to coordinate information shar-
ing and control by semiautonomous parallel processes all simultane-
ously processing different aspects of an input sentence. However, it
has also been used to model image understanding (Prager, Nagin,
Kohler, Hanson, and Risernan, 1977), protein-crystallographic anal-
ysis (Nii and Feigenbaum, 1978), inductive inference (Soloway and
Riseman, 1977), and interactions between the different knowledge
processes active in a single person doing routine planning (in this
case, planning Saturday errands).
In this model, planning processes are triggered bottom up by
something the planner notices about the world. This causes the plan-
ner to introduce new steps into a plan opportunistically, whenever
it is convenient to do so. For example, in planning errands a person
might notice that two errands are near each other and decide to do
them together. Alternatively, the person might decide abstractly to
group errands into regions and look for clusters of errands near each
other. The blackboard contains the same data at different levels of
abstraction to model the complex way in which people shift back
and forth among abstractions (e.g., in the example above, the detail
of proximity between stores triggering a shift to a global strategy of
trying to group all errands by region).
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Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth (1979) found several characteristics
of human planning in their studies, which they claim the blackboard
technique models:
• Opportunistic decision sequences: Each decision was moti-
vated by one or two immediately preceding decisions, rather than by
some high-level executive program.
*Multiple levels of abstraction: In thinking-out-loud proto-
cols, people switched back and forth among levels of abstraction in
reasoning about decisions.
• Multidirectional processing: Decisions at a higher level of
abstraction could influence decisions at a lower level of abstraction
and vice versa.
• Global tactics: People could make global decisions that they
were going to think of their planning problem as, for example, a
scheduling problem or a traveling salesman problem. This would
influence the processing strategy for the whole task.
Modeling of Informal Procedures by Agent Commitment
Recently, there has been interest in understanding the ways in
which informal plans are refined by interaction with the external
world and how the external world can be used as a participant in
the information processing. This interest is based on social science
research (for example, see Heritage, 1984; Suchman, 1987) show-
ing that, in many human activities, the procedures people do are
only partially defined, the consequences of actions are not very pre-
dictable, and manipulations of world objects are a potent way to
overcome information-processing limitations.
Fikes (1982) has suggested modeling informal procedures in
terms of making and fulfilling commitments to other agents. Whether
or not a goal has been achieved in this model depends only on whether
the client agent agrees it has been. Responsibilities for fulfilling com-
mitments can be subcontracted to other agents. This model attempts
to overcome two major difficulties in basing models of procedures on
the usual computer science notion of procedure: (1) the variability in
the way tasks are accomplished (e.g., the task may be accomplished
by skipping part of it or renegotiating a deadline) and (2) the infor-
mality of task descriptions. Similar ideas are now being tested for
coordinating the actions of multicomputer networks.
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Artificial Intelligence (AI) Planning Models
Models of planning in artificial intelligence, really models of how
to choose a sequence of actions that accomplishes given goals, have a
long history. The models of human planning presented above stand
in some contrast to models of activity planning that have been used
in AI (see Chapman, 1987; Cohen and Feigenbaum, 1982; Vere,
1983a). This reflects, in part, different strengths of humans and
of current machines. Humans have severe limitations on immediate
memory, but good visual perception capabilities and abstraction
abilities. Current machines have no difficulty in keeping track of
large numbers of partial states, are very limited perceptually, and
are much better at syntactically oriented processing.
Al planners are distinguished on a number of dimensions, but
the most fundamental one is whether they work in the space of indi-
vidual actions or abstractions of individual actions (like ABSTRIPS,
Sacerdoti, 1974), or whether they work in the space of entire plans
(like NONLIN, Tate, 1977). In the latter case, each step is an en-
tire plan. As work proceeds, the plan gets more refined, is better
sequenced, and has fewer errors. A review of Al planning models
is beyond the scope of this chapter, other than to note that some
Al planning systems have been put to use in applications related to
scenario generation: KNOBS (Engelman, 1983) for Air Force tactical
missions, DEVISER (Vere, 1983b) for planning spacecraft activities,
and SIPE (Wilkins, 1984) for aircraft carrier deck operations.
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Modeling and Predicting Human Error
DAVID D. WOODS
INTROD`JCTION
One cannot survey and rate "error models" for inclusion in a
computer-aided engineering and design (CAD/CAE) framework.' In
part, this is because a model of error is also a model of processing
mechanisms and, in part, because there are few models available
that address the way in which errors occur at the scale of behavior
relevant to pilot performance. In other words, models of processing
mechanisms are not necessarily models of how processing can break
down or lead to erroneous performance. The "error models" available
are either descriptive taxonomies (e.g., Rasmussen, 1986; Reason,
1987b) or cognitive simulations that assist an analyst in discovering
error-prone points in a person-machine system (e.g., Corker, Davis,
Papazian, and Pew, 1986; Woods, Roth and Pople, 1987).
Definition of Error
If the end brings me out all right, what is set against me won't
amount to anything. If the end brings me out all wrong, ten
angels swearing I was right would make no difference.
Abraham Lincoln
There have been long and unresolved debates among researchers
on human performance as to what human error is. Some of these
'For an overview of research trends on the topic of human error, the best
single source is Rasmussen, Duncan, and Leplat (1987); see also, Rasmussen(1986) and Senders and Moray (in press). Reason has conducted a large and
far-reaching research program on buman error (cf. Reason and Mycielska, 1982;
various chapters in Rasmussen et al., 1987; Reason, 1987, in press).
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discussions are reflected in the pages of Rasmussen et al. (1987)
and Senders and Moray (in press). To guide further discussions in
the context of this report, Figure 19-1 illustrates graphically one
approach to establish a temporary and pragmatic truce among the
differing camps.
The concept illustrated in Figure 19-1 is to separate performance
failures from information-processing deficiencies. Performance fail-
ures are defined in terms of a categorical shift in consequences on
some dimension related to performance in a particular domain. For
the helicopter domain, examples include failure to fulfill the tactical
mission goal, failure to survive the mission, failure to prevent a he-
licopter system failure, and failure to mitigate the consequences of
a helicopter system failure. Performance failures can be defined in
terms of some potentially observable external standard. Note that
the definition is in terms of the language of the domain.
Information processing deficiencies involve some type of "defect"
in cognitive function that, if uncorrected, could lead to a performance
failure. This is the point at which attempts to characterize the nature
of human error have floundered (cf. Rasmussen et al., 1987; Senders
and Moray, in press). The problem, in short, is what criterion or
standard to use to judge a defect (e.g., see Garbolino, 1987, for one
discussion of this issue). One complicating factor is the possibility of
"error" recovery. Thus, Figure 19-1 shows an initial information pro-
cessing deficiency followed by a recovery interval. If error detection
occurs before there are any shifts in negative consequences, then the
problem solver has recovered; if not, then a performance failure has
occurred. This way to call a truce in the debates on defining error
illustrates that error modeling must be concerned with the processes
of error detection and correction as well as error genesis (Allwood,
1984; Perkins and Martin, 1986; Rizzo, Bagnara, and de Visciola,
1987; Woods, 1984).
This definition of error also points to one of the difficulties in
human performance modeling: the customer is interested in domain
consequences or outcomes; the psychologist is capable of addressing
the kinds of information processing that go on in the course of solving
domain problems. However, a bridge is needed between the manner
in which processing may unfold and the domain consequences of that
processing.
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The Limited Rationality Approach
Most all of the research on human error today assumes that er-
ror is the result of limited rationality—people are doing reasonable
things, given their knowledge, objectives, point of view, and limited
resources, such as time or workload (Montmollin and De Keyser,
1986; Rasmussen et al., 1987; Woods et al., 1987). As a result, error
analysis consists of tracing the problem-solving process to identify
points at which limited knowledge and processing lead to break-
downs. This perspective implies that errors result from mismatches
between problem demands and a person's knowledge and process-
ing resources (e.g., Rasmussen, 1986). In this view, human error
becomes person-machine system breakdown. Another implication of
conceiving of error as produced by demand-resource mismatches is
that one must consider what features of domain incidents and situ-
ations increase problem demands. The section on problem demand
factors suggests some answers to this.
The limited rationality assumption also suggests a strategy for
predicting human intention errors in complex systems via a simula-
tion-based approach in which the investigator can vary the knowl-
edge resources and processing characteristics of a limited-resource
computer problem-solver and observe the behavior of the computer
problem solver in different simulated domain scenarios. This cogni-
tive simulation approach depends on mapping the cognitive demands
imposed by the domain in question with which any intelligent but
limited resource problem-solving agent would have to deal. This in-
cludes the nature of domain incidents, how they are manifest through
observable data to the operational staff, and how they evolve over
time. Then one can embody this model of the problem-solving envi-
ronment as a limited resource, symbolic processing, problem-solving
system. If the knowledge organization and processing characteristics
of the symbolic processing system can be varied in psychologically
meaningful ways (e.g., different mental models or diagnostic strate-
gies that can be linked to those used by subsets of the practitioner
population, as in Gitomer, 1988) and if the effects of external re-
sources can be mapped into the program's resource settings (such
as procedures, training, interface systems, aiding systems), then the
errors committed by the computer problem solver are hypotheses
about errors that people will commit given the same resource and
demand conditions. Woods et al. (1987) have begun to develop a
system based on this strategy and to apply it to ident.fying errors
in nuclear power plant emergencies (cf. also Johnson, Moen, and
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Thompson in press). Note that the cognitive simulation approach
does not necessarily require strong theoretical assumptions about the
detailed psychological processes underlying human behavior.
Errors in the Design of Person-Machine Problem-Solving Systems
The limited rationality approach emphasizes the role of knowl-
edge resources in performance. These resources are established by
training, experience, interface systems, and support systems. As a
result, one can consider "human error" to be a symptom or man-
ifestation of underlying flaws in the person-machine system (e.g.,
Hollnagel and Woods, 1983).
In this view, one objective of error modeling is to anticipate and
correct designer errors in the development of interface and support
systems—places where there are inadequate resources to meet the
domain's demands or unanticipated negative consequences of inter-
face/support system characteristics. There have been many cases
in which the introduction of new technology to support or off-load
the human has had unanticipated negative impacts in the form of
changed human role, increased mental workload, and new error forms
(cf. Adler, 1986; Elm and Woods, 1985; Mitchell a;ad Foreen, 1987;
Mitchell and Saisi, 1987; Wiener, in preparation). Roth, Bennett,
and Woods (1987) and Suchman (1987) provide studies of specific
cases of brittle machine problem solvers and communication break-
downs between person and machine, respectively. Other human per-
formance problems created by interface/support system design that
have been identified in the literature are mode errors, getting lost in
large display systems, the alarm problem in alerting and monitoring
systems, and tunnel vision due to keyhole effects in interface system
design (see Wood and Roth, in press, for an overview).
Because problems in domains such as army helicopter scenarios
are always solved with some external resources, the critical model-
ing question is what effects new resources or new configurations of
resources have on performance. This question can be addressed via
cognitive simulation, if known effects of interface/support systems on
how states of the world are manifest and how they affect the human
problem solver's knowledge activation can be represented within the
settings of the computer-based problem solver.
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ERROR MODELING
Sources of Error
Given the limited rationality approach, there are two basic
sources of information-processing deficiencies which need to be mod-
eled if one is to predict error-prone situations in domains such as
army helicopter missions:
1. missing, incomplete, or erroneous (buggy) knowledge; and
2. inert knowledge (i.e., situation-relevant knowledge is not ac-
cessed under the conditions in which the task is performed).
Mental model and intelligont tutoring work has focused on the
role of incomplete and erroneous knowledge of a domain in produc-
ing erroneous behavior (e.g., Brown and VanLehn, 1980). In general,
modeling buggy knowledge depends on empirical studies to iden-
tify the kinds of missing and erroneous knowledge that characterize
specific subsets of the practitioner population in specific domains.
Gaps in knowledge may be related to Johnson's concept of chasm or
missing bridge difficulties (Johnson and Thompson, 1981).
Another source of errors is inert knowledge. Does knowledge that
is relevant in principle and available actually get called to mind in
some problem solving context (e.g., Bransford, Sherwood, Vye, and
Rieser, 1986; Gettys, Pliske, Manning and Casey, 1987; Hilton and
Slugolski, 1986; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Perkins and Martin,
1986). One tends to assume that if a person can be shown to possess
a piece of knowledge in any circumstance, this knowledge should be
accessible under all conditions in which it might be useful. In con-
trast, a variety of research has revealed dissociation effects, that is,
knowledge accessed in one context remains inert in another (Brans-
ford et al., 1986; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Oliver, 1986; Gentner
and Stevens, 1983). For example, Gick and Holyoak (1980) found
that, unless explicitly prompted, people will fail to apply a recently
learned problem-solving strategy to an isomorphic problem (cf. also
Kotovsky, Hayes, and Simon, 1985). Thus, the fact that people
possess relevant knowledge does not guarantee that this knowledge
will be activated when needed. The critical factor is not whether
the problem solver possesses domain knowledge but rather the more
stringent criterion that situation relevant knowledge be accessible
under the conditions in which the task is performed.
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Monitoring/attentionalstrategies and cognitive processing strat-
egies for coping with high workload, used by a limited-resource prob-
lem solver, have strong effects on the contexts in which knowledge
is accessible. The concept of inert knowledge also shows how the
representation of the domain can affect the quality of performance.
The nature of the problem representation can help or hinder problem
solvers in recognizing what information or strategies are relevant to
the problem at hand. For example, Fischhoff, Slovik, and Licht-
enstein (1978) and Kruglanski, Friedland, and Farkash (1984) found
that judgmental biases (e.g., representativeness) were greatly reduced
or eliminated when aspects of the situation cued the relevance of sta-
tistical information and reasoning. Thus, one dimension along which
representations vary is their ability to provide prompts to the knowl-
edge relevant in a given context. Inert knowledge is also important
in modeling the hypothesis generation phase of diagnostic behavior
under limited resources (Gettys et al., 1987). In dynamic limited
resource problem-solving situations such as military helicopter mis-
sions, behavior depends on what hypotheses are called to mind and
pursued first to explain the current pattern of findings (Johnson et
al., in press; Woods et al., 1987). This means that incoming data
also serves as retrieval cues, given the context of the current situation
assessment and past experience.
Descriptive Error Forms
For a human performance model to address errors, it must be
able to detect conditions that lead to known kinds of human error.
This implies at least a partial taxonomy of descriptive error forms
that people commit in domains with characteristics similar to those
of military helicopter mission scenarios. What follows is a brief
listing of some of the descriptive error forms that have been noted by
various researchers. This list is not intended as a taxonomy of errors
but only as a sample of the error forms that would make up such a
taxonomy for helicopter mission scenarios. Note that the categories
are based on psychological concepts and not on the language of the
domain in which the error occurred or the physical form of the error.
Only psychologically based taxonomies can provide the basis for more
sophisticated modeling.
The errors noted are
DA171D D. WOODS	 255
• failures to revise situation assessment as new evidence comes
in, also called fixation, mind set, or garden path (De Keyser et al.,
1988; Johnson, Duran, Hassenbrock, Moller, Prietula, Feltovich, and
Swanson, 1981; Woods, 1984);
• premature localization (Bechtel, 1982);
• vagabonding (Dorner, 1983);
• missing side effects in highly coupled systems (Dorner, 1983);
• availabilityP c; i knowledge in hypothesis generation (Gettys
and Fisher, 1979; Johnson et al., 1981);
• representational errors (Evans, 1983) or failures of selective
attention (Woods, 1986)—lack of attention to relevant data
or paying attention to irrelevant data;
• confirmation, bias in hypothesis evaluation;
• lapses or slips of action (Norman, 1981; Norman and Shallice,
1980; Reason and Mycielska, 1982);
• capture or substitution errors;
• mistake in choosing alternatives (Rasmussen, 1986);
• omitting or forgetting isolated acts (Rasmussen, 1986);
• mode errors (Monk, 1986; Norman, 1983);
• strong-but-wrong error forms based on matching bias, given
variations in frequencies of encounter (Reason, 1987a); and
• over-reliance on familiar shortcuts (Rasmussen, 1986).
Each of these error forms could be examined in more detail.
However, one error will be considered (and that one very briefly)
which the author's own research and modeling experience suggests
is particularly important for domains such as helicopter missions.
The results of several studies (De Keyser et al., 1987; Johnson, et
al., 1981; Johnson and Thompson, 1981; Woods, 1984) strongly
suggest that a major source of human error in dynamic domains
is a failure to revise situational assessment as new evidence comes
in. Initial situation assessment tends to be accurate, in the sense of
being consistent with the partial information available early in the
event. Errors become manifest later, in the evolution of the event,
as people fail to revise their assessments in response to new evidence
which indicates a deviation of the event from the expected path (e.g.,
due to multiple failures). These results suggest that a major source
of human error in dynamic domains is fixation or perseverance: a
failure to revise situational assessment and planned actions when the
situation changes (cf. De Keyser, Woods, Masson, and Van Daele,
1988a,b; Johnson et al., in press, for an in-depth discussion of this
error form in complex dynamic worlds).
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Knowledge of descriptive error forms alone can be applied to pre-
dict performance in person-machine systems in several ways. Con-
sider, for example, flight management systems in fixed-wing aircraft.
Current flight management systems are relatively dumb subordinates
in that they require detailed, explicit instructions and input; they
exhibit overly rigid patterns of behavior; and their performance is
highly data bound.
Several predicted error forms result from this type of person-
machine system. First, given human characteristics, input/instruc-
tion misentries will occur. Whether performance failures follow de-
pends on the ability to detect the input error. This can occur at
several levels of abstraction if feedback information is available at
all. At the most concrete level, detection can occur through checks
that the correct instructions were entered in the time interval imme-
diately surrounding the input operation (e.g., data integrity checks).
The design of the detailed human-computer interface and the pres-
ence of various kinds of data integrity checks affect the likelihood of
error detection at this level.
Although instructions axe concrete, they implicitly set up higher-
level response strategies or goals. Therefore, error detection occurs
at a more abstract level via feedback about the implications of the
literal instructions. This type of feedback is not time synchronous
with the input operations; rather, it is time linked to when informa-
tion is available about performance envelope violations or intention
violations. The likelihood of error detection at this level depends
on the person's ability to maintain correct situational awareness.
This, in turn, depends on a variety of processing factors (workload,
fixation proneness) and interface/display factors (displays that char-
acterize the state of the flight relative to the state of control of the
flight and mission objectives). Actual cases of performance failures
have resulted from failures to detect flight problems due to lack of
situational awareness (Wiener, 1985a,b, 1988).
Expected future flight management systems will be more intel-
ligent in the sense of being more flexible through the ability to fill
in gaps in user instructions. Thus, the user will be able to specify
instructions at higher levels of abstraction and the system will fill
in the details. This shift in technology leads to predictions for the
frequency and forms of errors that are likely to occur. Concrete in-
put errors should be reduced. However, there will be a new type of
error in which communication breakdowns like those documented in
Suchman (1987) occur.
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Error detection can be enhanced, in the case of literal commu-
nication errors (misentries), by displays that help to highlight inten-
tion/strategy mismatches. In the case of higher level communication
breakdowns, error detection can be enhanced by displays that help
highlight mismatches of machine intention and human intention.
Descriptive taxonomies are also the first step in more sophisti-
cated approaches to modeling error. For example, Rouse, Geddes,
and Curry (1987) used information about error forms to build a com-
puter system that automatically assesses human performance. They
began by defining a taxonomy of errors and then building a symbolic
processing program, including user intent modeling, which checks for
conditions that can lead to the error forms (cf. also Hollnagel, in
press). Woods et al. (1987) and Johnson et al. (in press) illustrate
another approach in which cognitive mechanisms hypothesized to
underlie a set of descriptive error forms are set up in a cognitive
simulation by adjusting or changing the processing mechanisms res-
ident in the simulation. The simulation is then tested as a surrogate
domain problem solver to see if it exhibits the error forms under the
same or similar circumstances as the human practitioner.
Demand Factors
As part of error modeling, one must be able to vary demand
factors as well as resource factors. Because helicopter missions are
highly defined (i.e., a large amount of preplanned guidance about how
to act in different situations is available in written form or in learned
doctrine), problems increase in difficulty when some complicating
factor goes beyond the rote implementation of preplanned routines
and creates the need to adapt responses from the usual.
Complicating factors can take a variety of forms:
• underspecified or ambiguous instructions;
• special conditions or contexts (e.g., missing or failed means);
• errors in the plan;
• human execution errors; and
• impasses ( •N:iere the plan's assumptions are not trite).
In addition, multiple interacting factors in the scenario can pro-
duce situations that go beyond the preplanned routines, for example,
• a fault followed by additional failures;
• missing information;
• situations that remove or obscure the usual information;
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conflicting goals or responses;
situations requiring actions that depart from the usual; and
novel situations.
From this point of view, there are two error forms: (1) failures
to recognize the need to adapt (behavior persists in one path in the
face of changing circumstances that demand a shift in response) and
(2) erroneous adaptation (the need for adaptation is recognized, but
the attempted adaptation is inadequate due to incomplete knowl-
edge). This view is important because it can provide a basis for
why and when "violations" occur (Reason, 1988). Violations are
responses other than the nominal response sequence specified in pro-
cedures or standard operating practice which hindsight suggests was
most appropriate. From the viewpoint of adaptability, violations oc-
cur because of the need to adapt to circumstances that go beyond
preplanned routines or because of plan breakdowns. If these circum-
stances are chronic, violations can then become habitual and occur
in combination with circumstances that lead to disasters (e.g., the
Zeebrugge and Chernobyl disasters).
Another example of violations occurs with increases in automa-
tion when, as is almost always the case, the designer has not taken
into account all of the factors that are operative in the actual task
world. When the designer does not provide pilots with explicit mech-
anisms to control or instruct the automatic systems, pilots will learn.
how to trick the automatic systems into doing what the pilot wants
(see also Roth et al., 1987). ror example, some commercial avia-
tion pilots have learned that they can trick a flight control system
into getting them down faster for landing by entering a fictitious tail
wind. Circumstances often occur in which a landing must be carried
out quickly. The problem is that there may be side effects of this
action in terms of what the automatic systems will do under other
circumstances. The result is that the trick or shortcut may work
on many occasions but lead to unanticipated negative consequences
when factors that turn the side effect virulent are present.
In this approach to defining problem demand, the difficulty of
a problem depends both on the nature of the problem itself and
on the resources (e.g., plans) available to solve it. Also note that
the adaptability viewpoint emphasizes the ability of the skilled per-
former to compensate for environmental variability or disturbances.
Error then becomes a breakdown in one's resistance to variability or
disturbances. lIence the concept of "brittleness" in machine problem
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solving, where performance breaks down when the •roblem is outside
the design envelope (e.g., Roth et al., 1987).
Error Model or Processing Model
Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only
success can tell one from the other.
Ernst Mach (1905, p. 84).
Jens Rasmussen frequently quotes Mach on error and knowledge
to make the point that a model of error is inherently a model of pro-
cessing mechanisms. The question that a prospective error modeler
must answer then is: What processing mechanisms and variants need
to be included to be able to capture error forms? The following is a
sampling of some processing mechanisms that must be included if a
model is to address error in worlds such as that of military helicopter
missions. Note that what follows is not a particular model, but some
of the cognitive activities that must be modeled to predict error for
this type of domain.
Coping with High Workload
A fundamental characteristic of the helicopter domain is the
potential for problem solving under limited resources and high work-
load. Specific models of limited resource processing reflect two basic
concepts for coping with high workload (e.g., Lane, 1982):
1. process fewer events, that is,
•	 choose among competing activities,
•	 defer activities,
•	 monitor fewer channels,
•	 eliminate gathering feedback on expected responses (sub-
stitute expectation for checking), or
•	 consider fewer alternative hypotheses; and
2. process events less completely, that is,
•	 monitor less often (sampling),
•	 check less corroborating evidence,
•	 gather partial feedback on expected responses (level of
abstraction in checking),
•	 narrow the field of attention,
•	 limit anticipation of what might happen next or possible
future trajectories in diagnostic search and planning,
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pursue possible explanations less thoroughly (shift re-
sponse criterion).
In other words, information processing can be corrupted when
demands are high relative to resources. When this occurs fewer
events are processed or events are processed less completely. This
is, of course, oversimplified since the level of skill, training and
experience interacts with workload and limited-resource processing.
The current approach is based on the concept of automatic versus
effortful or controlled processing, where automatic processes are less
vulnerable to excessive workload conditions (e.g., Fisk and Scerbo,
1.987).
Other factors that affect workload/limited-resource processing
are the nature of the interface to the domain and the level and
philosophy of automation. The interface design can affect workload
and cognitive strategies (e.g., Woods and Roth, 1988). For example,
interface design can affect processing strategies by forcing a user to
shift from highly automatic perceptual processes to effortful cognitive
processes or vice versa (e.g., Woods, 1984b). Similarly, the design
and organization of machine agents (either control or decision au-
tomation) can affect workload (e.g., Wiener, 1985b, in preparation).
This means that in order to model errors in domains like helicopter
missions, one must be able to specify—analytically, empirically, or
theoretically—the effects of changes in the interface/automation on
the cognitive processing involved in handling domain events.
Choosing among competing activities may have to occur at a
strategic as well as at a tactical level. For example, early in a de-
veloping incident, one may focus on gathering evidence on the state
of the world rather than pursuing one possible diagnosis. During
hypothesis evaluation phase, one may focus on explanation driven
search. During a plan execution phase, one may focus on plan mon-
itoring. If the situation is changing rapidly, then one may focus on
disturbance management.
Monitoring and Control of Attention
Another fundamental aspect of processing in military helicopter
missions is monitoring strategy. This includes the way in which
salient signals inside or outside the cockpit interrupt and capture
processing resources. There are also knowledge-driven monitoring
demands directed both by diagnostic activities and by the need to
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monitor for expected responses from automatic systems, friendly
forces, and opposing forces.
As a result of limited resources in an event-driven world, there is
a need to control the focus of attention which may require capabilities
such as context sensitive judgments of importance and discrimination
of expected from unexpected events.
Control of attention may be a particularly critical element of a
processing model for limited-resource problem solving in changing
and uncertain situations. For example, March and Shapira (1987)
in commenting on the state of decision theory note that "these ob-
servations suggest that choice behavior . . . is susceptible to
an alternative interpretation in terms of attention. Theories that
emphasize the sequential consideration of a small number of alterna-
tives, . . ., or that highlight the significance of order of presentation
and agenda effects are all reminders that understanding action in
the face of incomplete information may depend more on ideas about
attention than on ideas about decision" (see also Klein, in press).
The nature of the interface to the domain (e.g., problems in the
design of alerting systems) and the level and philosophy of automa-
tion affect where attention is focused during unfolding scenarios.
Helicopter cockpits are highly automated and are likely to be-
come more highly automated (at least with respect to weapon sys-
tems, navigation, and communication). As a result, the cockpit must
be designed more and more for the human's supervisory control role.
A critical part of this is determining how the attention of the moni-
tor should be distributed in different conte;:ts and states. One type
of error in supervisory control is maldistribution of attentional re-
sources, and one type of mistake in the design of the human interface
to automation is introducing factors that force poor distributions of
attention. A classic scenario that can be abstracted from several real
cases in aviation is aircraft systems that require "heads down" to
operate or instruct the systems at times in the flight where it is most
important for the pilot to have "heads up" on the world. An example
of this is focusing on control-display unit (CDU) data entry in order
to reprogram the flight control system when a runway change has
occurred during the landing approach phase of flight in commercial
aviation. There are two basic variations on this scenario. In one,
because attention should be focused outside the cockpit during this
phase of flight, most pilots do not reprogram the flight control sys-
tem and land the aircraft manually. In the other, the pilot tries to
instruct or enter data into the automatic system. Error vulnerability
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occurs if the pilot has trouble doing this and focuses more and more
on getting the automatic system set up. As attention narrows on the
interaction with the automatic system, new incoming signals that
indicate a change in the situation and demand pilot attention are
missed. This narrowing of attention has been cited as a factor in
several industrial mishaps.
Diagnosis and Revision
Diagnosis and situation assessment in the domain of helicopter
missions must address the possibility of multiple interacting failures
and a situation that evolves and changes over time. This means
that one must address the manner in which diagnosis and situation
assessments are revised as evidence comes in over time (Klein, in
press; Woods and Roth, 1986). Fixation on a hypothesis in the face of
discrepant evidence (i.e., revision failures) is a dominant descriptive
error form in domains where multiple factors can account for the
perceived pattern of evidence and where situations evolve over time
(De Keyser, Woods, Massons, and Van Daele, 1988).
Limited resources and dynamic situations make hypothesis gen-
eration a critical part of diagnostic behavior—deciding what set of
hypotheses is plausible or worth pursuing (Gettys and Fisher, 1979;
Gettys, Mehle, and Fisher, 1986; Manning and Gettys, 1981). Hy-
pothesis generation focuses on how knowledge is activated about
plausible hypotheses which should be considered during hypothesis
evaluation—the calling to mind of pus Bible hypotheses. One kind of
error in hypothesis generation is the failure to sample the space of
potential hypotheses that could account for the currently perceived
pattern of evidence. For example, Johnson (Johnson et al., 1981;
Johnson, in press) studied the performance of experienced medical
diagnosticians on a problem prone to fixation. One class of errors
occurred in hypothesis generation and included failures to call to
mind the correct alternative. Note that modeling hypothesis gen-
eration requires gathering data on what hypotheses subsets of the
population of practitioners call to mind in different cov',exts.
When problems unfold over time, hy pothesis generation and
hypothesis evaluation activities are not separate sequential stages but
intermixed and interacting activities. This suggests another source of
error where hypothesis generation is terminated prematurely leading
to failures to revise. For example, a highly plausible hypothesis can
block retrieval fro a other parts of the hypothesis space. Manning and
A
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Gettys (1981) found this result in a study on the 4ects of providing
an initial hypothesis as a retrieval cue on hypothesis generation
performance (cf. also Arkes and Harkness, 1980). Johnson et al.
(1981) also found revision errors in the performance of experienced
diagnosticians when they were unable to shift from a highly plausible,
but incorrect, initial hypothesis to the correct one.
Plan Selection, Monitoring, and Adaptation
Because the domain of military helicopter missions is highly
proceduralized, formulating responses is initially a process of plan
selection based on the current situation assessment and not one of
plan generation. In cases of plan breakdowns or when the situation
goes beyond the preplanned routines, plan adaptation is required.
For example, choice under uncertainty and risk situations can arise
when there are competing goals (cf., Woods and Roth, for two ex-
amples of nuclear power plant emergencies in which the problem
crystallized into a classic dilemma of choice under certainty. Effec-
tive cognitive simulation must be able to capture the factors that lead
pilots to "improvise" in adapting preplanned routines and doctrine
to complicating factors.
Because the helicopter is an event-driven but highly doctrinal
world, there is an interaction between whether and when processing
is event driven (data driven) and when it is plan driven over the
unfolding scenario. Errors occur when behavior is excessively plan
driven, given situations that are incompatible with the preplanned
routine (e.g., Woods, 1984a,b).
Multiagent Problem Solving
There are multiple human agents involved in missions (within
and across helicopters), and there are (and will be more) machine
agents involved in flying missions (both control and decision automa-
tion). The architecture of this multiagent problem solving system has
consequences for knowledge activation and information processing,
especially because aifferent agents may have partial state informa-
tion or knowledge (Fischhoff, Lanir, and Johnson, 1986). There is
also the question of one agent controlling (supervisory control) or
interacting with another (cooperative problem solving), which raises
questions about mental models of how the other agent functions and
qualitative reasoning (envisioning) on the expected behavior of the
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other agents. The processing consequences can lead or contribute to
performance breakdowns (e.g., descriptive error forms such as mis-
communication, failures to communicate, working at cross-purposes
due to different situational assessments, groupthink).
Other Processing Needs
Several other areas may be important in supporting the above-
mentioned types of processing. One of these is qualitative reasoning
about the way in which the behavior of the domain (engineered
processes, friendly forces, opposing forces) will evolve, conditional
on different actions. Initial analyses with the cognitive simulation
developed by Woods et al. (1987) show that qualitative reasoning
mechanisms are important for models (1) to capture diagnostic be-
havior when multiple interacting explanations can account for the
current perceived state and (2) to capture one important character-
istic of expertise in which experts are highly sensitive to domain be-
havior that departs from the expected, given the current situational
assessment. The ability to discriminate expected from unexpected
domain behavior as a function of context may be particularly im-
portant in modeling limited resource diagnosis in evolving scenarios
(Rasmussen, 1986; Woods et al., 1987). Finally, qualitative reason-
ing may be an important element in simulating plan adaptation and
repair. Qualitative reasoning for this domain needs to address both
engineered systems and tactical processes (friendly forces, opponent
forces).
Another aspect of processing is default reasoning as part of con-
sidering context sensitivities in human reasoning and problem solv-
ing. For example, there may be a typical relationship between two
domain pieces of knowledge which only applies in certain contexts
or which changes under exceptional circumstances. This addresses
an error form in which a practitioner relies too much on a famil-
iar shortcut in exceptional circumstances when it no longer applies
(Rasmussen, 1986). Related to this is the need to capture differ-
ent diagnostic search strategies such as symptomatic (search-based
symptom-diagnostic category relations) or more explicit reasoning
about intervening or abstract states (Abbot, 1988; Rasmussen, 1986).
Error as Gradual Breakdown in Processing
Finally, performance failures may not be traceable to specific
knowledge bugs or corrupt processing strategies. Rather, in many
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cases, performance failures may result from the cumulative effect
of gradual breakdowns in the interaction of the kinds of processing
mentioned above (this finesses the problem of defining criteria to
judge defects in cognitive processing by focusing on and identifying
cognitive processing which results in poor performance in certain
classes of situations). For example, a signal may be missed (which
could result from a variety of factors—attentional focus, low observ-
ability, high signal noise). By itself, the missed signal may have
trivial performance consequences, in part because there are many
opportunities for correction (in this example, sampling the channel
later or observing other evidence for the state change). However, it
can begin a chain of processing that leads to adverse performance
consequences. For example, the missed signal could affect the set of
hypotheses that are called to mind, leading to inadequ;ite hypothesis
evaluation and the formation of an incorrect situation assessment.
In turn, this could lead to performance failures directly in terms of
incorrect intentions to act or indirectly by affecting the interpreta-
tion of incoming evidence. This strategy depends on having a way to
relate cognitive processing resources and external problem demands
to outcomes over large numbers of situations, that is, a cognitive
simulation that supports analytical experiments.
The gradual breakdown view illustrates the critical role of error
detection and the factors that affect error detestability in the pre-
diction of performance failures—the breakdown usually is corrected
before negative consequences ensue. Unfortunately, only a small
amount of research has investigated error detection and correction
(Allwood, 1984; Perkins and Martin, 1986; Rizzo et al., 1987; Woods,
1984).
The gradual breakdown view also pinpoints the need to model
human performance at the scale of behavior relevant to helicopter
missions in order to capture the interactions among such fundamental
cognitive processing categories as how information gathering inter-
acts with diagnosis, hypothesis generation and evaluation interact as
evidence comes in over time, and how plan adaptation and repair in-
teract with diagnosis and monitoring activities. Unfortunately, little
research in cognitive psychology has addressed these interactions.
Directions in Error Modeling
What follows is a broad menu of the potential strategies that a
prospective error modeler currently can choose to begin to identify or
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predict error-prone points. To use any of them for error modeling or
prediction presupposes some psychologically based error taxonomy
(cf. Rasmussen et al., 1987).
One possible approach is the use of computational technology
to amplify a human error expert's search for error-prone points in
a person-machine system. This can be done by using knowledge
about the sources of, and contributing factors to, known categories
of error as the basis for building one type of "error identification"
system. Such a system would be directly analogous to systems that
attempt to identify human errors on line as part of intelligent support
systems (e.g., Hollnagel, in press; Rouse et al., 1987) except that it
would not be monitoring the behavior of actual pilots. Buliding such
a system is possible in principle, but a variety of major research
hurdles exist. First, building systems that recognize errors made by
a person during task performance has proven very difficult. Such
systems tend to be based either on domain-specific criteria of what
is good performance or on very simple error categories that can
be defined through syntactic criteria (for example, simple execution
errors in discrete tasks such as omissions, reversals, repetitions).
Second, building an error identification system for the evaluation
of person-machine system designs involves identifying error-prone
points off-line, when there is no pilot actually performing the task.
As a result, this is not a promising avenue.
Related to this is the idea of a doctrine tester, where one builds
a computer simulation that attempts to respond to domain incidents
based only on an implementation of the available doctrine, standard
operating practices and procedures for handling different situations.
In other words, the preplanned routines are actually programmed.
By running the plans through a wide range of demand situations,
one can identify gaps in the preplanned guidance and characterize
the kinds of knowledge and processing necessary to span those gaps.
The rule-based programming technology needed to make this strat-
egy practical is available today, and this approach should be the
minimum standard in design. The main investment required is the
customization of the required computational technology to increase
the productivity and reduce the cost of executing this approach (but
see Corker et al., 1986).
Another possible approach is to extend techniques for evaluat-
ing the complexity or difficulty of a task. For example, Kieras and
Polson have used production system based task simulations to de-
velop a complexity/usability metric for some basic human-computer
a
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interaction tasks (Kieras and Polson, 1985; Polson, 1987). A par-
ticular person-machine system is represented within the simulation
and run through various situations. The outcome is a measure of
cognitive complexity (e.g., the working memory load and the num-
ber of rules invoked to accomplish the task). This approach has been
demonstrated successfully for evaluating simple human-computer in-
terfaces, when error-free performance is assumed. One could try to
extend it to errors if errors are assumed to be monotonically related
to the complexity or difficulty of the task. Error prediction would
be indirect: the more complex the human-computer interaction, the
greater the error potential. However, an extension of this approach
to errors is not without its difficulties. First, the assumption that
models of error-free performance transfer to cases in which errors can
occur is highly questionable. Second, building a complexity metric
that would apply to the scale of tasks involved in helicopter mis-
sions goes well beyond what has been developed to date for simple
human-computer interfaces. Finally, the difficulty, approach provides
no w of specifying the forms of errors to be expected in particular
situations.
Another simulation-based approach to error modeling is to set
up or constrain cognitive simulation by knowledge of how cognitive
processing can contribute to errors (e.g., limited resources, control of
attention, descriptive error forms) and b y a model of the problem-
solving environment that limited-resource problem solvers must con-
front (e.g., doctrine, incident evolution, complicating factors). The
analyst then varies the knowledge resources and processing char-
acteristics of the computer problem solver to represent the actual
or hypothetical situation to be investigated, for example, different
strategies for coping with high workload. The computer problem
solver is used to see what specific performance failures (unsatisfac-
tory mission outcomes) occur across a variety of domain scenarios.
If the knowledge organization and processing characteristics of the
computer problem solver can be varied in psychologically meaning
ful ways and if the effects of external resources can be mapped into;
the program's resource settings, then the computer problem solver's
performance failures are hypotheses about errors people will com-
mit given the same resource and demand conditions. In this w•ay,
a bridge can be built between psychological knowledge and domain
consequences (cf. Woods et al., 1987).
Consider the cognitive simulation of experienced medical diag-
noscicians that Johnson a-sl his colleagues (Johnson et al., 1981.
L
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1983; Thompson, Johnson, and Moen, 1983) have built. The com-
puter problem solver has processing mechanisms to call to mind a
subset of potential hypotheses (hypothesis generation), to test for
expectation violations, to evaluate plausible hypotheses, and to re-
vise its diagnosis as more evidence is examined based on analyses
of expert performance (the first version of this system was called
DIAGNOSER; a more recent system is called Galen). Johnson and
his colleagues compared the computer problem solver's performance
and errors to those committed by experienced diagnosticians on prob-
lems designed to be fixation prone. They found that the computer
problem solver and human diagnosticians committed many of the
same descriptive error forms. One class of errors occurred in hy-
pothesis generation and included failures to call to mind the correct
alternative from the space of potential hypotheses that could account
for the currently perceived pattern of evidence. Another shared error
form was that of revision errors in whirh both the computer problem
solver and experienced diagnosticians were unable to shift from a
highly plausible, but incorrect, initial hypothesis to the actually cor-
rect hypothesis. The system also exhibited breakdowns in hypothesis
evaluation that matched errors committed by experienced people.
Johnson and his colleagues also changed the processing/knowledge
resources of the computer problem solver and were able to control
whether it was fixation prone or fixation resistant.
N\%oods et al. (1987 ), are in the process of building and test-
ing a similar system explicitly designed to capture a wide range of
descriptive error forms and the factors that affect limited resource
problem solving. This system is called cognitive environment simula-
tion and is bawd on Pople's work in medical problem solving (Pople,
1982, 1985). The system is designed specifically for error analysis in
dynamic, highly doctrinal worlds (the initial application is human
performance in nuclear power plant emergencies).
This approach to cognitive simulation is based on the limited
rationality view of human error and its corollary that the source
of errors is demand-resource mismatches (e.g., Rasmussen, 1986).
The computer problem solver allows an analyst to examine how de-
mands (the kind of problem, such as multiple interacting factors, goal
competition, missing evidence) and resources (the dynamic flow of
information from the domain, knowledge about the domain, process-
ing strategies for coping with high workload, control of attention, and
diagnostic search) interact as the problem evolves. The Johnson et
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al. studies and the Woods et al. system show that this approach is vi-
able given today's computational technology and state of knowledge
of errors. Furthermore, it is the only approach that helps to predict
the form of errors tb may occur (aad, therefore, to suggest ways
of reducing error), which call hope to capture how person-machine
system characteristics affect performance and can translate from the
psychological world to consequences for ,:omain behavior (and vice
versa). Current experience with the cognitive simulation strategy
also reveals large gaps in our knowledge of how different cognitive
activities interact in complex task worlds and of the mechanisms
that give rise to errors. The cognitive simulation approach, however,
allows designers to take advantage of what is known at this time and
provides a structure or framework model that can evolve as more is
learned about human performance and error.
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Modeling Decision Making
For System Design
BARUCH FISCHHOFF
Judgment is needed to extract information from an uncertain
environment. Decision making is needed to extract a course of action
from those judgments in order to achieve some goals. The judgments
that a person-machine system's design must support include: Where
are we in the process? Is this instrument reading reliable? What
does that display mean? Did I hear those instructions correctly?
Do I remember my own plans? Is this an example of a Type Y
contingency? Have others heard me? What will happen if I try to
ride out this problem?
The decisions facing a system's operators include: What is the
best plan for this task? Should I treat this as an emergency situation?
If so, how? Should I trust the maintenance that has been done on the
system? Should I override the on-line computer's recommendations?
How should I describe my situation to others?
Systems used in military operations must support additional
judgments and their associated decisions. For example, will my
helicopter be seen if I pop up to survey the terrain, and is it worth
that risk to establish my location? Also, what does doctrine say to
do in this kind of situation, and how can I do something that makes
more sense to me under these circumstances, while still being able to
defend my actions?
Most organizations attempt to eliminate the guesswork from
such judgments and decisions. They want to make life easier for
their personnel, reducing their mental workload and allowing them to
focus on leadership, innovation, and implementation. Organizations
prefer to examine situations carefully at the planning stage, rather
than hurriedly at the action stage. They want their operators' actions
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to be predictable, for the sake of central control and for the sake of
other operators who depend on them.
Unfortunately for these desires, there are limits to planning.
Some contingencies cannot be anticipated at all. Particularly in
military domains, those who prepare surprises must also be prepared
for them. In other cases, while the general outlines of a contingency
may be anticipated, there may be so many variants on that general
theme that an operator cannot be expected to learn the precise
response to every one of them. In still other cases planners and
operators may disagree about what works. Even when planning is
perfect, there is no guarantee that operators will diagnose an actual
situation quickly and accurately enough to access and implement
the appropriate plan. Whenever uncertainty remains, judgment is
needed to interpret the situation and to convert that interpretation
into an uncertain decision, or gamble.
How people make decisions under conditions of uncertainty has
been an active area of research for about 35 years, with some longer
historical roots (Edwards, 1954, 1961; Fischhoff,1987; Levi and Abel-
son, 1983; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986). That research offers
a number of tools and perspectives on modeling operator perfor-
mance. These include methods that might be incorporated in system
design (including computer-aided design), methods that might be
used to test the limits of person-machine systems, and methods that
might make operator behavior more model-like and more optimal.
WHY DECISION MAKING SEEMS EASY TO
MODEL—SOMETIMES
Research into behavioral aspects of decision making arose from
the axiomatization of decision theory by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1947), Savage (1954), Wald (1948), and others. Psychologists
(and also, for a time, economists, philosophers, and others) asked
whether people actually conformed to the rules of behavior prescribed
by decision theory as representing rationality. To a first approxima-
tion, people did, in many of the laboratory experiments conducted in
the 1950s and 1960s. The decisions that subjects reached were close
to those that followed from applying decision theory to the exper-
imental tasks. This was encouraging evidence for mainstream U.S.
economists who assume the descriptive validity of decision theory
when modeling behavior in marketplace situations, where tests of
people's decision-making processes are more difficult than in the lab.
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Unfortunately, this "victory" proved to be a mixed blessin g, for
several reasons that emerged over time. One such reason is that
the sort of model posited by decision theory is a powerful predictor
of input-output (or stimulus-response) relations even for underlying
processes that follow rather different rules (Dawes, 1979; Goldberg,
1968). As a result, predictive accuracy provides only weak assurance
that people have, in fact, followed the rules of rational decision mak-
ing in the experiment (and, hence, might be expected to follow those
rules in less constrained situations). A second reason for concern
is that many experiments are designed in a manner that makes it
uniikely for sensible subjects to behave in a manner that deviates
greatly from rationality, whatever rules they are actually using. As a
result, behavior there says little about behavior in less constrained,
real-world situations, where the opportunities for suboptimality (not
to mention outright folly) are much greater.
A third reason for disappointment is that real-world situations
are also a lot more complicated than laboratory situations, which
involve, more or less, just the subject wrestling cognitively with a
stylized set of considerations. In the real world, various other factors
can encourage more or less optimal behavior (e.g., previous trial-
and-error experience, social pressure, advice, advertising). This also
means that it is much harder to identify the "effective stimulus," in
the sense of the set of facts and values that an individual is combining
in order to identify the best possible course of action.
It is hard to study simultaneously how someone construes a
situation and how that is translated into action. Laboratory stud-
ies have typically resolved this methodological dilemma by creating
tasks, such as choosing among gambles, in which the salient elements
(i.e., the possible gains and losses, subjects' goals) are easily identi-
fied and require no interpretation. Such designs allow investigators
to focus on the processes by which decisions are derived. In life,
though, there are often many cues potentially commanding atten-
tion, each subject to multiple interpretations. Moreover, people may
be choosing among a variety of alternative goals.
Faced with this richness, economic analysts have adopted the
complementary research strategy. They assume the decision-making
process, namely, that people follow the rules of rational inference,
and then work backward to determine how people have interpreted
the decision problem (i.e., what goals they have chosen to optimize).
The difficulty with this strategy is that it affords little opportunity to
test the underlying assumption of optimality. With some ingenuity,
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it is possible to identify some set of goals that people have optimized,
especially when there is also considerable freedom to guess at how
they have interpreted the facts of the problem (Fischhoff and Cox,
1985).
Some constraints to this potentially tautological research strat-
egy come from auxiliary assumptions that limit the set of possible
interpretations of behavior. Thus, it is often assumed that decision
makers (e.g., marketplace consumers) interpret the statistical infor-
mation that they observe accurately and that their decisions are
insensitive to any features of stimuli which have no representation
in decision theory. Unfortunately, behavioral research in the last 20
years has documented many ways in which people misperceive statis-
tical information or respond to seemingly irrelevant reformulations
of problems (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1980; Kahneman,
Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Turner and Martin, 1986). These findings
have been theoretically productive, in the sense of stimulating re-
search to account for particular patterns of suboptimal behavior. In
some cases, they have been accompanied by "error theories," show-
ing just how sensitive certain classes of decisions are to particular
errors (von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1982). They have yet to be
complemented by procedures for predicting how people will construe
decision problems for which varied interpretations are possible (Fis-
chhoff, 1983).
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODELING OPERATOR
PERFORMANCE
If one knows how operators have interpreted a situation, then it
is often reasonable to assume optimality when predicting their be-
havior. Optimizing models have, therefore, an important place in the
repertoire of system designers and modelers. In addition to providing
possibly relevant predictions, such models force explicit considera-
tion of the informational environment faced by operators attempting
to make specific decisions: What cues are out there, where they are
taken from, how easily are they accessed, how they should be in-
terpreted, and how they should be combined. Designers committed
to being user centered still need ways to focus their attempts to be
sensitive. Formally modeling the decisions that operators should be
making is one such way, even if those models are not held to be
descriptively valid.
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Adopting the operators' perspective in such a detailed way might
reveal design problems that would escape less rigorous analyses. For
example, it might show cases in which vital cues are ambiguous,
needlessly redundant, poorly positioned, or scattered in ways that
frustrate quick integration. Done properly, modeling should reveal
the relative informational value of different cues (Raiffa, 1968), show-
ing perhaps what cues bear watching in confusing situations, what
cues might be relegated to subordinate displays, and what cues would
benefit most from greater precision in how they are estimated or dis-
played.
The computational complexity of such a model might also pro-
vide a rough indication of the operators' mental workload, by assum-
ing that the mental manipulations used by operators in achieving
rationality are analogous to the formal calculations in the model.
One striking feature of many models that assume optimality is the
enormous complexity of the computations that people are supposed
to do in their heads (not to mention their implied sophistication in
knowing how to set up their work). Such modeling might help design-
ers to estimate how much workload could be reduced by simplifying
operators' decision-making tasks. For example, operators might be
instructed to ignore particular cues in some situations or to combine
them in less complex ways. These same models should also allow
estimating the effects of simplifications on the optimality of opera-
tors' decisions. As a result, designers should have the basic inputs
for identifying "best buys" among simplicity-optimality trade-offs
(Johnson and Payne, 1985).
Using rational models to estimate mental workload assumes not
only that operators identify the optimal course of action, but also
that they do it by something similar to the process described by the
models. However, even when people do the right thing, they may have
followed other processes, which impose other workloads. Training
may enable them to recognize a complex pattern of cues as calling
for a particular response, with little deliberation at all. Conversely,
they may come upon correct responses through a cumbersome rule-
based process that circumvents the need for analytical thinking. In
such cases, more behaviorally realistic models are needed for assessing
the difficulty of decision-making processes (Bettman, Johnson, and
Payne, 1986; Huber, 1980).
Whatever model is used for the process, it must focus on the con-
crete stimuli observed by operators and consider the real problems of
observing, interpreting, and integrating them. Otherwise, modeling
,
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becomes an exercise in operations research, rather than in human
factors. Not only are the predictions likely to be inaccurate, there
also will be little chance to identify design problems, which requires
both admitting the possibility of problems and looking at the reality
that operators actually face. Staying in the realm of the abstract will
also obscure which real-world features cannot be expressed in formal
terms, as well as the difficulty in finding the real-world equivalents
of formal expressions. The ease with which formal models are gen-
erated and elaborated by those fluent in modeling may make flight
from reality breathtakingly easy.
Those seeking fluency in modeling need familiarity with the
kinds of models that are available and help in matching real situ-
ations to abstract models. Using the wrong kind of model dooms
design efforts. Thus one of the most valuable things that an interac-
tive computer-aided design (CAD) system could do is help a designer
diagnose a situation as one in which the operator must perform a
value-of-information analysis (for which the task is identifying the
information source expected to contribute the most to decision mak-
ing or determining whether there is any value to gathering additional
information). The system could then lead the designer stepwise
through the creation of such a model, perhaps even providing some
reminders about its assumptions and limitations.
Decision making is not just a matter of interpreting informational
cues. It also involves exploiting that information to achieve particular
goals. Formal modeling requires explicit recognition of an operator's
goals and of the trade-offs among them. That effort may reveal
unclear or conflicting goals. The attempt to resolve these goals
may prompt greater organizational self-awareness, or it might upset
the entire modeling effort, when the organization cannot face or
admit publicly to its values (e.g., the relative importance of life and
property, or of the lives of different individuals).
Attempts to apply decision theory (e.g., in the form of cost-
benefit analysis) to public decisions involving risks to life and safety
frequently run afoul of charges that such cold calculations are im-
moral, taking the theory beyond its range of sensible application
(Calabresi, 1970; Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, and Keeney,
1981; Lowrance, 1976). The customary countercharge is that such
trade-offs are implicit in any decision involving those stakes; as a
result, it is best to face and make them deliberately. Even when the
logic of this argument proves persuasive, there is no guarantee that
system designers, operators, or senior organizational officials will be
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able to make those hard trade-offs in a coherent fashion. Indeed, a
growing literature shows people's evaluations for novel value ques-
tions, mixing barely commensurable consequences, to be unstable
or labile, easily buffeted by nuances of how the question is posed.
(Fischhoff et al., 1980; Hogarth, 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1981;
Turner and Martin, 1986). Such problems may strain the credibility
of decision theory, even when they are within its formal range.
One final psychological limit to using formal decision theory, or
any formal theory, to model behavior arises from experts' abilities to
describe the environment they are attempting to model. Knowing a
lot about an environment is no guarantee of being able to express that
knowledge in the terms of a particular modeling language (Fischhoff,
in press). A CAD facility ought to incorporate the best available
techniques for eliciting information from technical experts (National
Research Council, 1983).
MODELING WITHOUT OPTIMALITY
Economists, operations researchers, and others are fond of as-
suming optimality when they model behavior for several reasons.
One is that it is hard for those who know how to solve a problem
to empathize with those who do not; thus, optimality seems reason-
able. A second reason is the observation that people clearly make
sensible choices in many situations (e.g., when to cross the street,
which grocery goods to purchase), although it must be admitted that
such choices may re°ect the exercise of specific learned habits, rather
than the result of applying general decision-making principles. A
third reason is that optimizing models are extraordinarily tractable
analytically, allowing treatment of both individuals and collectives.
For example, much macroeconomics would falter if microeconomics
could not promise that individuals and firms are successful profit
maximizers in their economic behavior.
Although it has been the topic of much debate, the question
of whether people are optimal or suboptimal decision makers has
no simple answer (7ungermann, 1985). Anecdotally, one can point
to examples of either kind of behavior. Analytically, any observed
behavior can be interpreted in quite different ways, showing different
degrees of apparent wisdom. Presumably, performance varies with
individuals and with tasks.
Those investigators willing to entertain the possibility of subopti-
mal behavior have adopted several research strategies, with different
282	 MODELING DECISION MAKING FOR SYSTEM DESIGN
implications for system design. Some have assumed that people use
an optimizing decision rule but apply it to a suboptimal set of in-
puts. For example, people might ignore certain considerations (e.g.,
long-term consequences of their actions), estimate others imprecisely,
or even show systematic biases (e.g., exaggerate some probabilities,
underestimate the importance of some consequences). There is ex-
tensive literature documenting foibles of these types (e.g., Fiske and
Taylor, 1984; Kahneman et al., 1982; Nisbett and Ross, 1980).
This approach preserves the analytical tractability of the opti-
mizing models, but requires an empirical effort to establish what
inputs decision makers are actually using. For decisions that are
already being made, intensive concurrent or retrospective question-
ing might reveal what factors have been considered (Beach, Townes,
Campbell, and Keating, 1976; Blackshaw and Fischhoff, 1988; Bouw-
man, Frishkoff, and Frishkoff, 1987; Furby, Fischhoff, and Morgan, in
press; Kunreuther, Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slovic, Bork-in, and Katz,
1978; Svenson, 1979). When systems are being designed, one must
anticipate how operators will interpret novel situations. Those pre-
dictions might be based on performance with related systems already
in operation, on tests with prototypes of the planned system, or on
general behavioral principles (e.g., people tend to underestimate the
time needed to execute plans). With rich situations, it may be much
more difficult to determine what cues people attend to than how
accurately they perceive those that they do notice.
A second approach to modeling suboptimal behavior assumes
that people use an orderly decision rule, not just the one prescribed
by decision theory. (The inputs to this rule may or may not be
accurate and comprehensive.) That rule might be a rational one,
not simply the one dictated by the situation. For example, there
is a large field of study (Feather, 1982) devoted to fitting simple
expected utility rules to various decisions having a small set of salient
consequences that seem likely to be shared by most decision makers
(e.g., decisions about careers, about health behavior). Although
such rules are formally defensible, they seem overly simple for the
problems to which they are applied.
Alternatively, the rule might be one with descriptive, but not
normative, validity (Payne, 1982). That is, it is meant to represent
how people do make decisions, but not necessarily how they should.
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) "prospect theory" is an example of
this genre currently receiving considerable attention. Although it,
too, computes an expectation, the decision rule of this theory uses
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a different set of primitives than the comparable rule in decision
theory. In addition, before the rule is applied, options are simplified
through an "editing" process which transforms them in ways that
have no representation in normative decision theory. As with the
expected utility rule, applying prospect theory's rule in real-world
situations requires a detailed and potentially difficult specification of
how decision makers have interpreted their surroundings. Success-
ful application of such models means being able to predict reliably
behavior that is acknowledged to be inappropriate.
An approach to modeling suboptimality that is even less orderly
views decision making as the result of applying deterministic rules,
such as "do what we've always done," "do what others do," "do as we
were told," "nothing ventured, nothing gained," "no price is too high
for safety," "zero defects," "a bird in hand is worth two in the bush,"
or "ask Ed about these things." Certainly, people's explanations
of their decisions are often summarized in such rules. The appeal of
such rules as justifications to others presumably means that they have
some appeal to decision makers as guides to action. Invoking such
simple rules suggests that people have analyzed their decisions only
cursorily. However, these rules could merely be handy, defensible
summaries in situations where lengthier accounts are inappropriate.
Alternatively, they may be invoked as a way of selecting among the
options remaining after a more thoughtful analysis has eliminated
clearly inferior ones.
Although these rules are simple, their application probably is not
(for both those who use them and those who study their use). A great
many rules might be invoked in a given situation. Each may have
several interpretations. There is no obvious way to reconcile conflicts
between them if more than one is evoked. Perhaps because of this
messiness, there is relatively little systematic knowledge about such
rules. A further complication for investigators is that the study of
rules requires thinking about the substantive properties of concrete
situations, rather than about the formal properties of abstract ones,
the natural content of decision theory. The effect of deterministic
rules on the optimality of decisions might be studied with techniques
akin to those used to study the effects of simplifying heuristics in
operations research. The question of when are they applied remains.
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MAKING BEHAVIOR MORE MODEL-LIKE
Any model that presumes suboptimal operator behavior might
make the designers of a system (and their employers) nervous, even if
it could be shown that a suboptimal procedure often produces fairly
good decisions at a modest expenditure of decision-making effort
(Williamson, 1981). A natural response to problems is trying to fix
them. One type of fix is to replace the fallible component, in this case
the human decision maker. One type of replacement is automating
the decision-making function. Unfortunately, not all decisions can be
automated. Some cannot be anticipated. Others cannot be modeled
by decision theory. Still others require a human hand (or mind) to
generate the commitment needed to implement them (e.g., in military
or sales campaigns). When many decisions are automated, one must
still worry that the reduced role left to the operators' discretion will
lead to deskilling or disengagement, reducing their ability to "get
back in the loop" when distinctly human interventions are needed
(Sheridan and Hennessey, 1985).
A second natural response to problems is changing the system's
design so as to facilitate decision making and remove possible sources
of error. As mentioned earlier, decision theory models can help iden-
tify the critical cues for decision making and the degree of precision
required in each. Those analyses could, in turn, direct the position-
ing and design of displays, so that operators can spot the important
cues most easily and get the right amount of detail on each. When
decisions demand multiple cues, integrative displays could be de-
signed, in order to reduce the mental workload required for their
combination (at the possible expense of forcing operators to learn
about novel composite cues). If cues tend to be misinterpreted, then
care can be taken to avoid inadvertently misleading operators. For
example, di; ,flays ;.night instill too much or too little confidence in
the informatiun that they report (and, conversely, in the uncertainty
surrounding those reports).
A less obvious part of the design involves the decisions them-
selves. Some decisions are just hard to make. These include ones
with conflicting or ambiguous goals and ones with ill-defined option
spaces. Looking closely (and sympathetically) at operators' tasks
may reveal situations requiring clearer directives, which the organi-
zation might be able to supply and explain. A close look at a mass of
options might reveal some way of reducing it to a set of more man-
ageable ones (e.g., Fischhoff, rurby, and Morgan, in press), or it may
be advisable to restrict the number of options that can be considered
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to ensure that the remaining ones are considered thoughtfully. Sim-
plifying tasks should improve performance and predictability, it the
price of foregoing refinements.
A third response to human problems is human improvement.
Training operators to identify and execute the prescribed responses
in anticipated situations is part of the design for most engineered
systems. The more comprehensive that training is, the fewer situa-
tions there will be that require decision making. The operators' ,job
then becomes, first, to determine what situations have arisen and,
then, to implement the appropriate solutions. Their success can be
predicted, in part, by assessing the diagnostics of the cues available
for identifying situations. Success might be improved somewhat by
designs and training that helped them to match the concrete patterns
of cues observed in the world with the abstract patterns described in
plans.
Where decisions still must be made, operators need the raw intel-
lectual skills for independent decision making. Studies of the limits
to people's judgment and decision making have typically sought ways
to reduce those limits. That literature provides a point of departure
for training in decision making as a generalized skill (Beyth-Marom,
Dekel, Gombo, and Shaked, 1985; Janis and Mann, 1977; Kalineman
et al., 1982; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunde, 1983; von Winter-
feldt and Edwards, 1986). Those skills include being able to discern
the logical structure of decision-making situations, to access one's rel-
evant knowledge (in memory), to assess the limits to that knowledge,
to make unpleasant trade-offs, to control one's emotions, to evaluate
past experiences fairly, and to balance such diverse considerations in
one's head.
These general skills are needed if operators are to think their
way through to situation-specific decisions, rather thanjust follow
orders or apply known solutions. However, even though these skills
are general, their application may be context dependent. Thus, for
example, weather forecasters are outstanding at assessing the Em-
its to their own knowledge with respect to precipitation, without
necessarily showing equal facility at confidence assessment for other
tasks (Murphy and Winkler, 1984). Thus, in assessing any skills,
it is important to recognize their limits. That means, among other
things, expecting a reduction in skills, at least initially, when opera-
tors are shifted to a new task or when their task changes under them.
One common threat in highly engineered systems is the continuing
introduction of changes in the system, in the attempt to remedy
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imperfections. Although the operator's task may be unchanged for-
mally, its quirks may have changed and, with them, the validity of
the operator's predictions of system behavior (and of the behavior of
other operators).
TESTING THE LIMITS OF DECISION MAKING
Although one hopes and designs for optimality in decision mak-
ing, there are many reasons to doubt that it will be obtained. Often,
the tasks are complex, the time for execution is short, and the op-
timal solution algorithms are unfamiliar (or even nonexistent). In
such situations, it is incumbent on designers, operators, and organi-
zations dependent on them to know the limits of decision making.
Srch knowledge can show designers where to design around opera-
tors. It can show operators where to mistrust their own intuitive
thought processes and, instead, to seek guidance or rely on standard
solutions. It can show system managers something about what prob-
lems to expect, allowing them to allocate resources and prepare for
surprises.
Confronting the limits to decision making might express itself in
a number of ways. One is reduced expectatio_2s regarding operators'
performance, affecting both how their decis.ons are evaluated and
what reign they are given in selecting options. It is a false freedom
when operators are told to exercise discretion without being given
adequate decision support. A second possible expression is greater
attention to decision-making skills in training (e.g., simulator exer-
cises focused on decision-making processes; coursework focused on
intuitive decision-making processes, rather than on decision theory).
A third possible expression is reduced faith in models that assume
optimality, either as descriptions of operator performance or as pre-
scriptions of preferred actions. Admitting to a limit in what can
be modeled might change somewhat the balance between computa-
tion and improvisation within an organization, perhaps increasing
the latitude afforded operators in deciding what to do and when to
override model recommendations.
Although much progress has been made in studying and model-
ing decision-making behavior, that research has not yet been applied
systematically to designing engineering systems in ways that are sen-
sitive to the strengths and weaknesses of both human decision makers
and optimal decision theory (Hollnagel, Mancini, and Woods, 1986;
Woods and Roth, 1986). Its application would require individuals to
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be knowledgeable about both the range of available optimal models
and the research into suboptimal behavior (as well as about the sys-
tems being designed). It would also require additional research into
topics such as how well (various) people can describe different kinds
of operator behavior, how individual decision making is changed by
being embedded in group or organizational settings, what price is
paid (in terms of optimality) for relying on simplifying heuristics,
what the mental workload associated with different rules is, how
the benefits of modeling can be enjoyed without sacrificing off-model
considerations, how the ability to generate decision options can be
encouraged and modeled, and how general organizational goals can
he made meaningful to operators fared by specific situations.
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Knowledge Elicitation and Representation
DEBORAH A. BOEBM-DAVIs
Most pilots seek to maintain their aircraft within an opera-
tionally safe envelope. To accomplish this, they must successfully
perform a number of tasks (Chambers and Nagel, 1985), such as
• executing flight procedures,
• planning and replanning flight mission goals,
• monitoring flight progress,
• planning and executing corrective actions,
• maintaining air-ground-air communication, and
• diagnosing system malfunctions.
These tasks all require that the pilot have some sort of internal repre-
sentation of the environment. This representation must include both
declarative knowledge, such as facts and characteristics associated
with aircraft and flight, and procedural knowledge about how to use
various systems and how to perform certain tasks (Roske-Hofstrand
and Papp, 1986).
Several issues arise with regard to these representations. The
first is how to determine the contents of this representation. The
second is how to represent the information contained in these various
cognitive structures. Finally, there is the impact of different design
decisions on the form of these representations.
KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION
Knowledge elicitation is the term used to refer to any of the
methods employed to gather data regarding what information people
have about a particular system. This process generally elicits both
procedural and declarative knowledge; furthermore, the knowledge
is elicited from a person or people who are defined as expert in
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the domain being studied. Titus, the type of information elicited is
typically about how the system works, what the system components
are, how they are related, what the internal processes of the system
are, and how they affect the system components from an expert's
point of view.
The techniques for eliciting this know]-edge include both direct
and indirect methods. The direct procedures, as their name indicates,
involve asking experts to report directly their experiences in using
a system. This can be done through interviews, questionnaires, or
verbal protocols. For each of these techniques, the responses of the
subject-matter (or domain) expert form the knowledge base of that
domain.
In interviews and questionnaires, experts may be asked merely
to describe their interactions with the system, or they may be asked
structured questions such as cause and effect queries. Using ver-
bal protocol techniques (see Learning Research and Development
Center, 1985, for a guide to performing cognitive task analyses),
the subject-matter expert "talks aloud" while either solving typical
tasks or running through simulations designed to tap a variety of
circumstances likely to be encountered in using the system. These
protocols are then analyzed by the researcher, or knowledge engineer,
and the data are translated into knowledge structures that capture
the observed information-gatliering and decision.-making strategies.
Indirect techniques include traditional experiments, simulations,
and observational studies that capture and analyze patterns of re-
sponses, such as errors or pauses. In traditional psychological exper-
iments, the effects of different manipulations are used to infer the
underlying cognitive structure. In simulation studies, simulations
of the system are developed, and results of the simulation runs are
then compared with what people do in using the actual system. In
observational studies, the responses, errors, or pauses made by the
users are collected and analyzed for consistent patterns. Many of
these techniques rely heavily on statistical analyses, such as scaling,
path analysis, and ordered trees, to discover the structure of the
infL.a_ ^; ; in the domain (for example see, Reitman and Reuter,
1980; Schvaneveldt, Durso, Goldsmith, Breen, Cooke, Tucker, and
DeMaio, 1985).
Recent research in this area has focused on building automated
(or semiautomated) tools for acquiring this expertise (see, for exam-
ple, the four-part series of special issues on knowledge acquisition
for knowledge-based systems edited by Boose and Gaines, 1987).
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Many of these tools, however, suffer from problems common to all
the knowledge elicitation techniques discussed and to the whole ap-
proach for eliciting knowledge and representing it in a knowledge
base.
Fischhoff outlined some of these concerns in a report by the
National Research Council (1983). First, he points out the necessity
of ensuring a common frame of reference between the researcher
collecting the data and the subject-matter expert. Second, he notes
the need to match the questions asked of the domain experts to their
mental structures. Specifically, he stresses the assumption of most
techniques that experts can answer any questions asked. Researchers,
therefore, do not consider the possibility of getting misleading data.
This may arise either because experts do not want to admit how they
actually accomplish their tasks or because the specific question asked
falls outside the particular person's expertise. Finally, he points out
that the quality of the information elicited must be clarified, in terms
both of how complete and accurate the expert's knowledge is and of
how biased the reports are.
This raises the question of how to validate the knowledge gleaned
from an elicitation procedure. Researchers have questioned the im-
pact of reporting biases on the part of the expert (see, for example,
Cleaves, 1987); the veridity of retrospections used by experts in
developing answers to the questions posed, and the impact of the
technique itself on the type of knowledge elicited and the organiza-
tion of that information. Tied to this is the problem of knowing what
an appropriate level of abstraction is in representing the knowledge
collected from a subject-matter expert. These considerations make
it difficult to determine whether the "correct" information has been
elicited for any given system.
Another problem arises from the conceptions of the nature of
novice-expert differences. All the techniques discussed so far are
aimed at eliciting expert knowledge from experts. These techniques
have buried in them the assumption that the differences between
novices and experts are quantitative, not qualitative. In other words,
the assumption is that what makes a person a novice is that he or
she has not yet acquired as much information as the expert.
This assumption is not universally accepted. Rasmussen (1986)
has suggested that the differences between novices and experts are
qualitative, with expert models coming closer to what is true in the
world. If this is the case, the emphasis on eliciting all the contents of
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a user's mental model may be misplaced. Rather, one should concen-
trate on what the triggering conditions are for an expert to recognize
(or diagnose) a particular situation. This would suggest that models
as sophisticated as the ones described may not be necessary; rather,
it may be preferable to get a first cut at people's understanding of the
systems they use, which could be done with small, quick investiga-
tions. Some insights into a person's expertise could also be obtained
by calibrating their general ability to use the information contained
in a tool, rather than by trying to elicit all of their knowledge about
a system.
KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION
Once the information that experts have about a system has been
captured, a way must be found to characterize or represent that
information. A number of cognitive structures have been proposed
in the past few years to describe the content of people's declarative
and procedural knowledge in a given domain.
A recent report (Carroll and Olson, 1987) proposes three basic
representations to characterize what a user knows:
1. simple sequences,
2. methods, and
3. mental models.
Simple sequences refer to the sequence of actions that must
be taken to perform a given task. These sequences are steps that
allow users to get things done. They do not require that the user
understand why the steps are being performed. Methods refers to
the knowledge of which techniques or steps are necessary to achieve
a specific goal. This characterization of knowledge, unlike simple
sequences, incorporates the notion that people have general goals
and subgoals, and can then apply methods purposefully to achieve
them. Mental models refer to more general knowledge of the workings
of a system. Specifically, mental models are defined as "a rich and
elaborate structure, reflecting the user's understanding of what the
system contains, how it works, and why it works that way" (Carroll
and Olson, 1987, p. 12). Both sequences and methods are considered
to be "task-oriented in that they contain no theory of how the system
works or what the user's actions do internally to produce the results"
(Carroll and Olson, 1987, p. G).
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Mental models, by incorporating the user's knowledge into the
representation, provide a richer framework for study. Although men-
tal models have been around for some time in the manual control
area (see Rouse and Morris, 1986, for a discussion of this issue), the
term has only recently been adopted by the cognitive psychology
community.
A somewhat more general definition of mental models was pro-
posed by Rouse and Morris (1986) in a review of research in this
area. They define mental models as "the mechanisms whereby hu-
mans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form,
explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and
predictions of future system states. This definition incorporates three
purposes served by the models: description, explanation, and predic-
tion.
Regardless of the specific definition used for a mental model,
there are a number of characteristics that the concept shares across
application domains. These characteristics have been summarized
by Norman (1983, p. 8):
• Mental models are incomplete.
• People's abilities to "run" their models are severely limited.
• Mental models are unstable: People forget the details of the
system they are using, especially when those details (or the
whole system) have not been used for some period.
• Mental models do not have firm boundaries: similar devices
and operations get confused with one another.
• Mental models are "unscientific": People maintain "super-
stitious" behavior patterns even when they know they are
unneeded because they cost little in physical effort and save
mental effort.
• Mental models are parsimonious: Often people do extra phys-
ical operations rather than the mental planning that would
allow them to avoid those actions; they are willing to trade-off
extra physical action for reduced mental complexity. This is
especially true where the extra actions allow one simplified
rule to apply to a variety of devices, thus minimizing the
chances for confusion.
Huey (1986, pp. 6-7) has extended this list to include the follow-
ing commonalities:
They are fundamentally concerned with understanding hu-
man knowledge about the world.
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• They are what people have in their minds and what guides
their use of things—they reflect a user's beliefs about the
system.
• They are not static entities having only a single form.
• They constitute an underlying understanding of how a system
works.
• They are not directly observable—they must be inferred from
overt behavior.
• They evolve naturally—through interaction with a target sys-
tem, a person formulates a mental model of that system.
• They need not, and usually are not, technically accurate, but
must be functional.
• They will continually be modified in order to get a workable
result.
• They will be constrained by such variables as the user's tech-
nical background, previous experiences with similar systems,
and the structure of the human information processing sys-
tem.
• They may include contradictory, erroneous, and unnecessary
concepts.
• They contain only partial descriptions of operations and large
areas of uncertainties.
These commonalities raise a number of difficulties for someone
trying to build a mental model of a particular system. The fact
that mental models tend to be incomplete presents the first diffi-
culty. Unless information is elicited from a number of experts, all
the information needed to develop a complete mental model is un-
likely to be available. Even if a number of experts are queried, the
possibility remains that not all of the critical information needed
to build a complete model will be elicited. Second, the fact that
models tend to be dynamic and unstable suggests that it would be
exceedingly difficult to generate a concrete, runnable representation
of an actual mental model. If the instability observed in people's
representations of systems is due to explicit, changing conditions in
the external world, it may be possible to capture that information
and represent it in the model. However, if the changes are a function
of unobservable internal user states, it may be impossible to model
the system, except perhaps as a random process. Third, because
they are constrained by a user's technical background and current
understanding of the system, mental models will be different for dif-
ferent users. This may make it difficult to construct an overall model
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that is representative either of any given individual or of the range of
people likely to use the system. Fourth, because mental models (even
for an individual) include contradictory, erroneous, or unnecessary
concepts, it will be difficult for the knowledge engineer to build an
accurate model. Where elicited information is contradictory, it is
not clear how one would choose which information to include in the
system. Fifth, the fact that models are context sensitive suggests that
even if models are built, they might be applicable only in narrowly
defined situations. Context sensitivity also suggests that the models
will have problems dealing with interactions among variables. That
is, the experts may be unable to describe the impact of these same
variables in combination with one another. Finally, the fact that
mental models are not directly observable makes them difficult to
validate. Thus, even the best knowledge elicitation procedure will be
suspect because the knowledge elicited cannot be validated.
MENTAL MODELS AND DESIGN DECISIONS
The ultimate goal behind building a concrete, complete repre-
sentation of mental models is to use them as input to other processes.
The underlying assumption is that changes in mental models lead to
changes in performance. Thus, if the impact of a design change on
the mental representation can be captured and described, the impact
of this change on performance could be predicted. As an example,
consider a design decision to present altitude information by using
a digital, rather than an analog, display. To the extent that this
change increases or decreases the pilot's ability to access altitude in-
formation quickly and accurately while flying the aircraft, the design
derision will have an impact on performance.
Full-blown, runnable systems based on this kind of analysis may
not be possible immediately. Although, a number of techniques
can be used to elicit knowledge from experts and build expert sys-
tems, few techniques are available for validating this knowledge (see
Chignell and Peterson, in press, for a discussion of this issue). Even-
tually, validation will be needed both to assess the accuracy of the
model and to determine whether information is being captured at an
appropriate level of detail. Even if such models can be described, a
problem remains. The visual models described in this report gener-
ally do not require mental models data to run; rather, they rely more
heavily on biological data. On the other hand, the cognitive models
of pilot performance discussed elsewhere in this report do not have
input slots for this type of information.
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Afterword
Do useful cognitive models exist for computer-aided design
(CAD/CAI';) facilities? The situation appears to be mixed. De-
velopments in cognitive architecture are promising. Advances in
cognitive architectures can be expected to lead to across-the-board
improvements in the ability to use human performance models for
engineering analysis and design work because they address directly
one of the main limitations—the complex interactions among sub-
systems that occur for a human engaged in any macrolevel task. For
researchers associated with one of the teams working on cognitive
architectures, these models may be useful tools.
For time-sharing and workload, practical models are available.
However, there is a trade-off between the degree of quantifiable pre-
diction achieved by models of interference and interaction, and the
level of environmental complexity and heterogeneity in which those
models are suitable.
Much is known about human working memory, but traditional
models in this area have not been developed in ways that lend them-
selves to inclusion in a computational workstation. Some recent
developments show promise, however, if the issue of integration with
models of tasks using working memory can be overcome.
There are taxonomies of errors and explanations for t hl exis-
tence of different classes of error. Certain approaches could be taken
in predicting errors, such as combining a simulation with an error
detector. These have, at least, a limited usefulness.
It is possible to extend current scenario techniques by adding
some contingency to the scenario, such as Corker and colleagues
(Corker, Davis, Papazian, and Pew, 1986) have done. This improve-
ment leverages other models dependent on the scenario building.
299
30C	 AFTERWORD
Although much progress has been made in studying and model-
ing decision-making behavior, that research has not yet, been applied
systematically to designing engineering systems in ways that are sen-
sitive to the strengths and weaknesses of both human decision makers
and optimal decision theory.
It is probably too early to apply knowledge-based modeling to a
CAD/CAE system, although work proceeding in artificial intelligence
on developing a pilot's assistant could make this possible.
Three problems arise repeatedly in the engineering modeling of
cognitive function:
o The central problem is to integrate models of diverse com-
ponents into a coherent unity that works together. Real behavior
involves a complex interaction between parts of the cognitive archi-
tecture that is difficult to address in isolated models of components.
• As with vision, there are numerous gaps among the functions
that have been modeled successfully, so there is not yet a seamless
repertory that can be drawn on automatically in any task.
The role of perception as apart of cognition (e.g., as a form of
external memory and a coinitiator of procedural activity) has yet to
be adequately attacked in technical models. The intimate interaction
between cognition and perception is not well elucidated in the models
reviewed.
In summmary, if their strong limitations are taken into account,
cognitive models can be useful for some practical CAD/CAE tasks.
Furthermore, the attempt to create a CAD/CAE facility will put
pressure on researchers to extend models in directions that are likely
to lead to interesting theoretical (e.g., overcoming integration prob-
lems) and ultimately practical developments.
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Findings and Recommendations
This chapter contains the panel's findings on the adequacy of
existing models to serve as the groundwork for a computation-based
methodology and facility for aircraft cockpit design. It also presents
the panel's recommendations for the research needed to provide a
stronger base upon which such a methodology and related facilities
can be built. The panel believes that a computationally based hu-
man factors design methodology is an important development that
will have significant impact on many types of military, industrial
and commercial Human machine systems. The development of this
methodology and related facilities should be encouraged. A stronger
base of models more specifically directed toward the problems of de-
sign is required. The panel's recommendations are intended to define
actions that NASA and other agencies might take to improve this
base and to advance the development of computation-based design
methodologies.
It is clear from the reviews in Parts II and III that the models
available to us today do not support well the goal of providing a fairly
complete simulation model of vision and related cognition. There are
too many gaps in the models, linkages that are missing, validations
that have not been performed, and, in the case of cognition, an over-
all architecture that is ill-defined. It is a disappointment, but not a
surprise, to find that the cup is not completely filled, but neither is
it entirely empty. It is also clear from these same reviews that there
are some important design questions that can be addressed with
the models that now exist. For example, questions in domains like
mission analysis, workload, visual scanning, detectability, legibility
and others can be addressed at least in part. The panel believes
that a design facility which provides model-based tools for these ad-
dressable questions has significant potential for improving the design
303
304	 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
process and resulting designs and would also serve to stimulate the
development of more complete models and better tools.
DESIRABLE ATTRIBUTES AND TYPES OF MODELS
A model is of greater use in the human factors omp! , r-aided.
engineering (IIF/CAE) facility if it has certain attributes. First, it
must be computational, either numerical or nonnumerical. Second, it
must be explicit in its inputs and outputs. These are essential if the
model is to connect to the physical reality of the environment at one
end, and to compute and deliver the concrete performance of the hu-
man at the other. Third, a simulation model is preferable to a static
analytical model of human performance for answering many design
questions. This is because the simulation model necessarily incorpo-
rates the linkage between stimulus and response and can, therefore,
illuminate the effect of cockpit design on that linkage and on perfor-
mance in situations where the human's actions have an important
effect on the operational environment. however, static analytical
models are very effective in other situations and are preferable to an
empirical description of some behavior derived from data collected in
a limited set of experiments because they allow extrapolation beyond
the measured conditions. Finally, simulation models themselves vary
in the amount of available information about human behavior and its
limitations that they exploit—ranging from normative models which
represent ideal behavior, given human and situational limitations,
to computer implementations developed to make a machine perform
some human function. Because the panel is interested in human per-
formance, a model that explicitly represents human performance is
clearly preferable to one of equivalent functionality that represents
some arbitrary machine performance.
Recommendations
The Army-NASA Aircrew/Aircraft Integration (A ll) facility
should focus on simulation models that are explicit in their inputs
and outputs for use in the HF/CAE facility but should not ignore
static analytic models.
• Where a normative model exists, it should be used. If none
exists, a descriptive model should be used to complete a simulation.
• Where a human performance model exists, it should be used.
If none exists, it is better to use a machine performance model or
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even an arbitrary computer implementation to complete a simulation
and allow some investigation of feasibility and sensitivity.
ADEQUACY OF MODELS FOR THE A3 1 DESIGN FACILITY
Many models exist, but they do not provide a complete descrip-
tion of human vision and associated cognitive performance. Models
are missing in many important areas, and there are gaps in the
models that do exist. The linkages among the models within the
visual and cognitive domains are weak; the linkages between the two
domains are weaker still. A satisfactory architecture is lacking for
human information processing which would provide the integrative
framework for these and similar models so that the needed linkages,
omissions, and gaps could be illuminated and the models made to
work together. Despite the lack of a completeness, there exist many
models that would be useful for answering important design ques-
tions and which could provide the basis for a design facility that has
the potential for significantly improving the design process.
Recommendations
Efforts should be made to strengthen the research oriented
infrastructure in government, academic, and industrial settings sup-
porting computational human performance models for engineering
design. This is critical to the long-term development of models
needed for system design.
The engineering design community in government and in-
dustry, which benefits from the development of models, should be
encouraged to support the building of the academic infrastructure,
perhaps through the vehicle of consortia.
In developing models, emphasis should be placed on working
both (1) from the top down by developing information processing
architectures that specifies general interfaces, functionality, and data
structures and (2) from the bottom up by focusing on models of spe-
cific complete subsystems (e.g., vision) that would force identification
of needed model components, linkages, inputs, and outputs.
o The development of prototype HF/CAE facilities should be
supported. Early versions of such facilities should focus on tools that
address important design questions that are based on existing models.
These prototype facilities should be tested in a design context to
determine their utility and the validity of the assumptions upon
which they were based.
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VALIDATION
Validation against human performance of the models used in
the A3I facility and of the integrated set of models is a critical and
difficult problem. Many individual models and integrated sets of
models have not been well validated against human performance
data, thus casting doubt on the correctness of the analyses and
designs based on the use of these models.
Recommendations
A3I and all other programs developing human performance
models should emphasize validation as part of their program and
plan to conduct validation experiments that compare model data
with human data.
• Validation must be a continuous effort. Validation techniques
should be built into the A3I system, where possible, and into the
processes controlling the use of the system so that a growing body of
validation results is acquired.
NEED FOR ACCESS TO HUMAN FACTORS DATA BASE
The currently available models, although useful, are not sufficient
to support the design process for a complex human-machine system
without being supplemented by other human factors information
such as experimental results, guidelines, and case histories. This
situation will exist for a long time, if not indefinitely.
Recommendations
If the A3I facility is to be a complete design facility, provision
should be made to provide access to external data bases of infor-
mation relevant to the design problem, such as experimental results,
guidelines, and case histories.
• The research community should be alerted, to the need for
the types of human factors data to make effective use of models and
should be encouraged to collect these data.
• Consideration should be given to techniques for applying such
information effectively to design problems.
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BROADER CONTEXT OF
COMPUTATIONAL HUMAN FACTORS
The A3I program, if successful, will be an important contribution
to the advancement of a computation-based design methodology.
Such methodology can have an important impact on the design of
many types of military, industrial, and commercial human-machine
systems. For this impact to be significant, results of the A 3I work
must be made readily accessible to a larger community of other
researchers and system designers, and these researchers and designers
must be able to contribute to the development of future stages of the
A3I system.
Recommendations
The A3I program should lay the foundation for participa-
tion by the larger community of researchers and designers who are
contributing to the development of computational human factors or
who might become users of the methods and models developed by
researchers in this field.
Specific consideration should be given to making the archi-
tecture of the HF/CAE system modular, to making it be from many
sources (a collection of models rather than one monolithic model), to
writing the software so that A 3I models can be distributed and used
by other researchers and designers who are likely to have access to
industry-standard professional workstations.
IMPORTANCE OF THE SYSTEMS DESIGN CONTEXT
FOR RESEARCH ON MODELS
System design and analysis have special needs and require basic
theoretical work on models that is aimed at supporting this kind
of design and analysis. These requirements differ substantially from
those that often motivate traditional academic research on models of
human performance. The system design context is a powerful vehicle
for exposing shortcomings in models and linkages and, as a result,
imposes a valuable discipline on research and development of such
models.
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Recommendations
• More emphasis should be given by the research community
to research on models to be used in systems design contexts. This
will tend to force explicitness and completeness of the models that
result.
• NASA should encourage the development of models by the
academic community for use with the HF/CAE facility and should
foster the integration and evaluation of these models in that context.
All attempts to supplement and implement models of this type should
be encouraged.
NASA should stimulate research aimed at improving the un-
derstanding of design on a small and on a large scale, of how to apply
models to design, and of how the use of models makes a difference in
design.
FOCUSING THE A 31 PROGRAM
The A3I program is potentially a very large effort at the forefronc
of a new and important design methodology. Initial effoits must be
directed at understanding and proving the system design concepts
underlying the A3I program and at demonstrating the benefits of
computational methods of human factors designs.
Recommendations
The A3 I program should first focus on a well defined test case
and attempt to determine the effectiveness of the HF/CAE concepts.
A single or small set of important questions frequently encountered
in aircraft or helicopter design and supportable by existing mod-
els should be identified. The goal should be to determine what is
required to make the HF/CAE useful. Good candidates would be
questions related to workload and visibility.
• Next, the program should assimilate a cohesive set of models
appropriate for addressing these specific questions, build tools based
on these models that are directed toward answering them, apply
these tools to a specific problem of engineering analysis and run
it co completion to develop an understanding of the difficulties of
integration and use and to demonstrate the benefits of computation-
based design, in order to prove the concepts underlying A3I.
• The problems chosen should be representative of important
design issues ,end approached in a manner consistent with current
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design practices. Analyses and results required by existing practices
should be an essential output of the HF/CAE facility.
• These problems should be approached as publishable experi-
ments with the goal of collecting reportable data (e.g., by keeping a
journal) that can communicate the manner in which each tool and
mudel is used and each design problem solved.
PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK AND A BOX OF TOOLS
A large collection of tools will be required in a successful
HF/CAE facility. Some of these tools will provide general facili-
ties useful in many parts of the design process; others will help the
designer answer specific questions, synthesize specific elements of the
design, run specific experiments, and analyze and produce specific
outputs required of the design team. The collection of tools will grow
and change over time. The HF/CAE facility should be designed as
a framework within which a heterogeneous collection of tools can be
integrated and used effectively by a design team. In addition, the
HF/CAE facility must initially fit into existing design processes and
help answer questions critical to and produce the outputs considered
important by existing design processes.
Recommendations
• Current efforts to make the HF/CAE facility a flexible frame-
work for a collection of tools should be continued and encouraged.
• The analytical tools incorporated into the HF/CAE facility
should be developed to answer specific critical questions required by
the existing cockpit design process.
• Studies of current cockpit design processes and problems
should be undertaken to define the requirements for specific tools
to be developed for the HF/CAE facility to perform specific steps
required by the design process.
